A HISTORY

OF

CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE

BY THE

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THE PROSE WRITERS

FROM ISOCRATES TO ARISTOTLE

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ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν ἅμα ταῖς τύχαις καὶ ταῖς φύσεσι λαμβάνοντος, ἐξωθοῦσα τὸ περιττὸν ἡ χρεία, κρωβύλους τε χρυσοῦς ἀφῄρει, καὶ ξυστίδας μαλακὰς ἀπημφίαζε, καί που καὶ κόμην σοβαρωτέραν ἀπεκειρε, καὶ ὑπέλυσε κοθορνὸν, οὐ φαύλως ἐθιζομένων ἀντικαλλωπίζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολυτέλειαν εὐτελείᾳ, καὶ τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ λιτὸν ἐν κόσμῳ τίθεσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περίεργον· οὕτω τοῦ λόγου συμμεταβάλλοντος ἅμα καὶ συναποδυομένου, κατέβη μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν μέτρων, ὥσπερ ὀχημάτων, ἡ ἱστορία, καὶ τῷ πεζῷ μάλιστα τοῦ μυθώδους ἀπεκρίθη τὸ ἀληθές· φιλοσοφία δὲ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ διδασκαλικὸν ἀσπασαμένη μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἐκπλῆττον, διὰ λόγων ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ζήτησιν.—PLUTARCH, *De Pyth. Oraculis*, 24.

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HISTORY

OF

GREEK PROSE LITERATURE.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

ISOCRATES.

§ 441. We turn to another leading representative of Attic prose during the earlier half of the fourth century B.C.—a representative who, with Lysias and Isæus, with Plato and with Xenophon, makes up that wonderful constellation of writers of whom Demosthenes may be considered the greatest star. Our authorities are agreed that Isocrates was born at Athens in 436, the son of Theodorus, a flute manufacturer, and of Heduto. The names of three obscure brothers and a sister are mentioned. He may have been a few years younger than Lysias, eight or nine years older than Plato. His father, being wealthy, was able to give him so good an education that he himself boasts [1] he was better known and stood higher among his schoolfellows than ever afterwards—a very credible statement, seeing that his great talent for form must have made him a brilliant and promising pupil. Among his masters are mentioned Prodicus, of whom critics have found traces in his orations, and Socrates, whom he once mentions [2] in connection with Alcibiades, without sympathy, so that the stories about his public mourning of the philosopher's death seem false; indeed, no natures could be more contrasted than those of the two men,

[1] *Antid.* § 161. [2] *Busiris*, § 5.

and the praise of Isocrates in Plato's *Phædrus*, which Socrates speaks, is evidently mere Platonic Socratism.

It is fashionable to argue that he was necessarily influenced by Socrates, because he shows a high moral tone, and was superior in philosophic culture to Lysias and the earlier orators. But this opinion [1] is based on the vulgar notion that the real sophists were Plato's sophists, and on a false estimate of the philosophy of the speech-writers, whose art consisted chiefly in concealing itself. It is not fair to say that an epideictic orator is more philosophical than a court speech-writer, except the latter has had official means of affording us a comparison. At all events, the cardinal doctrine of Socrates, that virtue is a teachable science, was not held by Isocrates, though it was eminently in harmony with the profession of education which he adopted. On this point he shares the very noble and popular view expounded by Protagoras in Plato's dialogue.

When the Peloponnesian war ruined the fortunes of his family, Isocrates was obliged to turn his good education to account, and then probably took lessons from Gorgias, whose oratory was the model he adopted and vastly improved. He is also said to have been a friend of Theramenes, a more likely intimate than Socrates, also of Xenophon, and of Archinus—whom the critics restore in Suidas' notice—a well-known patriot and speaker.

§ 442. But it is evident that his first efforts in speech-writing were not in the style of Gorgias; they were the few court speeches which we still possess, and which the orator in after years deemed so unworthy of the far higher profession which he had adopted, that he stoutly denies ever having assisted in any litigation. The consistent external evidence, as well as the internal character, is, however, too clearly against him, and commentators are unanimous in refusing credence to the author as regards the genuineness of these speeches. There is, however, another theory possible, concerning which I will speak presently, which holds all or part of these speeches to be rhetorical exercises, made on the occasion of real lawsuits, but perhaps in rivalry with the speeches really delivered, and to show what ought to have been said. This would justify Isocrates'

[1] Cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 12.

assertion. Finding himself, however, not likely to surpass his rivals in this profession—both Lysias and Isæus must always have been more in repute—he turned to the profession of education, which had become fashionable under the Sophists and Socrates, but which he endeavoured in his manifesto *against the Sophists* to put on a new basis. In this fragment we can see the programme of all his life. He endeavours to steer a sort of midway between true philosophy, such as Socrates had taught it, and the pretended science of the Sophists, who held that expertness in speaking and in debate was in reality the only thing to be learned, and in itself the sum of education. He postulates a moral basis which, in opposition both to Socrates and the lower Sophists, he thinks impossible to attain by instruction, but, for the rest, he thinks the ideas required by a cultivated man few and easily comprehended ; whereas to think them in an orderly way, and express them with elegance, is really the object of education. In fact, *le style—c'est l'homme.* In after years, when his position as a rhetorician was secured, he published some moral addresses (to Nicocles), which are on the level of the gnomic poets in thinking, and preach that vulgar and selfish piety which has not yet disappeared from Christian pulpits. But as for any criticism of received dogmas, any speculation about the nature or the destiny of man, such things are far above him. The only immortality he knows is that of fame ; [1] the only sanction, that of material rewards. He is sceptical about the popular faith, but expresses his doubts as an ignorant man of fashion, not as a serious thinker feeling after the truth.

We have, in addition to the speech *against the Sophists*, a very long *resumé*, and defence of his life and teaching, in an imaginary speech entitled (by Aristotle) *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*, concerning the exchange of property, from which, and from the *Panathenaicus*, we may take the remaining points of interest known to us concerning his life. But when he tells us that, in contrast to the fast youth of Athens, his own life had been

[1] I am aware there is an exception, or an apparent exception, in his striking remark about the Mysteries (*Panegyr.* § 28) ; but its repetition in a vague way elsewhere (*De Pace*, § 34) prevents any serious weight attaching to it.

pure and blameless, he seems to contradict certain scandalous rumours preserved in Athenæus from an epistle of Lysias, that he was attached to two famous courtesans successively. He certainly did not marry till in advanced life Plathane, widow of the rhetor Hippias, of whose sons he adopted the youngest, Aphareus. When his fame as a rhetorician brought him many pupils, each of whom stayed with him from three to four years, and paid ten minæ—a sort of university course—he acquired a large fortune, and was enrolled among the richest class of citizens. Hence his state duties were heavy, and more than once he was obliged to resist the attack of sycophants, who desired to thrust upon him an undue share of state expenses. Once (acting through Aphareus as his deputy) he was successful (B.C. 355), but a second time he was obliged to undertake the duty. He protests that though his pupils were many and famous, and his wealth greater than that acquired by Gorgias, the most successful of former sophists, it was exaggerated by report. He also urges, in reply to the suspicions and the aversion of the Athenian public, the number and celebrity of his pupils, whom he gathered about him neither to waste their time with subtle speculations of ancient sophists—probably Pythagoras and Parmenides—studies respectable in themselves, but unfitting for practical life; nor to delude them by boastful promises that, in spite of any natural wants, he could make them orators and politicians. For he exhibited in his own person the defects of a poor organisation, a weak voice, and extreme bashfulness. Hence he never could take part in public affairs, nor did he ever solicit or fill any state office.

§ 443. But he amply compensated for this, in his own estimation, by publishing pamphlets in the forms of harangues, or open letters to eminent persons, on the interests of the Greek nation. His moral essays and those upon culture have already been mentioned. It may be added that he strove to take from the term *philosophy* the high meaning which it had acquired for ever from the writings of physical and metaphysical speculators, and to confine the name to the somewhat shallow compromise between vulgar common sense and real learning which he affected. But the most important of his pamphlets are those on the national politics of Greece. He developes in

these—published during a course of forty years, during many changes and chances in the history of the nation—the same leading ideas, to which he holds with narrow and stupid tenacity. He is ever painting the sorrows and miseries of Greece through internal factions, through internecine wars, and, in his earlier days, through the unjust and tyrannous supremacy of Sparta after the defeat of Athens in 404 B. C. The only remedy for the resulting poverty, discontent, and savagery throughout Hellenic lands is an union either under Sparta and Athens, or under either of them, or under some single head such as Philip; and this is the alternative which in later years he recognised as the only possible one. But the whole profit he saw in such an union, and the main chance of its benefiting Greece, was by producing at once an invasion of Persia, and plundering its enormous wealth for the benefit of the Greeks. He exhibited a very just estimate of the Persian power, chiefly derived, it would seem, from the experiences of Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, or from Agesilaus' campaigns, and he saw that the conquest was not difficult. But when he ever indulged the hope, which became with him a sort of monomania, that the conquest of Persia would make every poor Greek rich, and every discontented one happy, so that the natural superiority of the race would find due scope for its exercise, he was totally incapable of apprehending the necessary reaction which so vast a conquest must produce upon the conquerors, and how inevitably the very culture which he taught and reverenced must alter and lower itself to embrace a vaster area. Had these natural consequences been within his vision, he would have recoiled in horror from his pet scheme, for nothing was further from his mind than Hellenism in the later sense.[1] He held indeed that culture more than race was the distinctive feature of real Greeks, but for all that, he would not have hesitated to place the most ignorant Spartan far above the most enlightened Macedonian or Egyptian. Herodotus approached far nearer to the later conception of Hellenism than Isocrates.

§ 444. Preoccupied with these notions, surrounded by distinguished pupils and friends, but treated with indifference, and I imagine with contempt, by the Athenian public, the vain

[1] The same is the case with Xenophon; cf. his *Agesilaus*, c. 7, sub fin.

rhetorician lived on to an advanced age, still thinking himself the leading political adviser of Greece, and still wondering, with amusing naïveté, that his advice, however beautifully expressed, had so little effect upon the politics of the day.

He wrote most of his Letters, his *Philip* and *Evagoras*, in old age, for though not gifted with physical vigour, his health remained excellent. In his eighty-second year he composed the *Apology* entitled περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, and began to prepare his *Panathenaicus*, or panegyric on Athens, in his ninety-fourth year, finishing it in his ninety-seventh, though he then suffered from a painful disease, which attacked him three years before. When he was ninety-eight, the battle of Chæronea supervened, and he at last saw some hope of his life-long desire being accomplished ; for Philip now stood undoubtedly at the head of Greece, and could carry out the policy the orator had recommended to him in an open letter. Isocrates accordingly addressed him another letter (the third), which was the last product of his pen, and which is particularly valuable, as giving a direct contradiction to the fables about his patriotism, his disgust at the battle, and his consequent death by suicide. For he was no political martyr, having, in fact, always postponed the liberties of Greece, about which he discoursed so much, to the realisation of his favourite schemes against Persia : he knew that an autocratic ruler was more likely to carry them out, as the result proved. But he must have died about this time.

§ 445. Thus this remarkable writer lived through three of the most eventful generations in Greek history, and though one of the most prominent writers of his time, may be said to have produced no influence whatever except upon the form of prose writing. For he was in no sense a thorough-going man. He was a curious combination of sophist and patriot, of would-be politician and philosopher, of really private and public man at the same time. The candour and honesty of his nature made him in feeling a patriot, while his want of appreciation for deeper politics prevented him from seeing the evils of despotism, or taking any thorough interest in the forms and varieties of constitutions. His bashfulness compelled him to remain in private life, while his vanity urged him to appear in public ; his profession suggested to him the study

of philosophy, while his intellect was incapable of understanding its higher problems. Thus his egregious vanity and self-complacency were perpetually wounded by the consciousness that he had, after all, not made his mark upon the age, and that, though eminent and widely respected, he was neither consulted nor obeyed by the men whom he most desired to influence. He aspired to the position of a Swift or a Junius, with the talents of an Addison or a Pope.

We shall speak of his style when we have reviewed his works. Here we have only considered the man himself, a personage in after days greatly overrated, when the study of Greek history fell into scholastic hands, but in his own day rightly estimated as merely a shallow and conceited, but personally respectable rhetorician. Into the great contemporary struggle between Macedonia and Athens, between Philip and Demosthenes, he was never admitted, nor does either side ever refer to his advices. Among the philosophical schools which then sprang into life he finds no place. Thus he lived among the most profound speculative thinkers and the most ardent politicians the world has ever seen, without either giving or receiving aught in these momentous conflicts of deeper ideas and of nobler men. Had his advices been of the smallest importance, they would doubtless have been cited both by the honest and the dishonest opponents of Demosthenes' patriotic policy, both by Phocion and Æschines, as being strongly in their favour.

He was buried in the Kynosarges, and his family monument is described in the *Life* by 'Plutarch.' The account somewhat resembles what future ages may read concerning the Albert Memorial, except that on the summit was a Siren, the emblem of the sweetness and persuasiveness of his discourse. There were, moreover, a statue of him dedicated by Aphareus at Olympia, and one preserved in the Acropolis at Athens, as a boy on horseback, and yet another made by the sculptor Leochares for Timotheus. From this latter descend the busts which still perpetuate for us the gentle and refined features of the orator.

§ 446. As to his pupils, stated to have been one hundred in number, he himself enumerates several who were honoured

by the state with gold crowns ; but this list by no means specifies the most important, Diophantus and Timotheus, distinguished generals ; Androtion, Laodamas and Lakritus, equally distinguished speakers ; and Ephorus and Theopompus, who were the leaders of the later historiography among the Greeks. These latter will occupy us hereafter. But every contemporary, not only friendly, such as Xenophon, but adverse, such as Plato and Aristotle, shows the influence of his style, which he boasts to have been imitated by all his opponents. Moreover, though his pupils distinguished themselves in every department, so that he even foolishly pretends that Timotheus' strategy was the result of his good education, it is no doubt true that careful training impressed upon them all a certain fixed type or style, which made 'a pupil of Isocrates' mean in those days the same sort of thing that is now meant when we say an 'Eton boy,' or an 'Oxford man.' [1]

§ 447. The works of Isocrates have been handed down to us in various order in our MSS., and most of those which are fixed in date come from the period of his maturity, or his later age ; indeed most of the longer orations were written so late in life as to show an increase of garrulity, and of an anxiety to be heard, as he neared the limit of his activity. But the earlier speeches, especially the court speeches and rhetorical exercises, are not dated, so that we can follow our convenience in arranging them. Two of these exercises remain, or rather an actual exercise (the *Helen*), and a letter to the sophist Polycrates concerning an exercise (the *Busiris*), which Isocrates criticises, and suggests topics for a better treatment. Both documents are extremely interesting, as they must have been to some ex-

[1] It is observed by Blass that while Plato's school shows some affinity with western Greeks, the pupils of Isocrates, if not Athenian, come from eastern or Asiatic Greece, and this he rightly ascribes to the decay of Hellenedom through the tyrants and advancing barbarians of Italy and Sicily ; while in the East Hellenic culture was gradually becoming ascendant. Indeed, in another generation, Greek eloquence came to be called *Asian*, where the excess of ornament marred the chastity of the speech of Attic orators. Hence probably the strong interest felt by Isocrates in Asiatic affairs.

tent advertisements of what he could perform, and of the principles on which he considered an encomium should be composed. As, however, he assumes (in the *Busiris*) the tone of an experienced sophist of high repute, in contrast to the recent claims of Polycrates, it is probably reasonable to date these speeches shortly before his great performance—the *Panegyricus*—or about 390 B.C.

The *Helen* is composed in rivalry to another Helen, every topic of which he professes to have avoided, while composing a better encomium. This general indication, together with the friendly tone of Isocrates towards his rival, has made many critics, old and new, regard the other extant *Helen* (Part i. p. 80) to be the piece intended. The difficulty of ascribing it to Gorgias arises from the mention of that rhetor[1] in the present speech as a negative philosopher, in a way which at first sight seems to imply that he is not the author of the rival composition. The writer of the Greek argument suggests (after Machaon) that Anaximenes of Lampsacus was the rival intended. Blass decides in favour of its being Gorgias. However this may be, Isocrates' proem is quite foreign to the subject, though very suitable if the speech was intended as an advertisement, for it opens with censure of eristic and ethical philosophers, such as Antisthenes and Euthydemus, and also of the Platonic school, who spend their time in vain subtleties. These disputations (it says) are not even original, for long since Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno, and Melissus have done all this, and done it better than their successors. Akin to these vanities was their habit (he says) of advocating paradoxes, or exalting mean topics, in order to show their acuteness. He that wrote the encomium of Helen, on the contrary, at least chose a great subject, in which it is worth while to outdo him. After this proem[2] he approaches the proper argument. It is remarkable for the realistic treatment of mythical history, which gives the speech an unreal complexion, as well as for the digression on Theseus,[3] which, though intended to vindicate Helen by the greatness of her ravisher, is expanded with an evident bid for Athenian popularity. If these seem to us drawbacks, the

[1] § 3. [2] §§ 1–16. [3] §§ 22–37.

praise of beauty is, on the other hand, very noble and poetical, and its power in story and in poetry is set forth with great elegance and profound truth.[1] The style shows all the special points of finish, to which we shall revert when we have concluded our survey of the works.

§ 448. The *Busiris* is not only a sketch of an encomium, but also an Apologia for the hero, necessitated by the admission of Polycrates, that he was a cannibal who sacrificed foreigners when they came to Egypt. The subject therefore, as Isocrates points out, is badly chosen, besides being inartistically treated by the rival sophist. The introduction is a letter to Polycrates, couched in apparently friendly terms, professing as an advanced teacher to help an ignorant beginner, by pointing him out his gross faults of composition. The advice is far too sharp to be received in a kindly spirit, and we hear that Polycrates replied by criticising the *Helen* of Isocrates. He had also published an attack on Socrates, which unfortunately is not here described by Isocrates, except that Alcibiades was declared to be the pupil of Socrates, 'a thing no one ever heard before,' and which redounded to Socrates' credit. This then should not have been mentioned in a rhetorical attack. We wonder at Isocrates' criticism, which directly contradicts both Plato and Xenophon, nor has any reasonable explanation for such a statement been offered. In this speech also there is a long digression on Egypt,[2] which dilates on the still widespread fame of Pythagoras, who had learned his wisdom there. The conclusion of the essay is almost as offensive as the proem, and asserts broadly the superior wisdom and experience of the writer, though younger in years than his correspondent. The composition is not so elegant as that of the *Helen*, though there is some fine writing in praise of Egypt.

The speech *against the Sophists* is classed by the ancients with the foregoing, *detraction* being considered the opposite of *encomium*, and therefore requiring analogous treatment. Isocrates' refutation or censure of rival rhetoricians, first for their absurd pretensions in education, secondly for the immorality of their technæ, in aiding falsehood against truth, is able and

[1] §§ 54-58. [2] §§ 11-30.

clear. His attack on the dialecticians and their subtleties, on the contrary, is the shallow talk of a mere essayist, who cannot see the just value of this philosophic training.

§ 449. Before approaching the proper sphere of the orator —his harangues on political subjects—it is well to say a word concerning the few extant court speeches, which the author disowned in later life, but which are both well attested by competent ancient critics, and have internal evidence too strong to be overcome. Thus, for example, a sentence [1] in the earliest of them, that *against Callimachus*, is copied word for word in the *Antidosis;* [2] and this Isocrates would never have done had not the original form been his own. The speech was delivered shortly after the amnesty, as the practice of arguing a demurrer (παραγραφή) before the plaintiff spoke was then quite new, and was specially introduced to meet violations of the amnesty. The legal plea of the speaker (who is the defendant in an action for 10,000 drachmæ, said to have been abstracted from the plaintiff during the troubles following upon the rule of the Thirty) was to urge the act of amnesty, as a bar to further proceedings ; but, as was always the case before Athenian juries, such legal points, however valid, must be supported by showing that the defence was a just one on its own merits. Hence most of the speech is spent in proving that the speaker had nothing to say to the loss of the money ; moreover, that his opponent was a villain and a sycophant, while he himself was a patriotic democrat. The details concerning the act of amnesty and its general observance make the speech one of historic interest. It is smoothly and gracefully written, but wants the incisiveness of the greater logographers, as well as their superior ethos or character-drawing. A certain diffuseness is also to be observed, which we should naturally expect from Isocrates.

The short speech composed for a man of the lower classes against Lochites, who had assaulted him, has the same features —too much smoothness and too many generalities, though it is very interesting in its assertion of the modern notion of *insult* as the main thing to be resented by free men, the damage done being a mere accidental consequence of an essentially

[1] § 41. [2] § 91.

unlawful act. Blass compares this speech with that of Demosthenes *against Conon*, to show how abstract and broad Isocrates' pleading is, in comparison with the force and point of Demosthenes. But the opening of the present speech, in which the facts were treated, seems to be lost.

There seems to be also a mutilation at the end of the next speech on our list, that *against Euthynous*, which has no epilogue. Its authenticity has indeed been denied by Benseler, on the ground of the frequent admission of the hiatus. But in other respects it is sufficiently Isocratic to persuade Blass and Sauppe that it is the speech which we hear the orator to have written on the subject, though the only citation from it is not found in our remaining fragment. It may be held either that it is one of Isocrates' earliest speeches, composed before the principle of avoiding the hiatus had been consistently adopted, or that he did not give it a final and careful revision. The case was one of peculiar interest to rhetoricians, and we know that Lysias composed a speech on the other side, of which only a sentence remains. But we may be sure that it was often discussed in abstract exercises, and this is, according to Benseler, the real character of the present document. The intellectual interest referred to was that of arguing a case in which no direct evidence could be procured (ἀμάρτυροι), and which was therefore to be settled on general grounds of probability, which could be urged on either side.

The plaintiff Nicias, during the troublous times of the tyranny, being threatened with persecution, had got rid of all his property by depositing it with friends, among whom Euthynous had received three talents to keep for him. When he claimed back his money, Euthynous would only admit the receipt of two. As soon as the democracy was restored, Nicias, who had been afraid to do more than protest at the time, sued for the remaining talent. There being no evidence or witnesses, the case turns on the respective characters of the litigants, and their respective opportunities for sycophancy, or for oppression, under the Thirty. From this point of view the speech is an interesting exercise. In style it seems to me more concise and brief than is usual with Isocrates.

§ 450. The speech *on the Chariot and Pair* (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους) is really, as we have it, a mere encomium on Alcibiades, whose son is defendant in an action brought for the recovery of the value of the horses, which were alleged to have been wrongfully taken from a certain Tisias. Here again the earlier part, and the proofs of the honest acquisition of the horses from the Argives, seem lost, and we have merely the epilogue answering an attack on the life and policy of Alcibiades. The similar condition of several of the speeches just described, in which we have part of the argument elaborated with only a brief reference at the opening to the missing part, leads me to suspect that, after all, Isocrates may have told practically the truth when he denied that he ever busied himself in the law courts by writing speeches. It may have been his practice, when a case of public interest occurred, such as the general validity of the act of amnesty as a bar to proceedings, or the importance of punishing even a formal assault, or the panegyric of a public man like Alcibiades, to compose by way of model for his pupils a portion of the harangue which ought to have been delivered. This case of Alcibiades must have been peculiarly attractive to the rhetors, for his life and policy were open to either praise or censure. The attack handed down to us among Lysias' speeches bears close relations to the present harangue, either as its forerunner or its reply. Both orations seem mere displays of what could be said on either side concerning a genius so brilliant, so mischievous, and so various in his fortunes. We have another longer and more genuine *encomium* of the same kind in the *Evagoras*, addressed to Evagoras' son Nicocles, tyrant of Cyprus. This family stood in friendly personal relations to the orator, and the deeds of Evagoras in holding Cyprus for years against the Persians were not only more splendid but more recent, and not alloyed by the treacheries and unstablenesses of Alcibiades' career.

§ 451. The case seems to me different in the two remaining court speeches, the oration against Pasion (τραπεζιτικός) and the *Ægineticus*, both composed for friends or pupils, *not Athenians*, and one not even for delivery at Athens. If then the above sup-

position about the other court speeches[1] be correct, we may still believe the orator that he never mixed in the quarrels of citizens, though he assisted a foreign pupil from Byzantium against the banker Pasion, who was originally a metic of no better reputation than the Jewish money-lenders who settled in the mediæval cities of Europe. The conflict is about *à priori* probabilities, not, as in the *Amartyros*, for want of evidence, but from conflict of evidence, the plaintiff alleging that he had deposited a large sum in the bank with no witness except the slave clerk, and that Pasion had even forged a subsequent document to show that he was under no responsibility; Pasion of course denying all this, and showing that the plaintiff had openly alleged his poverty and his debts at Athens. This the plaintiff confesses to have done when summoned by Satyrus, the tyrant of the Bosphorus, to return and surrender his money. The whole case gives us no pleasant picture of the commercial honesty of Athens, and of the chicanery openly alleged against important men of business. This speech is plainer in style, and more closely reasoned, than most of Isocrates' court exercises, but indeed the hiatus is so frequent that Benseler rejects it altogether. We presume from Pasion's after career that he must have either gained or settled this lawsuit, though such an inference, inevitable in our day, is not conclusive in his case, seeing that he was constantly accused of gross fraud, which he managed to tide over through the influence of powerful friends and through his wealth. Our best evidence for the genuineness of the speech is Dionysius' careful criticism of it as such.

A strong argument for the merely theoretical character of the court speeches is furnished by the last and greatest which Isocrates composed, and this in the defence of himself. It was falsely entitled *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* by Aristotle, whereas the orator, who was pained at the result of this action, conceives himself attacked as to his whole life and profession, in imitation of Socrates, and delivers this long speech as an *Apologia pro vita sua* on a capital charge. Here, then, we

[1] Havet long ago extended this view to all these court speeches, and so apparently, from another point of view, does Kyprianos. Cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 118.

have a distinctly imaginary case treated in this peculiar form. The most interesting of all the other court speeches in the collection is the *Ægineticus* on a disputed succession; but we have already delayed too long upon this lesser side of the orator's activity.

§ 452. I pass to an intermediate pair of speeches, the *Plataicus* and *Archidamus*, which are in many respects like court speeches, though the subject-matter is political, and therefore approaches the 'public advices' to which he devoted the best part of his life and art. The former is supposed to be spoken before the Athenian assembly by a Platæan speaker, when that city had been destroyed a second time by the Thebans, about 373 B.C. He appeals to the Athenians, as the advocates of justice in Greece, and as bound by peculiar ties to Platæa, to interfere, and to restore them to their city. The speech is thus very similar in subject to those inserted by Thucydides in his history, and invites special comparison with the speech of the Platæans in his third book. But though there is great pathos in the description of the misery of the exiles by Isocrates,[1] and the style is infinitely smoother and more polished, the exercise of the rhetor is almost contemptible in comparison with the burning force and deep earnestness of the historian.

The *Archidamus* is a strong appeal made by the young Spartan prince to his city not to submit to the liberation of Messene by the Thebans, and to choose the extremities of war in preference to such a national disgrace. Both Dionysius and Philostratus place this work very high in the collection, on account of its splendid expressions of patriotism, and its postponement of all lower motives to that of honour and devotion.[2]

§ 453. I will only notice three more compositions, the later two of which are only expansions, with some modifications in detail, of the first and most perfect of the orator's harangues,

[1] §§ 46–50.

[2] I see that G. Sauppe (ad Xen. *Ages.*, prol. p. 126) declares it certain that this letter is not by Isocrates, I suppose on account of its historical blunders and contradictions about the acquisition of Messene. Blass does not even suspect it.

on which his fame properly rests. This is the *Panegyricus*, a speech which might have been delivered to the assembled Greeks at Olympia or the Panathenæa, but which was actually a pamphlet, and published in a written form, as the orator was totally incompetent to declaim it like Gorgias or Lysias. The subject is Isocrates' lifelong idea, the union of all Greece under the hegemony of Sparta and Athens, for the purpose of the conquest of Asia. It was published about 380 B.C.,[1] when the disastrous results of the peace of Antalcidas were becoming manifest, and when Isocrates' Asiatic pupils were doubtless constantly bringing him details of the misery of the Ionic cities under the decaying Persian despotism. Indeed his persistent anti-Persian policy may have been stimulated by his close relations with eastern Hellas, and doubtless tended to make him very popular among the better classes through the cities of Asia Minor. The Anabasis and Retreat of the 10,000 mercenaries under Clearchus and Xenophon had lately exposed the weakness of the Persian empire, and Isocrates shows an accurate appreciation of these facts. But, along with this war policy, he justifies the claim of Athens to the hegemony of the sea by an elaborate panegyric (in our sense) of her history and her claims, which should persuade the Spartans to yield this portion of their dominion. Here he enters into competition with the ἐπιτάφιοι, or funeral harangues, which always extolled the city and its greatness, so that we are again brought to compare him with Thucydides, whose Epitaphios in Pericles' mouth goes over similar ground, in describing the national merits of Athens as a centre of culture for all Hellenedom. I do not subscribe to the judgment of Blass,[2] that there is nothing equal to this passage in Greek literature ; but I do think that Isocrates has here successfully emulated Thucydides, whether with originality, or, as his opponents alleged, by plagiarism from others, and that the

[1] There are difficulties as to exact date, owing to a statement of Diodorus about Evagoras' war, which cannot be well reconciled by those of Isocrates. Cf. the discussion of the point in Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 230; and Mr. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, ii. p. 151. Blass now (iv. 350) inclines to 384 B.C.

[2] ii. p. 241.

passage is perhaps the best in his works.[1] Of course the harangue was naught as a piece of practical politics, for a vague

[1] §§ 43–51 : Τῶν τοίνυν τὰς πανηγύρεις καταστησάντων δικαίως ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἔθος ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν ὥστε σπεισαμένους καὶ τὰς ἔχθρας τὰς ἐνεστηκυίας διαλυσαμένους συνελθεῖν εἰς ταὐτόν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας κοινὰς ποιησαμένους ἀναμνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς συγγενείας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπαρχούσης, εὐμενεστέρως δ' εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, καὶ τάς τε παλαιὰς ξενίας ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ καινὰς ἑτέρας ποιήσασθαι, καὶ μήτε τοῖς ἰδιώταις μήτε τοῖς διενεγκοῦσι τὴν φύσιν ἀργὸν εἶναι τὴν διατριβήν, ἀλλ' ἀθροισθέντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγγενέσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἐπιδείξασθαι τὰς αὐτῶν εὐεξίας, τοῖς δὲ θεάσασθαι τούτους πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγωνιζομένους, καὶ μηδετέρους ἀθύμως διάγειν, ἀλλ' ἑκατέρους ἔχειν, ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ὅταν ἴδωσι τοὺς ἀθλητὰς αὑτῶν ἕνεκα πονοῦντας, οἱ δ' ὅταν ἐνθυμηθῶσιν, ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν θεωρίαν ἥκουσι,—τοσούτων τοίνυν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τὰς συνόδους ἡμῖν γιγνομένων οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἀπελείφθη. καὶ γὰρ θεάματα πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα κέκτηται, τὰ μὲν ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλοντα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας εὐδοκιμοῦντα, τὰ δ' ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις διαφέροντα· καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰσαφικνουμένων ὡς ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥστ' εἴ τι ἐν τῷ πλησιάζειν ἀλλήλοις ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦθ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς περιειλῆφθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ φιλίας εὑρεῖν πιστοτάτας καὶ συνουσίαις ἐντυχεῖν παντοδαπωτάταις μάλιστα παρ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ἔτι δ' ἀγῶνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ ῥώμης ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἁπάντων, καὶ τούτων ἆθλα μέγιστα. πρὸς γὰρ οἷς αὐτὴ τίθησι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδόναι συναπείθει· τὰ γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν κριθέντα τοσαύτην λαμβάνει δόξαν ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαπᾶσθαι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πανηγύρεις διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου συλλεγεῖσαι ταχέως διελύθησαν, ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα πόλις ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις πανήγυρίς ἐστιν.

Φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἣ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασε, καὶ πρῶτος τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράϋνε, καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τάς τε δι' ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας διεῖλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι, τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξε, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῖς δ' ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσι, συνειδυῖα μέν, ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ζώων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες, καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν διηνέγκαμεν, ὁρῶσα δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταραχώδεις οὔσας τὰς τύχας ὥστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὖ φρονούσης ἔργον ὄντας, καὶ τούς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτῃ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρίας καὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσκομένους, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνομένους, καὶ τοῦτο σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἑκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδεδειγμένον, καὶ τοὺς λόγῳ καλῶς χρωμένους οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν

advice to Sparta and Athens, from the study of a sophist, to unite against Persia was not likely to sway public councils. The whole importance of the speech is in its splendid form, which was in fact not only far superior to any previous piece of prose, but has not been surpassed either in Greek or modern writing. It is accordingly a monumental piece of writing, and, as such, not only deserved the ten years which the author devoted to its composition, but the great attention ever since paid to it by the students of rhetoric. Minute criticism has discovered slight inconsistencies in the political attitude, owing to the long interval between the composition of various parts, and even to enlightened Athenians, not to say to moderns, the citation of mythical friendships as a reason for modern alliances, and the distortion of history for panegyrical purposes, are defects which mar the enjoyment of the perfect form in which these trivialities or falsehoods are disposed. There is, moreover, an extreme equability of flow, a smoothness of diction, a rounding of periods, which a modern orator would have varied with bolder figures of diction, with poetical quotations, or at least with that forcible terseness which was admitted even in the stricter Attic prose writing. But, with all these reservations, the *Panegyricus* is still one of the masterpieces of prose, and has perhaps more constantly influenced careful writers in Greece, in Rome, and in the Renaissance, than any other harangue which could be named.[1]

§ 454. In advanced old age, when Isocrates had long seen the fruitlessness of his endeavours to reconcile the leading states by persuasion, he found in the rise of Philip a practical hope of realising his ideas. He therefore addressed him the open letter entitled *Philip*, calling upon him to insist upon peace among

δυναμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐντίμους ὄντας. τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.

[1] The oration *on the Peace* (after the Social War, 356 B.C.) is a similar practical exhortation to union among the Greeks, suggested by the circumstances of the time.

the Greeks, and to lead them against Persia. Thus the wealth of Asia would be carried back to Greece, and ample territory would be found for all the exiled and wandering mercenaries, who were now a pestilence in the Greek world. The orator had even predicted with singular felicity in his *Panegyricus*, that the difficulty would yet be to keep the Greeks at home, a state of things which really ensued under Alexander's successors, and produced, more than any other cause, the curious and sudden depopulation of the country. Isocrates thinks that the project would have been realised by Agesilaus, had he not spoilt his prospects, and created perpetual seditions and revolutions among the Greeks, by bringing back his own friends to power, whenever they had been exiled, or subdued by the opposite party.[1]

The other side of the *Panegyricus*—the encomium of Athens—was taken up again in the prolix and tedious *Panathenaicus*, already noticed as being composed between the author's ninety-fourth and ninety-eighth years, and which, therefore, should not be criticised too severely. But in form and style even this essay could not easily be surpassed, though Isocrates often apologises for his own decay, and protests that he is now no longer able to polish and adorn his speeches as he had done in former years. From this it appears that style never became a second nature with Isocrates, as it does with most great English authors, but always remained (as perhaps with the modern French) a conscious art. His definition of culture, in opposition to the philosophers and the lower sophists, is so interesting that I will quote it. It will be noticed that he is rather averse to the popular exposition and criticism of the poets, which we often see in Plato's dialogues, and which was certainly one of the usual modes of education.[2]

[1] §§ 86–88.

[2] §§ 26–35 : Τῆς μὲν οὖν παιδείας τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων καταλειφθείσης τοσούτου δέω καταφρονεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῶν κατασταθεῖσαν ἐπαινῶ, λέγω δὲ τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους, οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδείς ἐστιν, ὅστις ἂν ἀνεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν. Ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ τοῖς ὡρμημένοις ἐπὶ ταῦτα παρακελεύομαι πονεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἅπασι τούτοις, λέγων, ὡς εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο δύναται τὰ

§ 455. A word in conclusion on the nine letters in the collection, which, contrary to the usual rule, are all admitted to be genuine by the critics. Some of these (1, 6, 8) are mere proems to political advices, and evidently published as specimens by the author. The ninth (to Archidamus) is a very elegant summary of most of Isocrates' political views, and written in his best style. Three (4, 7, 8,) are letters of recommendation, of which the fourth (to Antipater) is one of the most perfect models of what such a letter ought to be. It is remarkable that, though we find some references to his *techne*, and to clever apophthegms in his conversation, there is not a single quotation from

μαθήματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀποτρέπει γε τοὺς νεωτέρους πολλῶν ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τηλικούτοις οὐδέποτ' ἂν εὑρεθῆναι νομίζω διατριβὰς ὠφελιμωτέρας τούτων οὐδὲ μᾶλλον πρεπούσας· τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἄνδρας δεδοκιμασμένοις οὐκέτι φημὶ τὰς μελέτας ταύτας ἁρμόττειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐνίους τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθήμασι τούτοις οὕτως ἀπηκριβωμένων ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδάσκειν, οὔτ' εὐκαίρως ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις αἷς ἔχουσι χρωμένους, ἔν τε ταῖς ἄλλαις πραγματείαις ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἀφρονεστέρους ὄντας τῶν μαθητῶν, ὀκνῶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τῶν οἰκετῶν. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ γνώμην ἔχω καὶ περὶ τῶν δημηγορεῖν δυναμένων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γραφὴν τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐδοκιμούντων, ὅλως δὲ περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων. οἶδα γὰρ καὶ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔτε τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καλῶς διῳκηκότας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις ἀνεκτοὺς ὄντας, τῆς τε δόξης τῆς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ὀλιγωροῦντας, ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἁμαρτημάτων γέμοντας· ὥστ' οὐδὲ τούτους ἡγοῦμαι μετέχειν τῆς ἕξεως, περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω διαλεγόμενος· Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος· ἔπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ κρατοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἡττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως, ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὑτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις. τοὺς δὲ μὴ μόνον πρὸς ἓν τούτων ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας, τούτους φημὶ καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι καὶ τελείους ἄνδρας καὶ πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετάς.

any lost oration—a good guarantee that we possess, as in the case of Plato and Demosthenes, all that he published. There is, moreover, a long catalogue of spurious treatises ascribed to him, quoted in the anonymous *Life*. The list is printed at the end of Benseler's (Teubner) edition.

§ 456. We now turn to the closer consideration of his rhetorical theory and his style. The first question which arises is whether Isocrates ever published a formal *techne*, or handbook of the theory of oratory, as was done by almost all the composers of court speeches. The conflicting evidence has been summed up with great care by Blass,[1] who shows that, though there are several references to, and quotations from, an alleged *techne*, there is not sufficient evidence to ascribe it to Isocrates himself, who seems only to have devised special rhetorical artifices called τέχναι, collected by his pupils into a book which passed under his name. This conclusion is quite consonant with the character of his mind, which was not capable (I think) of devising a complete and logical system. He rather looked upon rhetoric, which was to him synonymous with philosophy, as a mental gymnastic, requiring, first, good natural abilities, secondly, assiduous practice, and obtaining from theoretical instruction only moderate help. He distinguished, broadly speaking, the kinds of oratory into three: dicastic, or court speeches, which he considered an inferior branch; epideictic, or harangues of display, consisting of encomia or of the reverse, and these either of mythical characters or of historical men —the latter often of use in the epilogues of court speeches; and thirdly, deliberations, or orations of advice, of which the moral exhortations to individuals (Nicocles) were of less importance, and of inferior form, being necessarily disjointed in form, like gnomic poetry. The public advices, or speeches on national affairs, were, on the contrary, the highest and most valuable result of the whole art.

In all these he considered that the elements, or factors which made up the result, the 'ideas,' as he vaguely called them, were neither many nor obscure; the whole art consisted in combining them. On this point he has only left us the most

[1] pp. 97–8. He now (iv. 343) thinks he composed, but did not publish, it.

ordinary practical hints ; he evidently trusted to constant practising, and to the imitation of the models he proposed, as the real method of learning, in opposition to the purely scientific and theoretical instruction in the school of his rival Aristotle. We can only seek his notions from the occasional statements scattered through his speeches, and quoted from his teaching by old critics. He tells us first that we should choose a noble subject, not a trivial or a paradoxical one (like the cannibal Busiris) for an eulogy. This talent in the right choice of a subject depends upon natural taste, and cannot be taught. Then he tells us that the proem is not to be too long or too short, that it must fit closely into the main subject, that the narrative must be natural, and much more of such obvious, almost trivial advice, recommending that the finest and most striking topic should be kept for the last. Again, he cautions against digressions, though his own exercises are not free from this fault. Above all, he seems to have paid great attention to making easy and natural transitions from one topic to another, an art which is perhaps nowhere more remarkably exhibited than in his speeches. He utterly scorned the formal subdivision into heads since so popular in Puritan preaching, and sought to lead the hearer naturally and without conscious effort along well considered and carefully prepared, but carefully concealed lines of argument. A hiatus or gap in passing from one topic to another was to him as inartistic as a hiatus between two adjoining vowels. He recommends greater simplicity in court speeches, where a jury is to be convinced, whereas a harangue should be as splendid as a lyric ode, that is, a Greek lyric ode, such as those of Pindar and Simonides.

As to the particular ideas, the great point is to have them perfectly new, an advice only practicable in harangues, and which Isocrates has himself violated by admitting commonplaces into his court speeches,[1] as well as by repeating himself in later years. But, on the whole, he really adheres to the precept, his Helen being a remarkable exhibition of an exercise on a trite subject, in which he boasts that he does not reiterate a single topic used by his predecessors. In the next place, the striking points must

[1] *Antid.* § 18 ; *Trapez.* § 54.

not only be suitable in length and dignity, but should be distributed equably throughout the speech. It is remarkable that in encomia, and in personal attacks, he distinctly admits and even recommends exaggeration of the truth. This feature, which he applies not only to mythical, but to recent events, was of momentous importance in injuring the historical sense, if not the moral sense, of the historians who were his pupils. I will here add, as belonging rather to the matter than the manner, that though the whole flow of Isocrates' harangues is extremely ornate, he does not admit, or admits only very sparingly, those special ornaments, such as quotations from poets, epigrams, and witticisms, which are the main stock of modern orators. Such diversions, which are almost as foreign to Demosthenes as to Isocrates, are unworthy of the solemnity and dignity assumed by most Greek orators.

§ 457. Passing from the discussion of the proper *thoughts* in a speech, upon which we can find little that is new or original in Isocrates, but rather a careful and methodical use of the rules long since suggested by the experience of his predecessors, we come to the rules for *expression.* These are of course either for words (*ὀνόματα*) or for the combination of words (*σύνθεσις*). On the former of these heads he recommends strongly the use of the ordinary vocabulary, which he calls *πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα*, and censures the use of metaphorical or strange words, not absolutely, for the style is to be polished and above common language, but in any excess, for perfect style consists not in novelties and surprises, but in the refined use of the speech of other men. This is the more praiseworthy in Isocrates, as the choice of words (*λογή*) of Gorgias and his school was very ornate and artificial. Hence Dionysius and other critics cite him as, next to Lysias, the highest model of pure Attic diction, using the simplest and best recognised terms, and even too timid in avoiding the bold tropes and metaphors so striking in Demosthenes. However splendid the subject, and however noble the diction, it is everywhere remarkable how the effect is produced essentially by the *composition*, by a careful and artistic arrangement of common terms, seldom by the use of grand and poetical words. This is indeed the secret of a great artist, which he

might teach by constant showing and correcting, never by any definite collection of rules.[1] Occasional departures from this simplicity are caused by the necessities of the case. On the other hand, so many words and combinations of words are rejected by the purism of the author, that it is easy to find in a spurious speech like the *Demonicus* numerous violations of his usage. This Benseler has done, but it ought to make the same critic hesitate in rejecting other speeches merely on the ground of the hiatus, which is a far more fallible test than the accumulation of many phrases and constructions not found in the recognised works of so very consistent and careful a stylist.

§ 458. As to the composition of the words, there are a few rules quoted from the alleged *techne*. First to avoid hiatus in utterance, which must arise if we end a word, and commence the next, with vowels. And this is only a salient instance of the great importance he attached to melodious utterance, and the avoidance of all harsh and difficult combinations of sounds. But in most of these, our ignorance of the real pronunciation makes it impossible to guess his reasons; in the case of hiatus we have a law common in French and other modern languages. This matter was first thoroughly sifted by Benseler, whose book upon it [2] is a classical work, though he overrates its importance as a test of genuineness. For the law is not absolute in Isocrates, much less in other writers, though all his contemporaries, and all subsequent prose writers, more or less conformed to it. The elision or crasis of Greek and of Latin poetry became a law for the Romance lan-

[1] Some of the instances collected by Benseler are as follows: σύν is never used separately, always μετά, a peculiarity followed by most of the Attic orators: by Lycurgus, Hypereides, and Dinarchus absolutely, by Lysias, Demosthenes, Plato almost so (cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. 127). Again, ἀποστέλλεσθαι and λέγειν only of persons, ἀναλίσκειν only of time and money, ἐξαλείφειν, literally, of writing; νοῦς only with ἔχειν and προσέχειν, and a dozen more such points. This extraordinary purism is somewhat relaxed in his latest compositions. He seems even to repeat the same combinations, θαυμάζειν καὶ ζηλοῦν, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τιμᾶν, &c., as if he felt them peculiarly suitable.

[2] *De Hiatu in Orat. Att. et Histor. Græcis* (Friburg, 1841).

guages, but no prose has ever been so strict in observing it as developed Greek prose. Blass doubts whether Isocrates was properly the discoverer of the principle, but the indifference of Lysias in some of his best speeches, and of Plato in earlier works, seems to point to him as its first promulgator. Indeed in two speeches, the *Trapeziticus* and that *against Euthynous*, hiatus is not avoided, and hence Benseler rejects them. But these are early speeches, perhaps the only real court speeches, and may have been composed before he adopted the principle, or to conceal his personality. I have already observed that in Isocrates genuineness can be independently tested.

As to the particular kinds of hiatus admissible, of course those which admit of elision or crasis are not in point, though prose does not use these expedients so largely as poetry. Thus where there is a stop, elision is inadmissible, and a hiatus will occur which is by no means so offensive as that in the middle of a clause. Furthermore, as even these latter cannot be evaded, Isocrates admits a certain number, *τί*, *τι*, *περί*, *ὅτι* and *πρό*, with a vowel following; likewise *εὖ*, as do tragic and comic poets, but I doubt whether this *υ* was not pronounced a soft consonant, as it is now by the modern Greeks. *πολὺ ἄν* is allowed, but no other case with *ἄν*, and in the looser speeches *εἰ* and *ἤ* with a following vowel. In his stricter writing Isocrates carefully avoids hiatus with the cases of the article. Why these selections were made is now obscure, but should be carefully studied by those who seek to recover the old pronunciation. Many other details are given by Benseler. Another prescription was against closing and opening successive words with the same syllable, as *ἐπαινοῦμεν μέν*, which occurs indeed, with one or two more cases, in Isocrates. This law is obvious enough, and, had it been strictly followed, would have saved us endless blundering in the copying of our Greek MSS., and precluded many of Cobet's most brilliant emendations. Other disagreeable combinations were no doubt equally eschewed.

§ 459. When we approach the larger question of rythm, we find ourselves on peculiarly Greek ground. We can easily follow Isocrates when he taught that good prose must be more flowing and musical than conversation, and yet not so formal

as poetry—that it must, in fact, be rythmical, but not metrical. But when his pupils and rivals began to discuss the proper rythms to use, and the master recommended iambi and trochees, while Ephorus objected to spondees and tribrachs, and recommended pæons and dactyls, while Aristotle favoured the first pæon at the opening, and the fourth at the close, of a sentence—when we hear these and other such rules, we feel that there is indeed rythm in prose writing, and that we ourselves feel one kind awkward and another pleasant; but we cannot follow the Greeks into detail. The examples cited by the critics seem to depend completely upon quantity, disregarding accent; and this alone would make their rules unintelligible to a modern Greek, more than to an Englishman. Every good writer among us is led by an obscure feeling of rythm, which he observes, but none study prose writing with sufficient care to think of formulating their practice. It is refreshing to find that even the Greeks could not agree upon any absolute law, and that the later Asian orators, who constantly closed with trochees, like Isocrates' ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι, were ridiculed for it. Blass' analysis of many passages in Isocrates[1] proves that he used a great variety of rythms, but so combined them as to avoid poetical metre. It is very remarkable that, with all these artificial laws as to the order of words, our author seldom transposes the logical order, and that his sentences are models of clearness and facility. It is indeed one mark of genius, like that of great poets, to say naturally in metre what ordinary men can hardly express in prose; but this no doubt was one of the causes why he spent such vast time and labour on his writing. The result seems simple enough; yet how many times may each sentence have been recast before logical clearness and melodious rythm were equally satisfied. On the other hand, Isocrates' over-strictness in avoiding transposition deprived him of that peculiar force and vividness which Thucydides, for example, attains by the prominence into which he roughly drags his leading idea and its contrasts.

We now come to the combination of rythmical clauses, or *periods*, which are a very distinctive feature in Isocratic prose,

[1] pp. 138, sq.

though unfortunately we have no rules left us by the master himself as to his usage in this respect. Our earliest authority is the suspected third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, from which we learn that a period in prose is like a strophe in verse, a complete unity, including various members under it, but as a whole easily grasped and satisfying to the mind. By the aid of a suspended grammatical construction, and of adversative or connecting particles, a very long sentence can thus be brought into a well-balanced and harmonious system; but the poetical period is stricter in form; the prose period only varies the length and weight of its members, in order that the thought may also be rounded off and complete. It is evident from the careful survey of sentences by Blass [1] that very great variety was admitted, both as to the number of the clauses and their relative lengths, in Isocrates' periods. In fact, instead of the obvious antithesis of equally balanced clauses (such as those so common in Gorgias and in our Gibbon), he used a larger and more complicated harmony, in which we can now only wonder at the effect, and enumerate the elements, without being able to extract from them the law—if law it was, and not a cultivated instinct—which guided him in his practice.

Certain it is that we often find a thought expanded for the sake of fuller expression, and that this insistance upon formal harmony wearies the reader who desires to hurry onward to a new thought. But if there was one thing wholly strange and odious to Isocrates, it was hurry in thinking or speaking. Let us quote a specimen. In the *Panegyricus* he wishes to say (as a sequel to his undertaking that he will exceed all former speeches), that while our ancestral glories are common property to all, the highest treatment of them is a peculiar gift, and oratory would indeed flourish if admiration was bestowed not on the first inventors of speech, but on those who have brought it to perfection. How does he express this idea? [2] He ex-

[1] *A.B.* ii. pp. 147, sq.

[2] §§ 9–10: *αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἑκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἴδιόν ἐστιν. ἡγοῦμαι δ' οὕτως ἂν μεγίστην ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας*

pands the first clause, and gives weight to its conclusion by adding the superfluous *ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν*, because he desires to expand the responding idea, the oratorical treatment of ideas, in three parallel clauses, all coming under the *δέ*. Then he brings the emphatic *ἴδιον* into a later part of its clause than the corresponding *κοιναί*, thus gaining variety of order without losing his point.

All the rhetorical points in such periods as this are easy to apprehend, when we apply ourselves to the careful study of their structure. But I confess I can hardly follow Blass in the details of the analysis by which he shows that, in putting an argument, Isocrates balanced period against period, and wrote with an almost poetical though various symmetry. The reader will see the specimens he quotes,[1] and will be disposed to agree generally with his result ; but the working out of the details is not easy, as the exact limits of each clause may be variously fixed by different critics. Enough has been said to call attention to the subject, and show how Isocrates combined extraordinary fulness and splendour of style with perfect clearness and simplicity of structure.

§ 460. With regard to the ornament, or what the ancients called figures, he employs the antithesis, sameness of length, and sameness of opening or concluding sound, which Gorgias had already used to excess. It seems that Isocrates was

τέχνας καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους φιλοσοφίαν, εἴ τις θαυμάζοι καὶ τιμῴη μὴ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἔργων ἀρχομένους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄρισθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐξεργαζομένους, μηδὲ τοὺς περὶ τούτων ζητοῦντας λέγειν, περὶ ὧν μηδεὶς πρότερον εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς οὕτως ἐπισταμένους εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος δύναιτο. The latter sentence is a very elegant specimen of a rythmical and orderly period. The verbs are put first, because the double objects (other arts and eloquence) would otherwise keep the hearer too long in suspense as to the construction. Then in the expression *θαυμάζοι καὶ τιμῴη* the verb is doubled, merely to increase the weight of a clause which introduces a lengthy pair of oppositions distributed in a double pair of clauses. These clauses are marked both by rimed endings, and by curious and delicate varieties of expression. Thus *λέγειν, εἴρηκεν, εἰπεῖν* are used together to avoid tautology of sound, *μηδεὶς* and *οὐδεὶς* with their corresponding tenses producing the same effect. Moreover, *ζητοῦντας* compares with *ἐπισταμένους*, and the conditional *μηδεὶς* with *δύναιτο*.

[1] pp. 148–53.

averse to other alliteration or plays upon words for this very reason. But Gorgias had brought his rimes and alliterations close together, whereas in Isocrates they help us to catch the sense of balanced clauses. In maturer speeches he seems to employ them less, and we know that later critics despised all such arts as trivial. Isocrates avoids the ἀναφορά, or repetition of an emphatic word, common in Lysias, but agrees with him in the use of self-questioning to add liveliness to the argument. Asyndeton with him is rare, and so indeed are those figures of thought. such as irony and apostrophe, which were so effective in his successors. But we have already noticed the careful and smooth junction of his sentences and subjects, which is not consistent with violent emotions.

I must refer the special student to more explicit books for closer analyses of Isocrates' rhetorical excellences. Mr. Jebb [1] has given very full accounts of all his orations; Blass has 100 weighty pages on his style and diction; the Frenchmen Cartelier and Havet have treated him from these and other points of view. Of course he was the delight of later rhetoricians, and, had not Demosthenes arisen, would have been the leading name in Greek oratory.

§ 461. Owing to this competition, Isocrates, who had been in his day praised above all living men, falls in for a good deal of adverse criticism. The early critics Philonicus, Hieronymus, and Cleochares are cited by Dionysius as having made all manner of sound reflections on Isocrates' style, compared with the simple grace of Lysias and the force of Demosthenes. His sameness and smoothness, his agreeable flow, and never-failing dignity pall upon the taste, which desires stronger flavour and greater variety. Dionysius himself, in his tract on Isocrates, and again in his remarks on Demosthenes, is accurate and thoroughly sound in his judgments, for Isocrates claims to be judged as a rhetorician, and in this field Dionysius was a really great authority. Cicero also, whose style is exceedingly like that of Isocrates, appears to have especially used him for a model—as indeed did Demosthenes, and through these two orators he has moulded all the prose of modern Europe. But

[1] *Attic Orators*, vol. ii.

his great followers supplied from their genius, or from other models, the higher qualities in which he was wanting—conciseness, boldness, and, above all, pathos, which is hardly ever to be found in the polished periods of the self-satisfied professor of eloquence. Yet, strangely enough, though his moral exhortations were favourites in education, and his other speeches studied for sophistic displays—though Dionysius and Hermogenes were very full and appreciative concerning him—we have no scholia extant upon him except the few empty wordy notes published by Coraes from a Vatican copy (65 L), and again by W. Dindorf, with those on Æschines (Oxon. 1852). This is the more remarkable, as we possess one MS. of his works, which is better than most Greek MSS., the famous Urbinas, which is now the basis of our critical editions. The others are not to be named in comparison with this splendid codex. The first printed edition is also of the earliest among Greek classics, being, I think, the first prose author issued (Milan, 1493), and in the fine old type, which the influence of the Aldine press unfortunately destroyed. We then have the handsome Aldine edition of 1513, with the lesser orators. Since that time this remarkable author has been less edited than might have been expected. The Stephanus (1593) and the Basle (Hieronymus Wolf, 1570) are the chief texts till we come to Coraes (Paris, 1807) with the scholia, Bekker's text (Oxford, 1823) and the Zurich editors. There is also a good critical revision with the fragments by Benseler and Blass (Teubner, 1880). The *Demonicus* and *Panegyricus* have been lately brought out, with English notes, by J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 1872), the *Panegyricus* and *Areopagiticus* by Rauchenstein, and a few other single orations by other scholars. Reiske's *Index Græcitatis Isocrateæ* was reprinted by T. Mitchell (Oxford, 1828). The careful translation and commentary of the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre are specially commented on by Egger (Paris, 1865). There are several German translations, and one Italian. I am not aware of any in English.

CHAPTER II.

THE LESSER CONTEMPORARIES OF ISOCRATES.

§ 462. THE historian of Greek literature must chiefly occupy himself with the greatest and best of each period, as its real fruit both in showing the national genius, and in affecting the literary history of the world. But our full consideration of Plato and of Isocrates—the greatest lights of this generation—must not blind us to the large number of lesser stars around them, who as critics, imitators, and even as independent thinkers, also affected their age, and had perhaps more influence than is now apparent. The very names of these writers are unfamiliar to ordinary students, and do not even appear in some histories of Attic literature; but this makes it the more desirable to give such account of them as is necessary to a right estimate of the period.

We must remember that the earlier sophists started from universality of knowledge as their standpoint; they professed so to teach general culture, that on any given subject a man might be able to speak with elegance and with persuasion. Such was especially the aim of Gorgias, the most striking and suggestive of the older generation, whose negative attitude in philosophy was no doubt intended to arm the man of general culture against the specialist in metaphysic. As has been said (Part i. p. 62) in the chapter on the Sophists, this attempt at teaching universal wisdom, even through the help of scepticism, broke down before the orthodoxy of the public, who resented the *ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων* (as Alkidamas well called it), and before the attacks of the specialists, who by confining themselves to single subjects attained a depth and authority unattainable by polymaths. Antiphon, Plato, and Isocrates, each in his own line, made an impression on the Greek world,

which the more direct descendants of Gorgias sought in vain to rival. That the latter school still existed, that they carried on bitter controversies with one another, with Plato, and with Isocrates, that they moreover published their views in a voluminous body of literature, is well known to us from the criticisms of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, from the anecdotes of Diogenes Laertius, and from the lists of titles, and literary scraps, in Suidas and in various grammatical and rhetorical remains.

But of all this vast body of literature there only survive, perhaps happily for us, four little speeches, and a rhetorical tract. From these, however, we can form some estimate of the lesser writers of the day, just as the spurious orations in the works of Lysias and Demosthenes inform us, perhaps better than the genuine, of the average practical eloquence at Athens.

§ 463. The first of the four speeches is the *Ajax and Odysseus*, ascribed to ANTISTHENES. the founder of the Cynic, and indirectly the Stoic philosophy—a very remarkable figure in his day, as appears from the extraordinary sketch in Diogenes Laertius. But the main interest in him belongs rather to the history of Greek philosophy, to which I must refer the reader for a full account of his opinions. Being the son of a Thracian mother, and of poor circumstances, he began his studies late in life, and when attracted by Socrates was perhaps the most independent and original of all his pupils. This many-sided man was not only a philosopher, but a rhetor, who had learned from Protagoras and Prodicus; he speaks disrespectfully of Gorgias. His character may best be gathered from his conversation in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Memoirs of Socrates*, in both of which he takes a leading part. As he turned to practical ethics, and to the best rule of life, we find him ridiculing Plato's Ideas, and setting up sceptical paradoxes, which are in their turn ridiculed by Isocrates in his *Helen*. Plato, in his *Sophistes*, and Aristotle in his *Metaphysic*, speak of him with contempt as an unscientific and therefore unsuggestive teacher, who was not properly educated or cultivated.[1] This seems

[1] They seem to have the same sort of feeling about him which well trained university men have for self-educated writers, who often possess greater

strange in the face of his writings, which embraced tracts on Homer, Theognis, and other poets, on various questions of philosophy, and on rhetoric. The long and various list may be seen in the *Life* by Diogenes. Xenophon and Theopompus, among his cotemporaries, speak of him with great respect.

We are here, however, concerned with his rhetorical works, which seem to have contained a number of tracts on style, and also a number of specimens of oratory, in the form of imaginary attacks on or defences of mythical heroes. His dialogues were especially celebrated among later Greeks, and he is even cited as a model of Attic diction. Cicero says[1] that the fourth and fifth books of his *Cyrus* struck him 'like all Antisthenes' writings, as rather the work of a subtle than of a learned man.' The rhetors Dionysius and Hermogenes neglect him completely, and to this cause we perhaps owe the almost total loss of his works.

§ 464. The one document now ascribed to him is the argument of Ajax and Odysseus for the arms of Achilles, before a jury, said, in the legend, to be composed of Trojan captives. But this jury is not distinctly addressed as such in either speech, and is treated with contempt by Ajax, as knowing nothing of the case, and not being present at the previous conflicts. Hence the jury must be supposed a different one, made up of people who stayed at home, else we should certainly have had appeals from both speakers to the experience of the Trojan captives during the war. The argument of Ajax is short and blunt, insolent to the jury, and contemptuous to his adversary. With a good deal of ethos, and even with a few rhetorical points (such as the opposition, § 9 of διαγιγνώσκειν with διαδοξάζειν) there is much slovenliness in the style; thus λόγος or parts of λέγειν are used ten times in ten lines.[2] The answer of Odysseus is naturally longer and more elaborate, and vindicates the value of astuteness and wakefulness, of stratagems and wiles, against the brute valour and ignorance of Ajax. There

originality and force, but are wanting in the form and grace only attainable in an atmosphere of classic culture. Isocrates' school was as it were the literary Oxford, Plato's the scientific Cambridge of the day.

[1] *Ad. Att.* xii. 38. [2] §§ 7–8.

are constant allusions to the stories, and even to the expressions and metaphors, of Homer's Iliad.

The genuineness of this piece has been most needlessly attacked by many critics. Some think that these rhetorical exercises about imaginary cases only came into fashion late in the schools; others observe that there is some avoidance of hiatus, and therefore evidence of the prior existence of this law. Others again call the speeches unreal and vapid. All these difficulties have been disposed of by Blass,[1] who is one of the few German critics ready to defend suspected works. But he has hardly put enough stress on the important precedent set by Euripides in his tragedies, which show us that elaborate arguments on mythical quarrels were not only in fashion long before the later schools, but were much to the taste of the Attic public. Hence it is quite natural that we should hear of almost all the sophists occupying themselves with rhetorical displays in defence of Helen or Paris, or even Polyphemus, and in attacking Palamedes and other heroes of good report. These were in fact the favourite subjects for those sophists who wished to show their cleverness in teaching the art of debate. So far as I know, Socrates was the first *modern* personage who afforded materials for such exercises. As regards the absence of hiatus, there is no reason to think this work was brought out by Antisthenes until Isocrates was an established teacher, and his principles of composition generally recognised. The avowed hostility of Antisthenes and other sophists to Isocrates could not save them from his influence, and there is every evidence that this particular law of euphony found early and universal favour. It is greatly to be regretted that all the dialogues of Antisthenes are lost, for in them old critics recognised the best specimens of his style. The *Ajax and Odysseus* is not wanting in ability, but as a rhetorical specimen is poor and weak when compared with the greater productions of the age.

§ 465. A lesser figure, but one more strictly belonging to our history, is that of ALKIDAMAS, the son of Diokles, born in Æolis, who seems to have been contemporary with Isocrates, for his

[1] *AB.* vol. ii. pp. 310, sq.

extant speech *about the Sophists* came out before the *Panegyricus*, and he is, moreover, mentioned as the master of the orator Æschines, who was born in 390 B.C. This man was not only the pupil, but in the strictest sense the follower of Gorgias. For Antisthenes, though a rhetor and a sophist, was also a Socratic philosopher, and this side of his teaching, as an exaggeration of Socratism, was far more important than his Sophistic. Alkidamas, on the contrary, is the strict rhetor and sophist combined, who professes to teach men how to speak well on any subject, and his theory is put forth in the able tract still extant—a manifesto directed against the school of Isocrates. Suidas, indeed, calls him a philosopher, and the titles of some physical works by him are mentioned, but these seem of slight import. Even in formal knowledge of rhetoric he seems to have done little, nor is any official *techne* of his now known from certain indications. But Tzetzes, who says he read several of his books, mentions that the *Encomium on Death* he could not find (though Cicero refers to it [1]). There are, besides a φυσικὸς λόγος, the *Messeniakos*, composed on the opposite side of the case from Isocrates' *Archidamos*, the *Eulogies* of the courtesan Thaïs, his *Mouseion*, and the speech *about the Sophists*, which last is not mentioned by the ancients. The *Mouseion* is interesting as having contained an account of the contest of Homer and Hesiod, and of Hesiod's death.[2]

As a rhetorician Alkidamas seems to have asserted himself to be the rival of Isocrates, and with some success; for though posterity has decided long ago in favour of Isocrates, Aristotle (in his *Rhetoric*) combats Alkidamas' claims with considerable care and asperity. He censures him as being frigid, and illustrates it by many instances of the excessive use of composite terms, the use of poetical words, and the excess of epithets, which were used not as spice but as food in his writing.[3] Dionysius

[1] *Tusc. Disp.* i. § 116.

[2] I have discussed it above (Vol. I. § 87).

[3] *Rhet.* iii. 3, § 3: Διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις· οἷον, οὐχ ἱδρῶτα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἱδρῶτα· καὶ οὐκ, εἰς Ἰσθμια, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν· καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πολεων βασιλεῖς νόμους· καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ, ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ· καὶ οὐχὶ

follows in the wake of Aristotle. Nevertheless, his extant oration, as Blass remarks, saves him somewhat from these charges, and shows him to have been a rhetor of ability, who advanced with the times.

§ 466. The speech *about those who write set speeches, or about the Sophists*,[1] is a distinct defence of the school of Gorgias against that of Isocrates, which was now bidding fair to outstrip it. It is a *Lehrprogram*, just like Isocrates' *κατὰ σοφιστῶν*, and is alluded to in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (§ 11), at least probably, for I do not think the references at all so certain as Reinhardt and Blass do. The orator desires to show that the mere composers of carefully written speeches in the closet in which they spent their lives 'had missed the greater part of both rhetoric and philosophy, and should rather be called poets than sophists.' He supports this thesis by a string of sound but not logically connected arguments, in which the whole case is well and fairly stated. The difficulties of reciting a set speech, the ludicrous effect of sticking in it, the hazards of inserting any sudden inspiration, are all put with clearness and force. There is, in fact, from the history of Greek eloquence no document which represents more thoroughly the modern and common-sense views, as opposed to the artificial finish of ancient rhetoric. Alkidamas by no means despises writing; he fully appreciates the value and even the necessity of such a practice, but he insists that a proper training in extempore speaking is the only safe and thorough instruction in the art of practical oratory. The style of this excellent tract is in accordance with the matter. The author shows that he has benefited by Isocrates' work. He writes in good periods, he avoids unnecessary hiatus and alliterations; he attends to rythm and balance in his clauses. He is, in fact, a pupil of Gorgias who

μουσεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον· καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φρυντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ οὐ χάριτος, ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός· καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς· καὶ οὐ κλάδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψε· καὶ οὐ, τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην· καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν· (τοῦτο δ' ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον· ὥστε ποίημα γίγνεται) καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν.

[1] *περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν.*

has distinctly gone beyond his master. These are the results brought out by the careful examination of Spengel, who first made good the genuineness of the speech against earlier doubters, and whose arguments Blass has supplemented.

§ 467. But the critics are unanimous in rejecting the second speech, the *accusation of Palamedes* by Odysseus, as the work of another author. It is, like the defence of Palamedes ascribed to Gorgias, in form a court speech, resting rather upon general grounds (εἰκότα) than upon evidence, for though witnesses are cited to prove that a traitorous missive was shot into the camp on an arrow, neither the missive (though quoted) nor the arrow is produced. The rest of the speech is an artful λοιδορία, or attack on Palamedes' former life, showing that treachery might naturally be expected from him. I do not share in the contempt usually expressed for this speech by German critics. The writer has a bad case, and knows it, but he gives us an instructive picture of the sort of arguments permitted, and perhaps even thought effective, before Athenian juries. For though the composition (especially as to hiatus) shows it not to be the work of Alkidamas, Blass has proved that there is no reason to deny its antiquity, and that it may be the work of some contemporaneous rhetor. He suggests the rhetor *Polycrates*, to whom Isocrates addressed his letter of advice,[1] and who was well known as the advocate of desperate causes, in order to display his acuteness. Such would be the present speech, as well as the attack on Socrates, the defence of Busiris, of Polyphemus, the encomium of Clytemnestra, and others. He, moreover, composed a λοιδορία of the Lacedæmonians, and encomia of mice, of pots, and of counters. If the encomium of Paris was written by him, the citations from it show it to have been the best of these *tours de force*. Blass accordingly compares him in his juggling rhetoric with the dialectical acrobats Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, whom we meet in Plato.

§ 468. Of *Zoilus*, mentioned as both a rhetor and a historian, and moreover as the notorious *Scourge of Homer*, we know little beyond what Suidas and the Homeric scholia tell us. From this point of view he has already been noticed.[2] The sophist

[1] Cf above, p. 10.

[2] Vol. I. p. 34.

Lycophron is a very hazy, but yet interesting figure. We know from allusions in Aristotle that (in addition to some logical subtleties) he asserted noble birth to be an idle distinction, and what is far more important, that laws were the mere negative guarantee of justice among citizens. This last principle, taken in connection with Lycophron's democratic views, has suggested the probability that he may have followed up the idea of Hippodamus, and set up a democratic ideal against the aristocratic ideals of Plato and his school. To the latter laws were a system of positive training, intended to watch and direct the whole life of the citizen; to the former our modern notion may have been revealed, that laws are only the protection of a society governing itself in ordinary life without state control. If this be indeed so, we may deeply regret the loss of the works of so advanced and reasonable a thinker. But our evidence is too scanty to be satisfactory.[1]

§ 469. Far more important to us is ANAXIMENES of Lampsacus, son of Aristocles, pupil of Zoilus and the Cynic Diogenes, teacher and companion of Alexander in his campaigns. As he is reported to have written Alexander's life, and as the treatise extant alludes to nothing after 340 B.C., he may have been a mature and active teacher and writer for the period thus comprised (340–20 B.C.) His grateful fellow-citizens, whom he had saved from Alexander's wrath, set up a bronze statue of him in Olympia, which Pausanias saw. He was the master of the notorious Archias, who hunted down Demosthenes, and he is said to have been specially hostile to Theopompus, whose style he parodied in a libel on Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, called the *Trikaranos*, and published under Theopompus' name.[2]

[1] Cf. Vahlen's article on Lycophron, *Rhein. Mus.* vol. xxi., and Susemihl's interesting notes on the allusions to him in his edition of Aristotle's *Politics* (ii. pp. 67, 143), where further writers on the subject are indicated.

[2] There is a remarkable extract, giving the substance of it, in the rhetor Aristides (i. p. 338), which the reader will find quoted in Müller's *FHG.* i. p. lxxiv., note, in the Prolegomena on Theopompus. It argues —in my opinion with great justice— that none of the leading states of Greece ever knew how to carry out an imperial policy. The author appears to

These jealousies and rivalries are important as showing the competition among literary men, and the activity with which authorship was carried on as a profession during the fourth century B.C. Both as sophist and rhetor Anaximenes was in his day celebrated. He was a famous extemporiser, composed court speeches for others, and harangues, of which an *encomium of Helen* is cited. In more serious literature he wrote a tract on Homer, no doubt owing to Zoilus' example, and some philosophical book from which ethical fragments are quoted by Stobæus. But his *history* was the most important. Though called *Hellenica*, it began with the origin of gods and men, and reached down to the battle of Mantinea (in twelve books). Eight more embraced the *Philippica*, and the acts of Alexander. We also hear of a tract 'on the deaths of kings.' All these works are lost, and we can only imagine him to have been a rival of Theopompus and Ephorus, an Isocratic historian, with the capital fault of treating history as a branch of oratory. Dionysius speaks slightingly of him, as a 'Jack of all trades, but master of none.' [1]

§ 470. The extant *techne* was saved by being foisted in among Aristotle's works, with a spurious preface in the form of an epistle to Alexander. As early as the sixteenth century, Petrus Victorius conjectured from the allusions of Quintilian that it was the work of Anaximenes. Spengel has supported its genuineness in this sense with additional arguments.[2] This

have shown this in contrast to the policy of Alexander, to whom he was attached.

[1] *Isæus*, § 19.

[2] It should, however, be noticed that Zeller (*Aristotle*, p. 78, note, third German edition) hesitates, with Rose and Campe, to accept Spengel's theory, on the ground that the dedication to Alexander is not foreign to the rest, though plainly un-Aristotelian, and (what is far more important) that the work shows in several places the influence of Aristotle in its nomenclature and in its method. The careful examination of Mr. Cope (*Introd. to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pp. 401, sq.) rather goes to disprove this view, and leads us to suspect that the most important points of agreement were produced by a deliberate alteration of this lesser rhetoric to suit the accredited views of Aristotle in his classical work. Mr. Cope seems to incline rather to the work being previous to Aristotle's than a later produc-

techne is therefore possibly the only theoretical treatise of the kind extant from the age of the Greek sophists, when the rhetoric of Aristotle had not yet eclipsed all the rest. It gives us the condition of the theory of eloquence among his predecessors, and is consequently of considerable interest. But as literature it is nought, for it consists wholly of dry logical divisions, with the barest possible examples, and unfortunately original examples, by way of illustration. The most interesting section (30) is perhaps that on the *proem*, intended to conciliate the audience, which must be either favourable, unfavourable, or neutral. If unfavourable, it is so either to the speaker, or the cause, or the speech. If to the speaker, either for past or present causes, because he is too young, or too old, or talks too often, or not often enough. Hints are given in each of these cases. The book ends with a collection of gnomes, or ethical commonplaces.[1]

While the author is full and sensible on the arrangement of a speech as a whole, he tells us nothing of the mysteries of style, beyond avoiding the hiatus, and studying alliteration; he nowhere defines rythm, or discusses such ornaments as metaphors; in fact, with all his divisions and subdivisions, he remains on the surface of the subject. It is here that his work contrasts with the philosophical rhetoric of Aristotle, which was probably written a few years later. There are, indeed, points of contact in the two treatises, but while Anaximenes (if it be he) thinks of nothing of practical precepts, which are directly useful to a speaker, Aristotle thinks of little but the psycho-

tion, though he justly hesitates to ascribe it to Anaximenes, and prefers to call it *Anonymi rhetorica*. The resemblances between the two treatises are distinct, and yet so general and apparently so undesigned as to persuade me that there was certainly no borrowing on either side, but that the rhetors of the day had agreed upon some points which appear in both works. But had the anonymous work been really later, as Zeller supposes, the resemblances, if there were any, must have been far more frequent and definite. On the other hand, Cope points out (p. 409) some expressions which have a suspiciously later tone. The whole question is full of difficulty, nor do I see the prospect of a definite solution.

[1] For a fuller analysis the reader may consult Blass, *Att. Ber.* ii. pp. 355, sq.

logical conditions, and, as has been often observed, his *Rhetoric* never trained a speaker.

It is, I think, hardly fair of Blass to criticise this tract as a sample of Anaximenes' style, even though Dionysius quotes it when censuring the author. Of course a dry manual like this would not affect the dignity of his *Moralia*, or the grace of his historical narrative. The style is as simple and straightforward as possible, and as such well suited to its subject. I will only repeat that here, as among all early rhetors, there are no definite laws for grace of diction and euphony of composition beyond the obvious points which they all make. It was very well to speak of eloquence as a matter of training, of chaste and ornate prose as a matter of prescription. Whether in Isocrates, or in Plato, or in Demosthenes, the euphony really came from the delicate æsthetic sense of the individual master, and could never be transferred to inferior pupils by any handbook of rules, or prescriptions of arguments.

§ 471. *Bibliographical.* The best separate editions of the *techne* addressed to Alexander, which appears in all the complete texts of Aristotle, are Gaisford's (Oxon, 1820) and Spengel's (Zurich, 1844), who appends illustrations from the extant orators, as the author unfortunately constructs his own examples. Spengel has also included it in his collection of rhetorical tracts. As regards the text of the orations just discussed, they are found, as well as the *Helen* of Gorgias, in the MSS. of Antiphon and Andocides, but not all in each MS. The *Helen* is most frequently found; the oration of Alkidamas in the best MSS. They are printed in the Zurich edition of the orators, and by Blass with his Antiphon. There are not, I think, any special commentaries on them, except some articles in German classical periodicals, and a few special tracts, such as Vahlen's *der Rhetor Alkidamas* (Wien, 1864), Winckelmann's *Antisthenis fragmenta*, Cope's *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 401, sq., on the *techne* addressed to Alexander, and others not worth enumerating here. Blass' history of Attic oratory is quite exhaustive on all these matters, and should be in the hands of every serious student of the subject. Teichmüller's *Literarische Fehden des 4ten Jahrhunderts* is also interesting.

CHAPTER III.

XENOPHON.

§ 472. NEITHER the birth nor the death of this remarkable and characteristic figure in Greek literature can now be fixed with any certainty, but for literary purposes we can approximate to them sufficiently. Most of his biographers have been misled by either of two mistakes: first, the accepting of the false legend that Socrates saved his life at the battle of Delium, a story implicitly contradicted by Alcibiades' evidently historical account of this retreat in Plato's *Symposium;* secondly, the assumption that Xenophon was present, as a youth of fourteen or fifteen, at his own *Symposium*, an assumption in no manner warranted by his solitary opening remark, that he wishes to record the lighter conversations of eminent and refined men: *οἷς δὲ παραγενόμενος ταῦτα γιγνώσκω, δηλῶσαι βούλομαι.* The scene being laid at Athens in 420 B.C., would require us to assume 435 at latest for his birth, whereas Cobet has clearly shown[1] that he speaks of himself in the *Anabasis* as a very young man, and even specially numbers himself with those under thirty years of age. This, as well as his amateur position, without command in the Grecian army, makes it certain that he was not born before 429 B.C., and not much later, seeing the maturity of his character and conduct in the famous 'Retreat of the Ten Thousand.' We must therefore reject the date of Krüger and Clinton, who think him to have been born about 444 B.C., chiefly I think on the strength of the fable about the battle of Delium. There is, on the contrary, nothing known of Xenophon before 400 B.C. He then introduces himself, not as a tried veteran who had fought through the Peloponnesian war,

[1] *Nov. Lectt.* pp. 535, sq.

but as a young man who was still a disciple or follower of Socrates, and who was looking out for some opening in life. This general impression is, to my mind, so naturally produced by the narrative, that I wonder how experienced critics, like Sauppe, can still maintain the old chronology. What can be more decisive than the conclusion of his first speech?[1] *εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάττετέ με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἡγοῦμαι ἐρύκειν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ τὰ κακά.* The man who says this must be either above or below middle age. The former is impossible. We must therefore consider him not over thirty at this time. Cobet has cited much additional evidence. The latest events noticed in his works are the conclusion of the Social war between Athens and her allies (356–5 B.C.), together with the beginning of the Phocian or Sacred war. This is the proper interpretation of the allusion[2] to the Phocians abandoning Delphi, and the Thebans endeavouring to seize it—an earlier affair, which cannot mean the final ruin of the Phocians (347–6). This has also been well explained by Cobet.[3] We have thus a period of seventy-two or seventy-three years for his life, which is more probable than the ninety years claimed for him by Lucian.

§ 473. During this momentous epoch of Greek history, we have only a few passages in Xenophon's life clearly before us —passages however of great interest, and indeed of national importance. He was the son of Gryllus, an Athenian, of the Eretrian deme, and apparently an aristocrat, to judge from his habits and associates. According to the legend in Diogenes, given in his *Life* among the philosophers, he early attracted the notice of Socrates, who stopped him in the way, and asked him where men of honour were to be sought; and on his replying that he did not know, said, 'Follow me and learn.' His discipleship is, at all events, certain, though we cannot perceive any adequate moral results from such splendid teaching. We may suppose that first his youth, and possibly his connections among the oligarchs of 411 B.C., prevented him from taking any prominent place at Athens, where indeed all the later war was

[1] *Anabasis*, iii. 1, 25. [2] *Hellen.* v. 8. [3] *Nov. Lectt.* pp. 756, sq.

a naval war, for which he shows but little taste. Certain it is that we find him after the Restoration at Athens, with no fixed course of life, or good prospects, and ready to accept the invitation of his friend Proxenus to come to Asia, and ingratiate himself with that eminent phil-Hellene, the younger Cyrus.

It is, however, not impossible that before his departure he had something to do with bringing out the unfinished work of Thucydides, and that he commenced his *Hellenica*, as its continuation, in which he relates the closing fortunes of the Peloponnesian war, the Tyranny, and the Restoration by the patriotism of Thrasybulus. This valuable piece of contemporary history bears every trace of earlier composition, and of a different temper, from the later books ; and I even incline to the theory of a separate publication, as we can hardly imagine the author not rehandling and modifying his early statements, if he came afterwards to put forth the whole book for the first time in its completeness.

§ 474. His adventures in Asia, where he attended the battle of Cunaxa, as a sort of voluntary field officer, then consulted with the Greek generals, and at last became the principal commander and organiser of the Retreat—all this is among the most familiar chapters in Greek history. We will return presently to the question of his credibility in this narrative. He seems to have been then rather a young man to take the lead, but without doubt his good general education, and his ready eloquence, marked him out among an army of desponding mercenaries, none of whom excelled him except in military experience. How he obtained the technical knowledge for manœuvring large bodies of troops seems very strange, and is only to be explained by the strong natural taste he everywhere displays for evolutions, perhaps still more by the rudeness of warfare among the Greeks, who seem to have known little or nothing of tactics till Epaminondas arose.

Whatever share, however, he had in saving the 10,000 mercenaries, there can be no doubt, from his own narrative and his laboured self-justification, that he was a most important agent in their travels and troubles after they had reached the Greek colonies on the Euxine. He evidently

hoped to become the founder of a new city. When this scheme failed, he made himself the agent of the Spartans at Byzantium to scatter or to disarm the very dangerous army of marauders, which well-nigh sacked the city, and which must have been the dread of all the colonies within its reach. In consequence of these services, and of his strengthening the army of Thimbron (in 399 B.C.) with the remnant of his tried soldiers, he became intimate with the Spartan magnates, and especially with Agesilaus, to whom he particularly attached himself.

About the same time, but for reasons which are unknown to us, he was sentenced to banishment from Athens. If this sentence had certainly come after the battle of Coronea, its explanation would be easy ; but it is alleged by old authorities to have been because of his campaign with the mercenaries of Cyrus, which seems inexplicable. At all events, he accompanied Agesilaus on his homeward march, and was present at the momentous battle of Coronea (394 B.C.), of which he gives us a graphic description. He afterwards settled in Skillus, a Lacedæmonian district, some miles south of Olympia, and on the road to Sparta, so that he could see his friends on their way to the festival. In this retreat, which he digresses to describe in the *Anabasis*,[1] he combined religion, sport, and literary work. He erected a shrine to the Ephesian Artemis from the proceeds of his spoils, which he had deposited safely with a certain Megabyzus, her priest at Ephesus, for votive purposes, when he set out on his perilous march with Agesilaus. As the district was full of game, the main materials for the periodic feast were procured by the hunting of Xenophon and his sons, aided by any who chose to join.

§ 475. Most of Xenophon's works were produced in this delightful retreat, which seemed unlikely to be disturbed by further wanderings and troubles. But we hear that of his two sons, whom he sent to fight with Athens and Sparta at Mantinea, one (Gryllus) was killed fighting bravely in the cavalry, so bravely that his death was commemorated in one of the pictures which Pausanias saw long after in the Acropolis of

[1] iii. 5.

Athens. We also hear, on Diogenes' authority, that the Eleans invaded his estate, and drove him out, so that he spent his last days at Corinth. According to others, his sentence of banishment was rescinded on the proposal of Eubulus, and he revisited his native city, after a long lapse of chequered years. His death is placed by Diogenes (after Stesicleides) in 360 B.C.; though if the tract *on the Revenues* be accepted as genuine, he must have lived till 356 at least, and this is thought the more probable theory. Yet I find it hard to reject so precise a notice as that of Diogenes.[1] We know nothing more of his private affairs, except that his wife Philesia is said to have been brought home from Asia. An earlier wife, Soteira, is also mentioned as accompanying him to Aspasia's house. Among the other Xenophons enumerated by Diogenes, it is curious to find one mentioned as the biographer of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, the very men whom our author has passed over with unjust neglect. His personal beauty was much praised; I am not aware that there is extant of him any authentic bust.

In character he was a very typical Athenian, and though not pre-eminent when we think of Pericles or Thucydides, a far truer average specimen of his age than they. The very first point which strikes us is his religiousness, which is perpetually cropping up, but which, when closely examined, turns out to be mere prudence with regard to the gods, and not real piety. In his own account of the transactions at the close of the Retreat, and of the general affairs of his time as a historian, he shows far less honesty and singleness of mind than his sceptical predecessor. There are not wanting evidences of both selfishness and vanity in the man, in addition to the unfairness of mind which has robbed us of a contemporary portrait of Epaminondas, by one of the very few capable of estimating his military genius. But Xenophon is so intent on lauding Agesilaus and the Spartans, that he hides from us the real hero of his day. How far this one-sided manner of writing

[1] ii. 6. 56 : *κατέστρεψε δέ, καθά φησιν Στησικλείδης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγραφῇ, ἔτει πρώτῳ τῆς πέμπτης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Καλλιδημίδου, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου Μακεδόνων ἦρξε.*

history may have been produced by the influence of Isocrates will be discussed in its proper place.

§ 476. Turning to his WORKS, it seems that he is one of those few authors, like Plato, whose literary labours have been handed down to us complete. The dark ages have exacted from him no tribute of oblivion. The ancients counted forty books, which corresponds fairly with the sum of the subdivisions of our collection, nor is any work cited by them not to be found in our catalogue, even when their citations cannot be verified in our texts. As to their chronology, it is tolerably certain that one of them, the tract *on the Athenian Constitution*, is far anterior in date to all the rest. But though the once-received early date for Xenophon's birth might make his authorship of the tract possible, most good critics have agreed in declaring it an anonymous production, which has been incorporated in his works on account of its analogy to the genuine tract on *the Lacedæmonian Constitution*. The condition of Athenian affairs assumed in the work cannot have existed after 425 B.C., so that we have before us (discounting the fragment of Gorgias) *the earliest extant specimen of Attic prose*, the remains of Antiphon being generally supposed to date from the latest period of his career.

But here even the partial agreement of critics about this very interesting tract is exhausted, if we except their perhaps harmonious chorus of complaint as to the miserably corrupt and lacerated condition of the text. Indeed, if we consult the critical preface of Sauppe, we may find, even on the date of its composition, opinions varying from that already given, down to the Macedonian period, the latter extreme being supported by Bernhardy, on account of the statement [1] that the Attic dialect was an idiom containing a mixture of all the rest. There has been an equally great and bootless controversy about the authorship. Few scholars maintain Xenophon's claim, though Cobet seems to admit it. But (in addition to Thucydides!) both Critias and Alcibiades have been named,

[1] ἔπειτα φωνὴν πᾶσαν ἀκούοντες ἐξελέξαντο τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῆς. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἰδίᾳ μᾶλλον καὶ φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι χρῶνται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων (ii. 8). This is a wonderful statement.

because the work is professedly that of an Athenian aristocrat hostile to the democracy, and nevertheless defending the expediency of the policy of the demos. Both these suggestions seem to me absurd; for all the evidence we have concerning Critias shows him to have been a rhetor of far greater skill than the author of our tract, and we may be certain he would not have written in defence of the demos from any point of view. As to Alcibiades, there seems to me one sentence in the work directly aimed at him: 'I indeed excuse democracy in the populace, for it is natural that anyone should benefit himself; but whosoever does not belong to the populace, and yet prefers living in a democratic to living in an oligarchical polity, has [evidently] laid himself out for crime, and knows that it is easier for a miscreant to pass muster in a democratic than in an oligarchical state.' This is the reflection of an oligarch upon his fellows who adopt radical or whig politics, and play the part of democratic leaders.

Passing, then, from this resultless enquiry, we come to another cloud of controversy about the original form and scope of the tract, some explaining its direct question-and-answer style as implying a familiar letter; others (Cobet and C. Wachsmuth) maintaining that an older dialogue has been cut down into an argument by an inexpert writer; others again, such as Kirchhoff, analysing the work sentence by sentence, and declaring it a mere congeries of badly connected fragments. But Kirchhoff has dissolved in his crucible even the *de Corona* of Demosthenes; nor do I think that any ordinary speech, for example, of Andocides, would afford him fewer points of attack than this tract. If it be indeed an early essay in Attic prose, when no model existed for an argumentative treatise except, perhaps, a few dialogues of Zeno, we may fairly expect to find a conversational style with question and answer, as well as rapid transitions without strict logical nexus. And indeed, Rettig, in a careful tract,[1] has shown that, with a few transpositions of paragraphs at the close, the whole tract may be brought into a reasonable shape.

Turning to the matter of the work, the reader will find it one of the most interesting and instructive documents of the age, and

[1] *De Pseudoxenophontis de Rep. Athen. scripti* (Bern, 1844).

very remarkable for its Machiavellian tone, that is to say, its calm ignoring of the right and wrong of the case as irrelevant, and its discussion of the question: Given a democracy, are the provisions of the Athenian democracy expedient for its preservation? Had Machiavelli written his projected tract on the *Republic* as a sequel to his *Principe*, he must have produced a very similar argument, though with historical illustrations, such as Aristotle uses, which are foreign to the author before us. Thus the whole temper of the writer is that of the school of Antiphon or Thucydides, not that of Plato or Xenophon. I will quote below a specimen of the style.[1] In addition to G. Sauppe's text (Tauchnitz), the special editions of Kirchhoff (Berlin, 1874) and C. Wachsmuth (Göttingen Program, 1874) are to be recommended. For a summary of the various controversies, Wachsmuth's and Sauppe's prefaces, Kirchhoff's paper in the Transact. of the Berlin Academy (1874), Rettig's criticism of this and other essays (*Zeitschr. für öst. Gymn.*, 1877), and now L. Lange, *De* Ἀθ. πολ. *restit. Comment.*, Leipzig, 1882, will suffice most readers, and will indicate to the unwearied many more special studies which may be consulted.

The literature on the *polity of Athenians*, ample as it may appear, has been since enriched by an excellent recension, translation, and commentary from the pen of Müller-Strübing (*Philologus* for 1880, pp. 1–170). He lowers the date to 415 B.C., considering 414, not 423, the minor limit, and thinks

[1] ii. §§ 14–16: Ἐνὸς δὲ ἐνδεεῖς εἰσιν· εἰ γὰρ νῆσον οἰκοῦντες θαλαττοκράτορες ἦσαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν μὲν κακῶς, εἰ ἠβούλοντο, πάσχειν δὲ μηδέν, ἕως τῆς θαλάττης ἦρχον, μηδὲ τμηθῆναι τὴν αὐτῶν γῆν μηδὲ προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους· νῦν δὲ οἱ γεωργοῦντες καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι Ἀθηναίων ὑπέρχονται τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ δῆμος, ἅτε εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν σφῶν ἐμπρήσουσιν οὐδὲ τεμοῦσιν, ἀδεῶς ζῇ καὶ οὐχ ὑπερχόμενος αὐτούς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἑτέρου δέους ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, εἰ νῆσον ᾤκουν, μηδέποτε προδοθῆναι τὴν πόλιν ὑπ' ὀλίγων μηδὲ πύλας ἀνοιχθῆναι μηδὲ πολεμίους ἐπεισπεσεῖν· πῶς γὰρ νῆσον οἰκούντων ταῦτ' ἂν ἐγίγνετο; μηδ' αὖ στασιάσαι τῷ δήμῳ μηδέν, εἰ νῆσον ᾤκουν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ εἰ στασιάσαιεν, ἐλπίδα ἂν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις στασιάσειαν, ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἐπαξόμενοι· εἰ δὲ νῆσον ᾤκουν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἀδεῶς εἶχεν αὐτοῖς. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἔτυχον οἰκήσαντες νῆσον, νῦν τάδε ποιοῦσι· τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ταῖς νήσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλατταν, τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορῶσι τεμνομένην, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν ἐλεήσουσιν, ἑτέρων ἀγαθῶν μειζόνων στερήσονται.

it the production of Phrynichus, replying to an argument of Critias before the oligarchical members of an Athenian club. Whatever we may think of this positive theory, which rests on very hypothetical grounds, Strübing's discussion of the facts, and his criticisms of Kirchhoff's subtleties, are excellent.

§ 477. There is the greatest difficulty in arranging chronologically the remaining works attributed to Xenophon, and the differences of opinion are so great and ably defended, that in a practical survey like the present it seems best to give one's own view, and refer the special student to the critical prefaces in Sauppe's edition, which contain a prospectus of the controversies up to 1886. But it seems to me surprising that those who hold Xenophon to have been forty years of age when he joined the expedition of Cyrus, should also hold that he wrote nothing until after his return. That a mature and educated man should write nothing during years of enforced idleness, or certainly of political and military insignificance at Athens, and suddenly burst into persistent authorship, after serving as a mercenary for a few years, because he was exiled from his home, and settled in a sporting country —this is what I cannot believe. There is no reason for asserting that he ever rested from campaigning or wandering till 393 B.C. at least, so that he would thus begin his literary career at over fifty years of age. Cobet, who holds more reasonable views as to his comparative youth when he served with Cyrus, thinks the ardour of the *Tract on hunting* good evidence that it was a youthful work—a supposition most unlikely, seeing that Attica was so thickly populated that 'not a hare could be found in it,' and that Skillus was the natural scene of such interests. Nor is Cobet perhaps acquainted with sporting society, in which the keenest members are often those who have spent the longest time in such pursuits. To my mind, the continuation of Thucydides, which may have been suggested to him by his being entrusted with the unfinished MS., is his earliest work. We find in it no trace of Laconism, or of that historical unfairness which he developed in later years. In fact, it seems probable that it was written about 400 B.C., just before his departure for Asia;[1] nor do I think

[1] I observe that the many Ionisms and Dorisms, which Cobet has

its concluding sentence, which says, 'that after the amnesty the Athenians live in political harmony, and even now abide by their pledges,' is any proof that many years had elapsed. The real danger was during the first couple of years. These, I take it, had just elapsed, and still the demos was firm and kept its promises. The same phrase is no doubt used in the end of his *Life of Socrates*, which must have been written ten or twelve years after the events he describes, when he says that 'even still' people kept regretting his loss. But the cases are not at all parallel. Nor can it be argued that this vague phrase implies any corresponding lapse of time whenever it is used.

But it is better to abandon these unsatisfactory enquiries, and classify Xenophon's works not as to date, which is impracticable, but as to subject-matter. They will easily fall under four heads : the *historical* books, the *Socratic* books, the Essays on *Political Philosophy*, to which perhaps may be appended the Tract on the Attic revenues, and lastly the *technical* tracts on horses, on the management of cavalry, and on hunting. The first class falls naturally into the following order : first the early books of the *Hellenica*, down to the Restoration of the Democracy under Thrasybulus. Then the *Anabasis*, or Expedition of Cyrus, with the Retreat of the Greek auxiliaries, and their fortunes in Asia Minor under the Spartan supremacy. This huge parenthesis in the *Hellenica*, which is specially indicated as such at the opening of the 3rd book, is followed by the remainder (lib. 3–7) of the Greek history, down to the battle of Mantinea and death of Epaminondas. The *Agesilaus*, a panegyric on the Spartan king, forms a sort of appendix to these works, justifying the exaggerated estimate of the king which we find in the later *Hellenica*.

§ 478. There can be no doubt that the earlier *Hellenica*, or *Paralipomena* (of Thucydides), as they are sometimes called, are far the most reliable of Xenophon's contributions to history, though all are very valuable, as giving us light where we are deserted by the earlier and greater historians. At this time the

noticed throughout Xenophon, and regards as evidences of residence away from the pure dialect of Attica, are almost all cited from later works, and that the earlier *Hellenica* (especially books I. and II.) offer very few examples. Sauppe's *Lexilogus* seems to afford us the same evidence.

author had not developed either that personal vanity, which makes him justify all his own actions in the *Anabasis*, or that servile adulation of Agesilaus, which has infected his later history. In the *Paralipomena* he follows the course of the Peloponnesian war from the year 411 B.C. to the Restoration of Thrasybulus (403–2 B.C.). The affair of Arginusæ, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, and the final settlement of the great war, are the prominent events which he records. Several remarkable characters —Lysander, Callicratidas, Theramenes—would be almost unknown to us but for this work; and of Callicratidas in particular he has drawn, perhaps unconsciously, a nobler picture than that of any other Spartan. Grote is not satisfied with his account of the affair of the generals after Arginusæ, but whatever difficulties there are in the narrative are rather to be ascribed to the conflict of evidence than to any want of candour on the part of the historian. The whole narrative, and the inserted speeches, though clear and agreeable to read, want both the power and the pathos of Thucydides. The trial and death of Theramenes, with whom he evidently sympathises, is the most striking episode in these books.

§ 479. At the opening of our third book of the *Hellenica*, in which the author resumes his narrative in later years, and with altered tone, he states that the relations of Cyrus with the Lacedæmonians, and subsequently his march against the king, his death, and the retreat of the Greek mercenaries to the sea, have been written by Themistogenes the Syracusan. No such person is elsewhere mentioned, except by Suidas, as an author, and our *Anabasis*,[1] though composed anonymously, has so many internal marks of Xenophon's style, that all antiquity was unanimous in attributing it to him. The question remains, whether Xenophon wished to have his own work attributed to another, or whether there really was an earlier *Anabasis* lost, or completely superseded by the work now extant. There is of course on this, as on every other Xenophontic problem, a perfect library of controversy. Plutarch thinks that the author considered his self-laudation would be more cre-

[1] We generally speak of the 'Retreat of the Ten Thousand,' whereas Xenophon entitled his work 'The Expedition (or going up the country) of Cyrus' against his brother the King of Persia.

dible if put as the evidence of a disinterested writer. Some have dreamed of modesty on Xenophon's part—a theory which ignores all that we know of his character. Others, again, suppose that he expanded a nucleus or smaller narrative of Themistogenes, but are opposed by minute censors who find traces of gaps and omissions, and think our *Anabasis* only a compendium. It is a curious fact, that the writer of the book not only speaks of Xenophon throughout in the third person, but that he often pretends not to have been himself an eye-witness. Thus,[1] in describing a scene at which Xenophon's presence had just been mentioned, the writer proceeds: '*but some say* that they (the Greeks charging at Cunaxa) struck with their shields against their spears, to frighten the horses.' Several such examples are cited by Mure.[2] On the other hand, there are passages, like the soliloquy of Xenophon, when he starts up from his dream in the eventful night after the treacherous murder of the generals, which can hardly have been composed by anyone else, even admitting the habit among Greek historians of supplying set speeches for prominent speakers in their narrative.

Nevertheless contemporary writers, like Isocrates, while well acquainted with the history of the Retreat, and often quoting it as a great feat of arms, never mention Xenophon among its leaders. This silence of Isocrates is to me so strange that I conjecture him to have read an original and shorter *Anabasis* by Themistogenes, in which the part of Xenophon was by no means so prominent; that Xenophon, in reply to unfavourable criticisms upon his conduct in connection with his relations to Athens and Sparta, took up this obscure and little known work, and re-edited it with larger additions from his own recollections. Hence the combination of second-hand and direct observations, and also those not very consistent excuses and self-justifications in the later part of the narrative which Mure has exposed with much acuteness. According to this theory the opening notice of the third book of the *Hellenica*, which may just as well be regarded as the concluding sentence of the earlier second book, must have been written before Xenophon rehandled the work; for from that moment

[1] i. 8, 18. [2] v. p. 368.

his authorship could not be doubtful, and his affected disguise would be ridiculous. It would also account for any harshnesses of transition which are really to be found in the work, still more for the 472 words not elsewhere (*aut perraro*) used by Xenophon, which the patience of Sauppe and others has discovered in our text.

It is surely unnecessary to say one word in description of the subject-matter of the *Anabasis*, which may be found in any elementary history of Greece, and with great fulness of detail in Grote's monumental work.

§ 480. As to the historical merit of the work, most critics have been unbounded in their admiration of its excellence, and have adopted it as a thoroughly complete and faithful account of a very important episode in Greek history. Even Grote, who is cautious and critical in accepting the statements of the *Hellenica*, here lays aside all reserve, and finds in Xenophon the model of an Athenian gentleman, and a splendid specimen of the results of democratic education. This mixture of scepticism and credulity is a curious feature often recurring in Grote's great work. We do not so much wonder at it in mere philologists. But many even among these, and with them Colonel Mure, in one of the best chapters of his work, have suspected that the *Anabasis* is, after all, as an historical work, not more conscientious than the later *Hellenica*, and that the author, without fear of contradiction, seeing that all the main actors were now dead or scattered, could assume an importance quite beyond that warranted by the real facts. He is the soul of the Retreat : he is never wrong ; he always thinks of the right thing, and says the right word. It seems extraordinary that, were his achievements equal to his description of them, he should not have been recognised as one of the greatest generals of the age ; and yet we never find him either employed or consulted subsequently in that capacity.

In truth we have here a striking example of the value of literary excellence. The clear and fascinating narrative of the author's adventures ; his affected modesty and worthiness, his frankness and apparent naïveness and piety —all these seductive qualities have made us forget that he is really pleading his own case, without admitting any reply ; while, even on his own

showing, his conduct towards his companions at the close was doubtful and treacherous. At all events, his contemporaries seem to have judged him differently from the mass of modern critics. The book is one familiar to every schoolboy, and there is no figure in Greek history now so prominent in the classical world. This is a just tribute to his style and to the adventurous life which he led. In his own day, the Retreat of the Ten Thousand was chiefly valuable in showing the inherent weakness of the Persian Empire, and in suggesting to every ambitious Greek the possibility of overthrowing it. But to us the concluding books, which treat of the fortunes of the army after it reached the sea near Trapezus, have perhaps the most interesting and valuable lessons. They are far less read and edited than the earlier books, and schoolboys seldom attain unto them. Nevertheless, it is here we obtain our only clear and detailed account of the doings of a mercenary force, when not engaged in an actual campaign—of the scourge which such a force was to all the surrounding country, and how they were just as likely to plunder a Greek as a barbarian settlement. At the same time we see among them that strong sense of external religion, that dependance on dreams and omens, that fear of the anger of the gods, which strikes us all through Xenophon's writings as a strong contrast to the temper of Thucydides. In all these features we are strongly reminded of the Grand Catalan Company, whose pious words and atrocious deeds form so interesting a chapter in the history of the Byzantine Empire, and of Greece during the Frankish occupation. There are also in this concluding part of the *Anabasis* many curious details about the manners and customs of savage tribes living along the Euxine, as well as of the court of Seuthes, and of the social condition of his kingdom.

§ 481. The digression about his residence with his children at Skillus[1] proves that the work was not brought out till many years after his return, somewhere about 380 B.C. It would have been impossible for him to resuscitate the details with such accuracy, had he not either taken notes at the time or trusted to some earlier history of the Retreat. It seems to me improbable that, had he kept a journal with the intention of

[1] v. 3.

publishing it, he should have delayed its completion, when all Greece was deeply interested in so remarkable and significant a campaign. His delay may be accounted for by the earlier work of Themistogenes, which I have above assumed, and perhaps by his fear of being contradicted or criticised by the surviving leaders, had he put his own prowess so strongly forward while they were at hand to correct him.

Nothing strikes us more strongly, at the close of this history, than the enormous power wielded by the Spartan harmosts and admirals throughout Hellenic lands, and the arbitrary and cruel use they made of it. Xenophon's Laconism was not then so developed as to prevent him from drawing these things with a faithful hand; his own subserviency to the Spartans, and his determination to stand well with them, while it throws a stain upon his loyalty to his comrades, shows us how he thought it hopeless to adopt any other policy. He may have apprehended banishment from Athens, though the digression just referred to is worded as if it had only followed his treason at the battle of Coronea. It is indeed hard to conceive any motive strong enough to induce him to this latter step, except his personal attachment to King Agesilaus. We may be sure that an Athenian would feel as much intoxicated by the favour of a Spartan king as some Americans are by the courtesy of European grandees.[1]

§ 482. This intimacy with one of the main actors seems to have suggested to him the continuation of his *Hellenica*, which he accordingly carried down to the year 362 B.C., ending with the battle of Mantinea. It is in this work that we meet with the earliest specimen of that debased historiography which is mainly to be traced to the influence of the rhetoricians, and particularly of Isocrates. As that rhetor confessedly used historical facts for the sake of recommending a policy; as he propagated the old sophistical habit of composing panegyrics of or attacks on mythical and historical persons, in which truth was deliberately sacrificed to oratorical effect; as he began distinctly

[1] There are three special Lexica on the *Anabasis*, by Strack (8th ed. 1874), Vollbrecht (4th ed. 1880), and Suhle; Rehdantz' 4th and Vollbrecht's 6th eds. (both 1877) are the best commentaries; Arnold Hug's new recension (Teubner, 1878), based on the Parisian MS. C, eclipses all previous texts, even Cobet's, and is regarded by many critics as final.

to lay claim to history as a branch of oratory; the fatal fashion was introduced of writing history with an object, and so the splendid path pointed out and pursued by Herodotus and Thucydides was abandoned. Thus we have a school of historians whose respect and attachment for truth is seriously impaired, while their studied rhetoric is indeed by no means superior to their great models. The later books of the *Hellenica* are an instance of this depraved tendency, and here we happily have some means of exposing it. The earlier books are upon the Asiatic campaigns of the Lacedæmonians, in which Xenophon could panegyrise them without serious damage, though occasional discussions about acts of tyranny in Elis and Thebes are glossed over without comment, especially when Agesilaus is concerned. But in the later and general history of Greece, which follows the battle of Coronea, when the leaders of Greece were Thebes and Sparta, and when the latter was completely humbled by the genius of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, the deliberate partiality of the author becomes painfully apparent. He was writing up Agesilaus, a second-rate man, against the strong and sound popular opinion that Epaminondas was the great military genius of his age. Hence the military achievements of both Ismenias at Naryx, and Pelopidas at Tegyra—victories of Thebans over Spartans—are quietly omitted; at Leuctra and elsewhere the Theban generals' names are ignored, and it is only at the close of the book, in describing the campaign which ended with Mantinea, that a tardy tribute to Epaminondas is wrung from him, in terms which show that the popular opinion (which we find in Plutarch) was then prevalent, and that he sought to detract from it by no better arguments than petty carping, unjust insinuations, and unworthy silence. This is all the more regrettable, as we have in Xenophon one of the few men competent, had he been so disposed, to have informed us concerning the remarkable innovations in both tactics and strategy due to the great Theban, of which we have but a glimpse in the account of the battle of Mantinea—a sort of ancient Rossbach in its disposition. But the fuller criticism of such matters does not belong to the history of literature.

§ 483. Turning to the style of the *Hellenica*, the ordinary

reader finds it easy and pleasant, yet not without a certain dryness and narrowness, as the author confines himself strictly to military affairs and political revolutions, without social or literary digressions. But more careful critics find it full of harsh transitions, apparent gaps and breaks, and other traces of its either being left unfinished by its author, or contracted by an incompetent epitomist. They even profess to find in Plutarch traces of his use of a fuller Hellenica, which had disappeared, and made place for the present compendium, before the days of Diogenes Laertius. But all such arguments are surely very unsafe in the absence of the other sources, which Plutarch may have used, and in answer to which Xenophon may have composed his *Hellenica*. This latter attitude seems to me so probable, that I fancy the book was composed in the form now before us, by way of answer to some strong and popular panegyric on the Theban leaders.[1] Such an origin would account for gaps, for transitions, and for allusions not supported by the work itself—such, for example, as that to the fame of Epaminondas, in the very last chapter, when hardly an act of his has been recorded throughout the history. But the weight of German enquiry into the sources used by Plutarch, and his way of using them, inclines to the theory that he followed some later historian, such as Ephorus or Ister, as his one main guide in each life, so that he only agrees with the older authorities when these authors have copied them. Plutarch may, therefore, not have used Xenophon directly, any more than he used Thucydides directly in composing his *Lives*.[2]

In other respects the composition reminds one rather of Herodotus than of Thucydides, not of course in dialect, but in the dramatic way in which speakers are introduced, short speeches and dialogues interspersed, and especially in the constant transition from indirect to direct speaking—from a report of what was said into the actual words of the orator. This practice is, indeed, so constant in the *Hel-*

[1] See especially 7, 5, 12, which is manifestly a reply to such a panegyric.

[2] Cf. Vollbrecht, *De Xen. Hell.* (Hannover, 1874), pp. 19, 20, who states and refutes the arguments of Kyprianos and Grosser, the main advocates of the epitome theory.

lenica, as to be apparently a favourite *figure* with the author. There is an occasional moral or religious reflection of no great depth, and always in agreement with the writer's bias. In the scenes which he himself witnessed, such as the battle of Coronea, and the announcement to Agesilaus of the destruction of his battalion by Iphicrates near Corinth, there is much graphic power; and he does not seek to paint his hero a conventional Spartan, but a man touched with the changes of fortune, starting up in wild excitement from his throne or weeping with joy, at sudden announcements of evil or of good.[1]

§ 484. The formal panegyric of the Spartan king has come down to us in the tract entitled *Agesilaus*, which gives a sketch of his life and acts, in the form of a written encomium, like Isocrates' *Evagoras*, which that orator afterwards declares to have been the model for many imitators. Most of the facts in this tract are copied from the *Hellenica*, some unsuitable points being omitted, and a notice added of Agesilaus' expedition to Egypt, and death, which occurred in 360 B.C. Hence the tract, if genuine, must rank amongst Xenophon's latest works. But concerning the genuineness there is, as usual, a mass of confident and contradictory criticism, many first-rate critics asserting that the book must be by Xenophon, because of its style and its manifest borrowing from the *Hellenica*, while a large number of learned men reject it for the very same reasons. Under such circumstances, any new decision is not likely to be accepted with much confidence. The rhetorical pomp, which marks this composition beside its genuine fellows, may of course be accounted for by its very object—an epideictic display. The historical suppressions are proper to such a performance,[2] even were they not strictly Xenophontic. But what does seem to me like the work of a stranger, and not of the Boswell of Agesilaus, is the want of intimate personal knowledge of that king beyond what the *Hellenica* afford. There are, indeed, a few things added, but it seems strange that Xenophon, if he were the author, should not have supplemented his *Hellenica* with

[1] The best recent editions of the *Hellenica* are those of Breitenbach (1876), Büch-enschütz (1876), and E. Kurz (Munich, 1874).

[2] On this point, therefore, the censures of Mure (v. pp. 434, 435) are completely beside the point.

many private recollections, when he is illustrating the character of his hero by special anecdotes. I am suspicious, moreover, on account of the gross exaggeration (in chap. ii.) about the Spartan loss at Leuctra, which, he says, amounted to half the citizens, whereas in the *Hellenica* we are told that 400 out of the 700 present were slain. The style is uneven, and the structure of the piece not according to the strict laws of rhetoric. Thus the proem consists only of two short sentences, and there is a full recapitulation at the end, which is unsuitable, and spoils the effect (as Isocrates felt, when he forbade such repetitions in encomia). The following sentence is perhaps the worst possible specimen of Gorgian alliteration[1]:—*νομίζων ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τό τε ἀτρεμές, καὶ ἀνεκπληκτότατον, καὶ ἀθορυβητότατον, καὶ ἀναμαρτητότατον, καὶ δυσεπιβουλευτότατον εἶναι.* Several of these words occur nowhere else in Xenophon, as is the case with many other terms in this tract. But the frequent recurrence of *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* in each tract or work of Xenophon makes it very difficult to establish their genuineness from internal evidence. In contrast to the former, here is an elegantly finished period: *ὁ δὲ καρτερίᾳ μὲν πρωτεύων, ἔνθα πονεῖν καιρός, ἀλκῇ δέ, ὅπου ἀνδρίας ἀγών, γνώμῃ δέ, ὅπου βουλῆς ἔργον, οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς παντελῶς ἂν νομίζεσθαι.*[2] Here I leave the *Agesilaus*, recording my own opinion against its genuineness, but referring the reader to the German critics for arguments on whichever side he pleases to range himself. There is a convenient English text and commentary lately published by Mr. Hailstone.

§ 485. We now proceed to consider the Socratic group of works, consisting of the *Memoirs*, or general sketch of Socrates, with the *Œconomicus*, which describes his views on the practical business of life, and the *Symposium*, on social relaxations. This account of the great philosopher, by an affectionate pupil, differs widely from the panegyric we have just discussed. Instead of rhetorical periods and figures, for which Xenophon had little natural taste, and imperfect training, we have the form of artless narrative and easy dialogue, in which he is a great master, though overshadowed by the quaint Herodotus

[1] c. vi. sub fin.

[2] Cf. also c. xi. § 13.

and the matchless Plato. Yet the real artlessness and the frequent tameness of his conversations only impress us the more strongly with their faithfulness, and it is now agreed that to him we must look for the unvarnished picture of the great master whom Plato transfigured and Aristophanes traduced. This form of composition was indeed not new, or original to Xenophon, having been already employed by Ion of Chios, in his Recollections of his own Life, and of the remarkable men he had met. But Xenophon applied it to the special purpose of illustrating the Life and Character of Socrates, and the other persons introduced are intended as mere foils to the central figure.

It is remarkable that the author, though here speaking throughout in the first person, introduces himself as a third actor in one scene.[1] The treatise as a whole is too disjointed and too diffuse to be agreeable reading, but may be taken up here and there with great profit. Near the commencement[2] there is a very interesting defence of Socrates against the charge of having educated Alcibiades and Critias. It is shown that these men went to Socrates to gain power from intercourse with him, not to learn virtue, which they from the beginning despised, though they were for a time kept in check by him. I may indicate as specially interesting in the remainder of the work the *locus classicus* on the choice of Heracles, borrowed from Prodicus' famous apologue,[3] the sketch of a *Panegyricus* on Athens,[4] and the very elegant argument for the existence and benevolence of the gods from final causes,[5] with the exhortation to piety in gratitude for these favours.

The last chapter[6] has so much in common with the *Apologia Socratis* handed down to us under the name of Xenophon, that most critics have refused to believe in the genuineness of both, but believe that one at least, perhaps both, must be spurious and that the longer *Apologia* is either the source or the expanded copy of the eighth chapter. If the *Apologia* is (as I believe) genuine, it was probably the original conclusion of the *Memoirs*, with which it agrees strictly in form, being professedly no complete account, but, like the fourth Gospel, a sort of supplement to the incompleteness of other defences. Cobet[7]

[1] i. 3, 11. [2] i. 2, 12, sq. [3] ii. 1, 21, sq.
[4] iii. 5, 10, sq. [5] iv. 3. [6] iv. 8. [7] *Nov. Lectt.* 667, sq.

thinks it specially intended as a reply to the accusation of the sophist Polycrates—a rhetorical exercise to which Isocrates alludes in his *Busiris* (above, p. 10). The shorter eighth chapter would then be an excerpt, put together and added to the *Memoirs* when the *Apologia* came to be read and copied out separately. As a defence, though neatly and even elegantly written in the unmistakable vein of Socratic questioning, it is very inferior to Plato's *Apologia*. For it implies a greater assumption of wisdom and piety in Socrates (which specially appears in the far stronger response of the oracle to Chærephon), and also preaches the eudæmonistic view of the profits of death at the limit of a hale old age, with which Socrates consoles himself. He thinks it a positive gain to die before his faculties and friends forsake him. Old age, we must remember, was not honoured at Athens as it is among us.

The marks of time in both *Memoirs* and *Apologia* are few and uncertain. In the former he says[1] that all 'even still' continue to feel Socrates' loss (ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες αὐτόν), which seems to imply the lapse of some years after his execution. The Apology alludes not only to the death of Anytus, but to the confirmed drunkenness and loss of character of his son, and this again requires a considerable interval. Still I do not believe, in the rapidly changing society of Athens, that these *Memoirs* would have produced any effect, or the *Apologia* have been read, many years after Socrates' death. If so, this sketch of Socrates would date from the time when Xenophon first attained literary leisure at Skillus, about 390 B.C.

The text is purer than most of our MSS. of Xenophon, nor have the critics (except in the last chapter of the *Memoirs*) found fault with the logical nexus of the various subjects, as they are successively discussed. These tracts have not received much attention from English scholars, who seem, indeed, of late years, rather determined by school requirements than by the intrinsic value or interest of the Greek classics. The best special information (besides the histories of philosophy on Socrates) will be found in Breitenbach's (ed. 5, Berlin 1878) and Kühner's editions, and in the preface to Sauppe's text.

[1] *Mem.* iv. 8, 11.

§ 486. The *Œconomicus*, which is in form a mere book of the *Memoirs*, introduced with a connecting particle, is really an independent treatise, and is the only Socratic dialogue of Xenophon which can be compared in value to the Platonic dialogues. For here Xenophon is no longer a mere pupil, but an independent thinker, setting forth views even opposed to those of his master. But, characteristically enough, while Plato does this in speculation, Xenophon does it in practical matters, and in relation to the art of husbandry. The dialogue, which is very varied in its subjects, and, excepting the technical part, exceedingly interesting, begins with Socrates' affected desire to make the fashionable and ambitious Critobulus a good economist, since, though his fortune is large, his expenses, and the public demands upon him, are proportionate. They then enter upon a very sophistical discussion as to the proper meaning of the term *economy*, which is shown by Socrates to apply to practical good sense in all the affairs of life, but specially to the management of one's household ; and first of all of its mistress, then also of landed property with its stock, the chief kind being horses. There follows a panegyric on farming,[1] showing it to be a suitable recreation even for the Persian king, with the garden anecdote about Cyrus and Lysander, and an allusion to Cyrus' death, which is an anachronism in Socrates' mouth, as he could hardly have heard such details until the return of the Cyreians, just before his trial. There is a fine passage[2] on the tyranny of the passions, which is eminently Socratic, but the panegyric on agriculture, in cap. v., is probably quite foreign to him.

Accordingly, with great dramatic propriety, the leading part is now transferred by Socrates to Ischomachus, a gentleman of position as a landed proprietor, and owner of a large town house, who instructs Socrates, first[3] on his method of training his wife and servants, then[4] on his own rules of life and of recreation, and next[5] on the training of his steward. There follow[6] chapters on the details of practical farming.

[1] *Œcon.* cc. 4 and 5.
[2] c. 1, 16, sq.
[3] cc. 6–10.
[4] c. 11.
[5] cc. 12–14.
[6] cc. 14–19.

The end of the treatise is an eloquent argument against Socrates' leading doctrine, that knowledge is virtue, since all men understand husbandry, but many fail from not carrying out what they know, through sloth, or incapacity of governing their dependants. The conclusion is a reflection upon the divine gift of ruling men without constraint, which seems inborn in a few men, and cannot be acquired. It is likely that Xenophon is here thinking of Epaminondas, in whom he particularly praises this quality at the close of the *Hellenica.* Thus the principal speaker not only lectures Socrates on topics which the latter does not understand, but tells him important truths which he does not contradict, though they are foreign to his teaching. We may, therefore, regard this tract as composed after the *Memoirs,* and that the author began by adhering to the form of dialogue and the character of Socrates, but soon wandered into an independent line of thought. The description given by Ischomachus, a model Attic husband, of his young wife, brought up in total ignorance except of cooking, and adorned with paint and false hair, and high-heeled shoes, though never allowed to leave the house—his account of his gradual education of her, of her ingenuous and noble cooperation, and of the honourable relations of husband and wife, is one of the most striking passages in all Greek literature.[1] The style is careful and pure, though critics find some peculiarities unusual in Xenophon.[2] The reader will find in the *Œconomicus* many hints of the author's

[1] Cf. my *Social Life in Greece* pp. 275, sq. It is remarkable that the use of factitious dress and ornament, so justly reprehended by Ischomachus here, is defended in the case of the Persian kings in the *Cyropædia* (viii. 1, 40–2) as a means of imposing on (καταγοητεύειν) their subjects.

[2] Thus the careful variation of the verbs in this sentence (concerning the risks of painting and other artificial aids to female beauty) is remarkable: ἢ γὰρ ἐξ εὐνῆς ἁλίσκονται ἐξανισταμέναι πρὶν παρασκευάσασθαι, ἢ ὑπὸ ἱδρῶτος ἐλέγχονται ἢ ὑπὸ δακρύων βασανίζονται ἢ ὑπὸ λουτροῦ ἀληθινῶς κατωπτεύθησαν. Here is an elegant passage in praise of husbandry:—xix. 17–19: Οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ πάλαι σοι ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γεωργία οὕτω φιλάνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πρακτὰ τέχνη ὥστε καὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐπιστήμονας εὐθὺς ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖν. πολλὰ δ', ἔφη, καὶ αὐτὴ διδάσκει ὡς ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτῇ χρῷτο. αὐτίκα ἄμπελος ἀναβαίνουσα μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα, ὅταν ἔχῃ τι πλησίον δένδρον, διδάσκει ἱστάναι αὐτήν· περιπετεννύουσα δὲ τὰ οἰνάρα, ὅταν ἔτι αὐτῇ ἁπαλοὶ οἱ βότρυες ὦσι, διδάσκει σκιάζειν τὰ ἡλιούμενα ταύτην τὴν ὥραν· ὅταν δὲ καιρὸς ᾖ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἤδη

special knowledge of horses, which led to the tract *on the Horse*, and also of the technical side of his mind, shown in the details concerning farming. The allusion to Aspasia, as an authority on the duties of husbands and wives, has excited much attention, and has helped ingenious authors, such as M. Becq de Fouquières,[1] to rehabilitate her character. English readers will also be much struck with the description of the big Phœnician ship, which was visited and admired for its order and discipline, as an English man-of-war is visited in foreign parts. These are but a few of the many points suggested by this tract. The best and most recent English edition is Dr. Holden's (Macmillan's classical series). The latest English version has appeared in vol. i. of Mr. Ruskin's *Bibliotheca Pastorum*. Schenkl's text is the most recent German recension.

§ 487. We turn to the *Banquet*, a dialogue intended to show the conversation of educated gentlemen at Athens in society, and especially of Socrates, as the king of all good talkers. The scene is laid at a feast given by the rich Callias in honour of his favourite, the boy Autolycus, who won a victory in the pancratium at Athens in 421 B.C. But when critics infer that Xenophon was present at a banquet in this year, they quite mistake the freedom with which Attic authors composed their dialogues. He was intimate, he tells us, with the speakers, and that is all.

After describing the extraordinary effect of the beauty of Autolycus on the company, and their consequent silence and awkwardness, a professional jester or parasite, perhaps the earliest we know personally, intrudes himself, but is hospitably admitted to the feast. After his jokes have been tried, with little effect, the conversation becomes general, and wanders through many subjects, all of them, however, social or ethical. This is diversified by the feats of a company of what we should call circus performers, introduced by a professional Syracusan, who

γλυκοίνεσθαι τὰς σταφυλάς, φυλλορροοῦσα διδάσκει ἑαυτὴν ψιλοῦν καὶ πεπαίνειν τὴν ὀπώραν, διὰ πολυφορίαν δὲ τοὺς μὲν πέπονας δεικνύουσα βότρυς, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι ὠμοτέρους φέρουσα, διδάσκει τρυγᾶν ἑαυτήν, ὥσπεο τὰ σῦκα συκάζουσι, τὸ ὀργῶν ἀεί.

[1] *Aspasie de Milet.* (Paris, 1872). The special literature on the *Œconomicus*, both in editions and dissertations, will be found enumerated (up to 1864) in Sauppe's Preface. Schneider's edition (with several other Xenophontic tracts, in 1805) is still the most complete.

is much annoyed at the lead which Socrates takes in the entertainment, and only pacified by the latter recommending him to exhibit something lovely and graceful, instead of feats of danger. The banquet accordingly closes with a wanton scene of the loves of Ariadne and Bacchus, acted by a boy and girl of his troupe.

The conversation, which seldom remains fixed upon one subject, is chiefly intended (unlike the *Memoirs*) to bring out the peculiarities of each of the company. Antisthenes, Critobulus, Callias, and Hermogenes are sketched in this way, each by dilating upon his own strong point. Thus Hermogenes describes his piety, and the practical results of it,[1] in a very homely way, reminding us of Sydney Smith's description of certain people's religion as *otherworldliness*. Poverty and riches are discussed, and so are beauty and love. This latter is the leading topic, and gives Socrates the opportunity for a remarkable discourse on its two species—the spiritual and the carnal[2]—which is not unworthy of Plato's best writing.

The similarity of subject has of course given rise to much discussion on the relation of this to Plato's *Symposium*, some holding that Plato meant to rival Xenophon, others that Xenophon intended a critique on Plato, while there is really no clear evidence that either intended to censure or sought to excel the other. In splendour of thought and loftiness of diction Plato is of course far pre-eminent, but we may be sure that in excluding all the professional amusements, which he does with marked contempt, and in making his guests speak long orations on the same subject, he has not drawn so faithful or natural a picture as Xenophon's, where the talk is disconnected, often trivial, sometimes coarse. To us it would appear that the people talked too much about themselves, and that questions of personal interest, as opposed to those of larger importance, are too prominent. On the main subject discussed, that of love, our modern ideas are so far removed from those of Socrates and his companions, that it requires long study of Greek life, and deep sympathy with its grace and beauty, to enable us to tolerate even what is said by way of banter. To the serious statements of Socrates no objection can be made. But it is not to be wondered at that a respectable English Philistine,

[1] iv. 47, sq. [2] cap. viii.

like Mure,[1] should condemn Xenophon's Socrates and his company very severely, and see nothing but grossness of the lowest kind in their mutual affection. We must not judge them so harshly, for even the divine Plato stooped lower at the close of his *Symposium*, and Epaminondas did not rise above the received customs of his country, though both were men of genius, and I believe also of piety.

The weight of opinion leans towards the priority of Xenophon's *Symposium*, and to its being written early in his literary life, as a supplement to his more elaborate picture of Socrates. As a source of information on Attic morals and manners its value is not easily over-estimated, nor is it by any means so tedious as his longer works.

§ 488. The political philosophy of Xenophon was not, as we may imagine, of a very deep or speculative order. During middle life he was brought in contact with the Spartans, whose constitution was the most lasting and the most aristocratic in Greece. Accordingly he undertook in a special tract, not unlike the tract already described on the Athenian state, to show the causes of the dignity and permanence of the Spartan power. There is, indeed, little said about the constitution, so little that the tract should rather be entitled *on the discipline of the Lacedæmonians* than on their polity. The Lycurgean training of the youth, so like in some respects to that of our public schools, the military training of the citizens, their high state of discipline and their subjection to authority, are set forth in a very striking picture. But we can see plainly that the author gives us old traditions confused with actual facts, and the fourteenth chapter, if genuine, distinctly admits that a great decadence had set in, and that the ideal condition described in the tract was a thing of the past. The concluding remark, that the curious obsequies of the kings were meant to show they

[1] Vol. v. pp. 453, sq. The reader who desires to consult an opposite authority may turn to G. F. Rettig's long article in the *Philologus* for 1879 (vol. xxxviii. part ii.), where the whole dialogue is analysed with great minuteness, and all manner of hidden delicacies and moral lessons extracted from it. But the learned German is so simple as to imagine that the Syracusan's παῖς is his son, and to be completely in the dark as to their relations (p. 296). He has since (1881) published a text and commentary, with a translation.

were regarded as heroes, appears to me made in reference to Herodotus' remark,[1] that the customs of the Spartans on these occasions were the same as those of the Asiatic barbarians.

There is the usual controversy about the form of the work, and even Cobet is in this case induced to consider it a mere abstract of a fuller treatise, seeing that Plutarch, who uses it freely as an authority in his life of Lycurgus, seems to quote things not now to be found in the text. Others have pointed out its antagonism to the *Panathenaicus* of Isocrates, who claims for the Attic culture, against a partisan of the Spartans, the superiority which Xenophon claims for his patrons. When the tract was written, the battle of Leuctra had evidently not been fought, and the fourteenth chapter, which is perhaps to be placed at the end, and may have been mutilated, seems intended to meet the altered *prestige* of the Spartans in Greece. I am disposed to hold it genuine, and nearly in its original form, seeing that all Xenophon's works are found equally disjointed in argument, and that the theory of compendiums by later hands surely cannot apply to the whole of his writings.

The permanent interest of the tract is the sketch of a state morality overriding the ordinary laws of chastity and of purity, and yet, though maintaining rude habits and rude morals, promoting the feelings of honour and personal dignity among men and women, who must have been degraded in any ordinary state. There is much in Plato's *Republic* plainly imitated from this remarkable society, particularly his postponing the purity and permanence of the marriage tie to the higher duty of producing healthy children for the state. But Plato's arrangements, whereby the sanctity of the tie was strictly maintained through its temporary duration, seem far more civilised than the customs of the Spartans.[2] They may, however, be only instances of an Aryan custom akin to the Hebrew *Levirat*, and meant to obviate the extinction of families,[3] for the Spartan women, whatever their other faults, seem to us more like modern mothers of families than any other Greek women.

On the *polity of the Lacedæmonians* we have also a good monograph by E. Naumann (Berlin, 1876), who defends the authenticity and completeness of the tract, and argues it to

[1] vi. 58. [2] i. 7–10. [3] Cf. C. Jannet, *Inst. Soc. à Sparte*, p. 101.

have been written about 385, with the last chapter added in 378. He thinks it was followed by the *Hiero*, and then by the ideal sketch of the *Cyropædia*.

§ 489. But while Xenophon could not but be struck with the marvellous permanence and power of the Spartan constitution, his inmost character must have led him to favour the monarchical form. He was all his life attached to some one superior mind, which he took as his guide, and which he served with ready obedience—first, and best, Socrates, then the brilliant Cyrus, then the inferior, but still able Agesilaus. Hence we find in his remarkable dialogue entitled *Hiero*, between that tyrant and the poet Simonides, that though the miseries and dangers of tyranny are most eloquently set forth, the author finally turns to the good side of absolute rule, and shows how a despot may live a life of great usefulness to the people whom he sways. A private career is, indeed, vastly happier, but a tyranny may be made not only an endurable, but even an enviable position. The whole form of the tract is peculiar, being a dialogue without Socrates, and being, moreover, more ornately written than is usual with Xenophon. Nevertheless, critics have been almost unanimous in accepting it as genuine, and I do not feel my instinctive dissent can be supported with convincing arguments. The passage which describes the change from the contentment of private life to the anxieties of sovereignty, is perhaps the most striking in all our remains of Xenophon.[1]

[1] Cap. vi. §§ 1–8 : Βούλομαί σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, κἀκείνας τὰς εὐφροσύνας δηλῶσαι ὅσαις ἐγὼ χρώμενος ὅτ' ἦν ἰδιώτης, νῦν ἐπειδὴ τύραννος ἐγενόμην, αἰσθάνομαι στερόμενος αὐτῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ξυνῆν μὲν ἡλικιώταις ἡδόμενος ἡδομένοις ἐμοί, συνῆν δὲ ἐμαυτῷ, ὁπότε ἡσυχίας ἐπιθυμήσαιμι, διῆγον δ' ἐν συμποσίοις πολλάκις μὲν μέχρι τοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι πάντων εἴ τι χαλεπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ ἦν, πολλάκις δὲ μέχρι τοῦ ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ θαλίαις καὶ χοροῖς τὴν ψυχὴν συγκαταμιγνύναι, πολλάκις δὲ μέχρι κοινῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐμῆς τε καὶ τῶν παρόντων. νῦν δὲ ἀπεστέρημαι μὲν τῶν ἡδομένων ἐμοὶ διὰ τὸ δούλους ἀντὶ φίλων ἔχειν τοὺς ἑταίρους, ἀπεστέρημαι δ' αὐτὸς τοῦ ἡδέως ἐκείνοις ὁμιλεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐνορᾶν εὔνοιαν ἐμοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν· μέθην δὲ καὶ ὕπνον ὁμοίως ἐνέδρᾳ φυλάττομαι. τὸ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ὄχλον, φοβεῖσθαι δ' ἐρημίαν, φοβεῖσθαι δὲ ἀφυλαξίαν, φοβεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς φυλάττοντας, καὶ μήτ' ἀνόπλους ἔχειν ἐθέλειν περὶ αὑτὸν μήθ' ὡπλισμένους ἡδέως θεᾶσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀργαλέον ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα ; ἔτι δὲ ξένοις μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ πολίταις πιστεύειν, βαρβάροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ Ἕλλησιν, ἐπιθυμεῖν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθέρους δούλους ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ δούλους ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν ἐλευθέρους, οὐ πάντα σοι

§ 490. In this tract, the disadvantages of despotism decidedly preponderate, but we find that our author was not content to leave the question so, and many years after (for the *Hiero* seems an early work) we find him developing his ideal state under the form of a paternal and hereditary monarchy in his *Education of Cyrus;* a very diffuse political novel, in which he sets forth his ideal picture as a biography of the older and greater Cyrus, in opposition to the dreams of Plato and other theoretical politicians of the day. This work, which is the longest and most ambitious of all Xenophon's writings, but consequently the most tedious and the least read, seems to be our earliest specimen of a romance in Greek prose literature. The author frequently professes to have written from observation, and from information obtained in the East, and this has induced many critics to seek in the *Cyropædia* for historical materials, wherewith to supply a corrected account of the Eastern histories of Herodotus and Ktesias. Xenophon differs from both as much as they differ from one another on the history of Cyrus; and as there were at least four versions of his origin and his rise into power, it has often been supposed that Xenophon followed one of these traditions, and did not invent his facts. When he agrees with Ktesias against Herodotus, that the name of Cyrus' second son was Tanaoxares, and not Smerdis, he no doubt had some foundation for his assertion. But it is idle to attempt to sift out the particles of history from the mass of fiction with which the author has consciously surrounded his hero.

The work being strictly a panegyric of Cyrus in the form of an historical narrative, the writer felt bound to exclude any flaws or faults which he knew, and to exaggerate all his virtues, and seeing that he pursued this rhetorical course in professed history, he was not likely to depart from it in a treatise really

ταῦτα δοκεῖ ψυχῆς ὑπὸ φόβων καταπεπληγμένης τεκμήρια εἶναι; ὅ γέ τοι φόβος οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἐνὼν ταῖς ψυχαῖς λυπηρός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἡδέων συμπαρακολουθῶν λυμεὼν γίγνεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ πολεμικῶν ἔμπειρος εἶ, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, καὶ ἤδη ποτὲ πολεμίᾳ φάλαγγι πλησίον ἀντετάξω, ἀναμνήσθητι ποῖον μέν τινα σῖτον ἠροῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ποῖον δέ τινα ὕπνον ἐκοιμῶ. οἷα μέντοι σοὶ τότ' ἦν τὰ λυπηρά, τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ τῶν τυράννων καὶ ἔτι δεινότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντοθεν πολεμίους ὁρᾶν νομίζουσιν οἱ τύραννοι.

political, and describing an ideal monarch. Thus from this long and elaborate work we can hardly be said to gain anything new on the life of the greatest and the most interesting figure in Asiatic history. Nevertheless, we wonder how a man born and educated in all the blessings of Hellenic law and liberty can stoop to defend almost all the circumstances of Asiatic despotism—eunuch households, painted faces, pompous and effeminate robes, and slavish ceremonies.[1] Such concessions to the splendour of the Persian court, which had evidently so dazzled Xenophon in his youth that he never recovered his political vision, make his ideal picture anything but a monument of Hellenic superiority. As to style, the book is excessively diffuse, and many conversations are introduced without much point, merely to illustrate the conversational talent on which Xenophon much prided himself, as a Socratic Athenian of good birth, and accustomed to good society. But the specimens he gives hardly justify his good opinion of himself.

It is remarkable that in this political romance we have also (as an episode) our earliest sentimental romance, the loves of Abradatas and Panthea, which are told at intervals through the narrative,[2] and which end with the death of Abradatas in battle, and the suicide of Panthea and her eunuchs. As was natural to an Athenian of that epoch, such love could hardly be conceived as existing till after marriage, and the story may have been introduced in support of the Socratic theories of the dignity and importance of the female sex and of the married state. To us, who have been satiated with such stories, this early attempt seems rather dull and feeble, but it deserves notice as a phase important in literature, and one which was to bear fruit an hundredfold.

The great king is represented as dying quietly in his bed, and not from his wounds in a battle, as Ktesias says. He ends his life with a very striking address to his children, in which the author inserts his hopes of the immortality of the soul[3]—a very interesting passage, of which Cicero has made large use.

The last chapter of the book must surely be spurious, as it contradicts the whole purpose of the work. It explains how, as soon as Cyrus was dead, his people degenerated into all

[1] Cf. vii. 5, and viii. 1. [2] Books iv. to vii. [3] viii. 7, 17, sq.

manner of vice and disorder, and reversed all the good arrangements inaugurated by him. This chapter is, indeed, curiously analogous to the chapter on the Lacedæmonian decadence in the tract just discussed, and could not but suggest the hand of an editor, who added his own reflections on the historical results to the theories of the author. In the present case some such theory is necessary to sustain Xenophon's character for good sense. The text is perhaps purer than that of any other portion of our author; but though this is so, and though the style is perhaps smoother and more finished than the rest, yet the subject is so needlessly spun out with dialogues and descriptions of semi-imaginary campaigns, that it can never be popular, though Spenser tells us (Pref. to *Faery Queene*) that it was preferred to Plato's *Republic*! Here, if anywhere, we should have longed for the 'epitomator' of the German critics to come forward, and treat this tedious novel as he is supposed to have treated the rest of Xenophon's remains. The *Cyropædia* seems a late work, composed, probably about 361 B.C.,[1] in the decline of his powers, and when the garrulity of age was increasing.

§ 491. We pass from the most theoretical and fanciful of Xenophon's works to the most thoroughly practical, the tract entitled πόροι (not περὶ προσόδων, a later name), and intended to exhibit the financial resources of Athens, and the policy which should consequently be followed by that state. We hear from Diogenes Laertius that Xenophon, having been exiled on the proposal of Eubulus, was ultimately recalled by the influence of the same statesman, then at the head of the Athenian finances, and it is consequently conjectured that Xenophon, in extreme old age, wrote this tract by way of advice to Eubulus—a notion justly ridiculed by Cobet. Nevertheless, it was certainly intended to support the same party, and, if not written for Eubulus, was intended to dispose the public to put confidence in a peace policy.

Commencing with an eulogistic statement of the climate and central situation of Athens, as favourable for a development of wealth, the author recommends four improvements in

[1] Both Breitenbach and Hertlein have given us good commentaries (now both in third editions, 1874).

state policy : (1) the encouragement of alien settlers, by allowing them to buy or build houses in the city, admitting them to the cavalry (not the hoplite service only), and other such compliments ; (2) the encouragement of merchants by material conveniences, such as marts and hotels, and by better laws for saving time and promptly settling disputes, but in general without any further outlay than 'decrees, and civilities, and attentions,' such as inviting important traders to public entertainments—he also recommends a state merchant service ; (3) the development of the silver mines by state subsidy and state control, providing capital in the way of slave workmen, and by the formation of joint-stock companies ; (4) lastly, by earnestly adopting a peace policy, and endeavouring by embassies to establish a sort of international agreement to check the wastefulness of war. He advises a mission to the Delphic oracle and to Dodona to enquire whether such a policy be not the right one, and if so, how it should be carried out in detail.

But the main object of all this care to increase the revenues of the state is to secure a regular state support of three obols per day, payable to all citizens alike, poor and rich, without any corresponding obligations. Thus, says he, the prevailing poverty will be relieved, and even the rich, who pay heavy taxes, will receive back a very high interest on their outlay. It is hard to conceive a more dangerous and mischievous theory of finance. As Grote observes, the returns for the outlay, especially in the mines and the merchant navy, are all uncertain, while the expenditure is heavy and certain. But even granting the possibility of an adequate return, can any condition be conceived more utterly ruinous to all the true greatness and dignity of Athens than that of making all the citizens pensioners of the state, so long as they could manage to remain at peace with their neighbours? Could any proposal pander more effectually to the weaknesses and vices of the Athenian character? Grote justly points in contrast to the oration of Demosthenes *on the Symmories*, delivered about the same time, where the views of a practical and sensible statesman may be found, based on the same facts, and the same condition of public affairs. There is nothing commendable in the policy of

the tract, except the warm affection and zeal for Athens which the author shows in his declining years.

§ 492. Some critics have wondered why Xenophon makes no mention of agriculture, for which in his other works he shows so strong a predilection, and again, how so experienced and enthusiastic a soldier should advocate a peace policy. Of course the agriculture of Attica was not, in his mind, capable of producing state revenue, and no man was more likely to advocate a peace policy than the aged veteran, who in his hospitable retreat had so long learned to value the enjoyments of peace, while narrating the excitements and dangers of war. The peculiar value of the tract lies not in its recommendations, most of which are obvious, and the rest not very practical, but in the very interesting details it gives of the mines of Laurium, and their working. Xenophon seems to express quite too sanguine an opinion as to their inexhaustible value, and he says some absurd things as to the unalterable value of silver, even as compared with gold. But we know from the speeches of Lycurgus and Hypereides, that great profits were being made twenty years later from the mines, and great activity displayed in opening new shafts. Sycophantic prosecutions, with promises of enormous confiscations of wealth among the people, became quite common, and even stopped private enterprise.[1]

The date has been very well determined by Boeckh as Ol. 106, 1, just after the conclusion of the Social war, and before the beginning of the Sacred war, though the Phocians had, it seems, already seized the Delphic temple, but had retired from it—a preliminary occupation which Cobet was the first to infer, and which has helped to clear away the difficulties of dating the tract. All the critical questions as to its Xenophontic style, its unity, and its purpose, have been discussed in a very careful pamphlet by H. Zurborg (Berlin, 1874), and since in his edition of the text (1876). The form adopted is no longer that of dialogue, but rather that of a deliberative speech,[2] so much so that

[1] Hypereides, *pro Euxen.* col. xlv.

[2] Accordingly, a comparison with Isocrates' speech *on the Peace*, composed under the same circumstances, is very instructive on the differences of the two men : the one broad and vague and sentimental ; the

the tract has been held to be compiled from two such discourses. But all such subtleties are disposed of by the analogy of the remaining tracts, which are wholly, what the *Finances* are chiefly, *technical treatises*, and which, therefore, need only be slightly handled in a work on literature.

§ 493. These technical tracts are three in number : on the care and training of horses ; on the duties of a cavalry officer ; and on hunting, including the care and training of dogs. They are the earliest specimens we have of such books, excepting the Hippocratic treatises, and as such have been much studied by specialists. I confess the *Hipparchicus*, or tract on the duties of a cavalry general, confirms my notion that the Greeks knew little of scientific warfare. The directions for creating and keeping in discipline a cavalry force are what any practical man could suggest. The evolutions described are very simple, and much of the tract is devoted to the political difficulties of raising and maintaining such a force. But the most curious feature of all is its dominant religiousness, so much so that the opening is like that of a business meeting, where the proceedings commence with prayer. All through the practical directions, the reader is constantly reminded that he must act according to the will of the gods ; and at the conclusion Xenophon leaves his reader with a justification of this view : 'If any should wonder why the expression D. V. (*σὺν θεῷ*) has been so frequent in my treatise, let him know well that a man who has gone through many dangers will be less surprised, and that in war, though the adversaries are always making plans, they seldom know how they will turn out.' I may also notice[1] the non-Socratic doctrine that correct knowledge is of no use in any pursuit or art, if we do not insist on the carrying out of the practical details.

§ 494. The treatise *on the Horse* is a far more valuable work, and really shows an insight into the care and training of horses, which would do credit to a modern book. He refers in his preface to the work of Sinon, which he praises, and of which

other narrow and precise in his thinking, but both one-sided, and wanting in the qualities of real statesmanship.

[1] Cap. 9, 2.

a short fragment has survived.[1] He desires to supply what has been omitted in that work, which its author commemorated by setting up a bronze horse at the Eleusinion, and engraving his works on the pedestal.

The technical character of this treatise does not tempt us to delay upon it; I would only mention the persistent inculcation of kindness and gentleness in the treatment of the horse, so far in advance of the methods of our vulgar and brutal horse-trainers. But though Xenophon constantly alludes to the dangers of being cheated in the buying of horses, Providence, which he elsewhere so frequently invokes, is here never called upon to interfere. The principal object of keeping horses at Athens was for display in processions, and curious importance is laid[2] on the proper prancing and caracolling of horses at such ceremonies. In fact, we see the author describing such riding as is represented in the famous Parthenon frieze, which may have been before his mind when writing, We also learn that this was no ideal horsemanship, but the fashionable practice at Athens. The absence of any remarks on saddles, or on shoeing, will strike the modern reader; neither of these was in use among the ancients. Hence the hardening of the feet, and the difficulties of mounting without stirrups, occupy much space. This tract has been specially translated and commented on (together with the *Hipparchicus*, by P. L. Courier, a French Artillery officer, 1807) in English by Berenger, in his *History of the Art of Horsemanship;* also by Fr. Jacobs (Gotha, 1825). Neither tract has received much attention among recent English scholars.

§ 495. We now come to the last and most characteristic of Xenophon's technical tracts, that on *Hunting*, which treats very carefully of the points, the breeding, and training of dogs; then of nets, and, lastly, at great length, of hare hunting, in which the author takes the most enthusiastic delight.[3] Nor is

[1] Published by Darenberg in his *Notices et Extraits des MSS. médicaux*, p. 169.

[2] Cap. 11. Cf. on the whole tract Grasberger's *Erziehung*, &c. iii. p. 231, sq.

[3] *οὕτω δὲ ἐπίχαρί ἐστιν τὸ θηρίον, ὥστε οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἰδὼν ἰχνευόμενον, εὑρισκόμενον, μεταθεόμενον, ἁλισκόμενον ἐπιλάθοιτ' ἂν εἴ του ἐρῴη* (v. 32).

the religious element wanting, for when the nets are ready, the best trained of the dogs is not loosed without a prayer to Apollo and Artemis Agrotera to give the hunter sport. The chase of fawns and stags, or of wild boars, is not detailed with any such care. There is a foolish and mythological preface about Cheiron and his pupils, generally and justly rejected by critics; there is also a very inappropriate attack upon the sophists at the conclusion, beginning with the last (thirteenth) chapter, which is also rejected. I should be disposed to hold the real conclusion to come earlier, ending with 12, 9. But the question is hardly worth discussing. Cobet thinks it (above, p. 50) probably the earliest of Xenophon's works. If we adopt (as I do) Cobet's own arguments on Xenophon's age, he was brought up at Athens during the Peloponnesian war, when hunting in Attica would be seldom possible, and indeed we know that in the following generation one of the comic poets speaks of it as a land where not a hare remained. I am convinced, therefore, that it was not composed till after the author had settled in his 'hunting box' at Skillus. The very form of the genuine proem,[1]—*ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν περαινῶ τοῖς νέοις*, &c.—implies a writer of mature years.

§ 496. On the so-called fragments of Xenophon I need not delay the reader. There are short epistles to Socratic friends, first printed by Allatius, and some quoted by Stobæus, which may be read in the appendix to Sauppe's edition, or in the *Epistolographi Græci*, but which are certainly spurious. There are also a considerable number of words and phrases quoted by old authors and grammarians as Xenophon's, which we do not now find in his works. These are the stronghold of the 'Epitomators,' the chief of whom is the modern Greek Kyprianos. A good many of them are doubtless blunders, where Xenophon is cited instead of Xenophanes, or some similar name. Others are free citations, and can be still identified. A few, especially from the *Anabasis*, are really unexplained, and may possibly come from the lost *Anabasis* of Themistogenes.

§ 497. It remains for us to sum up the general conclusions to be derived from our special survey of Xenophon's works.

[1] i. 18.

We have seen that there is much reasonable suspicion of their having been edited by a later hand. The epilogues of the *Memorabilia*, of the *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, of the *Cyropædia*, of the tract on *Hunting*, all contain irrelevant matter, in some cases stultifying all that goes before. If these be indeed the author's additions, we must assume them to be the additions of an embittered and querulous old age, and appended to the later copies of his works. Again, the combined prolixities and brevities of his style have tempted scholars to the theory that we possess but blundering epitomes, which feebly convey to us the real grace of the 'Attic bee.' But the fact that these objections have been separately brought against so many of his works, show that the epitome theory is vastly improbable, and that the fault lies in the author himself, whose imperfect literary and rhetorical training—Socrates was no master of form—contrasts with the very polished and strictly professional authors of the same period.

It is, however, hardly true to speak of Xenophon as a mere practical man, and his works as mere recreations. On the contrary, his later life seems to have been wholly devoted to literature, and he attained a rank among Attic writers which very few were ever able to reach. Among the Roman critics especially he earned no small meed of praise. His subjects were congenial to them; his books were easy; his language approached the later common dialect, which they all understood perfectly. He was, moreover, always the gentleman amateur, who cared less about a hiatus in his vowels than in his hunting nets, and admitted stragglers in his vocabulary while he would not tolerate them in his troop. This reputation for simple grace and unaffected ease, which made him so popular among Roman critics, he has maintained among the students of Attic style, and among the educators of our youth in Attic Greek, so that great scholars, like Cobet, Dindorf, Sauppe, Schneider, and Schenkl, have spent endless labour upon the purifying of his text. It is the more remarkable, as he confessedly not only admits Ionic, Doric, and poetical words into his ordinary style, but uses so irregular a vocabulary that each work abounds in ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, not only as regards himself, but as regards the

good Attic authors of his age. As a writer, therefore, of good clear Attic Greek, and upon very attractive subjects, there can be no question that Xenophon ranks very high.

§ 498. But when we come to judge him from a different standpoint, and consider how he appreciated the divine philosophy of Socrates, the momentous facts of the Theban supremacy, the merits of the various polities with which his adventurous life acquainted him—then it is that we feel in him a great want, and are obliged to degrade him to the second rank among the writers of the Attic age. For among his many advantages of ability and of experience he lacked the one which is worth all the rest—he lacked genius. We see this in his practical life, for though a successful and experienced general, he never attained any high reputation as such through Greece. Indeed, he seems all his life dominated by any great man whom he met—Socrates, Cyrus, Agesilaus. Yet even here when he endeavours to draw the portraits of his idols, he is a mere Boswell, a mere photographer, who copies petty details, but, being no true artist, is unable to catch the ideal side of the character, and reproduce it for all time. Thus the portrait of Socrates in Plato's dialogues is probably far less faithful in detail than Xenophon's, and yet in its depths how infinitely truer and more satisfying! So likewise in his History, in his political philosophy, he is consciously writing up a personal friend, and writing down his foes; he is consciously recommending the virtues of a personal friend, or, in the *Anabasis*, his own, and thus he omits the larger features of the world-problem as it unrolled before him. Above all, he completely wants that spontaneity, that absence of self-consciousness, which marks the products of real genius. Hence his portrait of Socrates is vulgarised, and that great man's philosophy represented as a mere refined and calm Hedonism, such as Epicurus afterwards taught. His own religion is of the same kind, a cool calculation of the profits to be derived from honouring the gods, and no real exercise of self-denial, purity, or nobleness of soul.

The stirring times in which he lived, and his diligence as an author, make him a valuable and important personage in Attic literature, but he has probably imposed upon the learned

with a great exaggeration of his military deeds in the *Anabasis.* In his own day, this famous Retreat, while it made no little stir through Greece, did not bring him any immediate renown. It is owing to his own bright and well told narrative that he is not only cited as an authority by all the historians of Greece, but that he is a household name in the mouth of every schoolboy who begins the study of classical Greek.

The writings of Xenophon were much read and admired by succeeding generations; but, imitated by Arrian,[1] quoted by Cicero, criticised by the Latin rhetors, I cannot find that the Alexandrian scholars paid him any critical attention. There are said to be scholia in some of the Oxford texts, but as yet unedited, nor do I know what may be their value.

§ 499. *Bibliographical.* The number of extant MSS. is very great, and scattered through libraries from Jerusalem to Madrid, but few of them are old, and there seems much difference of opinion as to their real date and respective value. The earliest dated (A.D. 1166) is the No. 511 in the Marcian library at Venice; there is another of some such date in the Escurial; one at Wolfenbüttel seems the best. Very few of them, if any, contain all the works, but rather selections and excerpts. The earliest printed *Xenophon* is the Latin version of 1476 (Francis. Philelfus, Milan), the first Greek edition the Juntine of 1516. Of recent complete texts the best are Schneider's (3rd edition, Leipzig 1838–40), that in the Didot

[1] The works of Arrian, who called himself, and was called by others, the younger Xenophon, are interesting and valuable from an historical and ethical point of view, but cannot be included within the bounds of Greek classical literature. There are in them so many grave violations of Attic usage, that by common consent they are not studied in an ordinary classical education. The appellation of the younger Xenophon, it may be observed, applies by no means so much to style as to similarities of life and choice of literary subjects. The Socrates of Arrian was Epictetus, whose life and opinions he recorded. Besides this, he wrote history chiefly from a military point of view, such as the *anabasis* of Alexander, the *Indica*, and other lost works, a book on tactics, and a supplement to Xenophon's tract on hunting. The *Indica* were not even composed in Attic Greek, but in the Ionic dialect of Ktesias and Herodotus, the latter of whom he has everywhere imitated in the structure of sentences, and in many peculiar terms.

series, and those of G. Sauppe (Tauchnitz, 8vo., 1864) and L. Dindorf, with A. Hug's *Anabasis* (Teubner, 1873). There are many excellent recent editions of the separate works, which have been already mentioned. Let me add Dr. Holden's *Hiero*, and part of the *Cyropædia* (Pitt Press series). Schenkl's complete edition (Berlin, 1876), with his studies on the MSS. in the *Abhandlungen* of the Vienna Academy for 1875–6, is now far the most complete and valuable. He has also published a very popular Chrestomathy with lexicon (6th edition, Vienna, 1877). The various recent monographs are noticed by Nitsche in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1877. Quite recently (1890) Mr. H. G. Dakyns has published the first volume of a complete English translation, which will doubtless supersede all the older versions. This volume contains part of the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis*.

CHAPTER IV.

DEMOSTHENES.

§ 500. We come at last to a great Greek author, concerning whom there are fortunately very ample materials preserved to us. We have several copies, evidently authentic, of his statue, so that his very appearance is familiar to us. We have in the next place the details of his early struggles in life in his own speeches against his guardians; of his political acts and career in his great public harangues, especially in the speech *for Ctesiphon on the Crown*, which is a splendid *apologia pro vita sua*. We have, moreover, these public confessions in many cases commented and animadverted on by his adversaries, Æschines and Hypereides, so that they are not uncontrolled self-panegyrics.

In the following generation, when literary history came into fashion, his memory was yet fresh enough to afford good materials to historians and biographers. From these are derived the various and independent *Lives* of the orator, which still amount to ten in number. Fullest and most interesting is the work of Plutarch, then the many details contained in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though his official *Life* is not preserved. The various sketches in the *Lives of the Orators*, in Suidas, and in the prefaces to his speeches, are less important. The points which remain in doubt are rather obscured by controversy than by oblivion.

§ 501. We know that Demosthenes was born of respectable and well-to-do, though not illustrious, parents—Demosthenes (of the deme Pæania) and Cleobule,[1] and that in childhood he was

[1] Æschines (*against Ctes.* § 171) gives an explicit account of the Scythian origin of Cleobule, which may be true, but he can find nothing to say against her character.

brought up in comfort, and with the advantages of a good station. But the exact year of his birth is uncertain, because he has himself confused it. He says he was thirty-two years old when he prosecuted Meidias, and this speech is fixed at such a date (349 B.C.) as would make his birth-year 381 B.C.[1] On the other hand, the speech against Onetor specifies that he attained his majority (in his eighteenth year) in the archonship of Polyzelus, 366 B.C. This gives us his birth-year as 384–3 (the date given in the *Lives*); and this date is now assumed, with slight variations, by all the best authorities. Thus at the very outset we have a specimen of the sort of difficulty we constantly meet in treating of this orator. The passage in the speech against Meidias being an isolated statement, must be regarded as a deliberate misstatement, and it deceived most of the ancients—Dionysius, Aulus Gellius, and apparently Plutarch. But there are not wanting indications of the truth elsewhere.[2]

The elder Demosthenes had two establishments, one for the manufacture of swords and knives, another for the wooden frames of couches; in fact, we should call him both a cutler and a cabinet-maker. But of course he carried on this business rather as a capitalist, for his property in slaves and chattels at his death is valued by his son, probably with some exaggeration, at fourteen talents (about 3,300*l.*)—in those days a large fortune. By his will he left his children—Demosthenes, a boy of seven years old, and an only daughter—to the care of two nephews and a family friend, on the understanding that one nephew, Aphobus, should marry his widow (an ordinary Attic arrangement); the second, Demophon, should marry the daughter, with a good dowry, and to all three he gave the use of certain moneys until his son should come of age. None of these arrangements, except the securing of the money for themselves, was carried out by the dishonest guardians. Thus Demosthenes found himself, when he came of age, possessed of the responsibilities and expenses of a fortune—which ought by

[1] This, viz. Ol. 99, 4, is Dionysius' opinion.

[2] Cf. the intricate discussions of A. Schäfer (*Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, iii. B. p. 55), and of Blass, *AB.* vol. iii. pp. 7–10.

interest, he says, to have increased to thirty talents—but in fact a pauper.

There is little doubt that in this emergency he had recourse to Isæus, the most skilful practical pleader of the day in such lawsuits, and with his help and advice[1] brought an action against Aphobus, the main delinquent, for ten talents, the third part of the embezzled property. There is no proof that Demosthenes learned from any other of his famous contemporaries, either philosophy from Plato, or rhetoric from Isocrates; but it is certain that, by a diligence so exceptional as to be remarkable, he had attained a sounder general culture than almost any young man of his day. Hence his own knowledge was sufficient to compose in the main the early speeches concerning his property, which, though not brilliant, manifest the force and directness which we admire in his most perfect works. He won his case against Aphobus, but was put off by various pretexts and devices, so that he was obliged to prosecute Onetor, Aphobus' brother-in-law, to whom the property had been professedly transferred.

I need not give the details of these disputes, which can be read in the speeches. The young orator seems to have recovered but a small part of the ten talents claimed from Aphobus, and after many vexatious delays and disputes, while the other two guardians were not prosecuted, so far as we know. However, his legal victory over Aphobus must have brought him into notice, so that he was soon able to improve his impaired fortune by the lucrative profession of composing speeches for litigants in the law courts.

Our authorities agree in representing him as a very hard-

[1] The relations of Demosthenes' to Isæus' speeches have been carefully examined in two programs (Hildesheim, 1872–3) by A. Laudahn, who also adduces the forty-first speech (*against Spudias*) to show how the same ideas were repeated in various forms by Demosthenes. Laudahn thinks that though the borrowing from Isæus is clear, the modifications introduced into the proem of the Or. xxvii., which to some extent mar Isæus' composition, cannot have been made with that orator's advice and consent, and thus Demosthenes' independent use of Isæus' speeches may be proved.

working, water-drinking, unsocial person, who spent all the night either in political studies, or in the preparation of speeches, which smelt of the lamp, and were at first so laboured as to be obscure and even dull—a fact which we can partially verify in his earliest public harangues. In after years there were not wanting allegations of debauchery and extravagance against him, but these seem so inconsistent with his nature that they would require the most convincing evidence to sustain them. It is more likely that he devoted every moment of his early life to intellectual work. Later on he married, but his only child, a daughter, died just before the news came of Philip's death (336 B.C.), and he left no direct descendants to enjoy the hereditary honours voted, though long after his death, by his grateful fellow-citizens.

For ten years after his successful suit against his guardians he worked as a speech writer, and from this period we have remaining the speech (if genuine) *for the trierarch's crown* (359 B.C.), then the speech *against Leptines* (354 B.C.), and possibly others, but many are lost. He is reported at the close of the speech (of Demon) *against Zenothemis* to have said that he abandoned private suits, when once he had undertaken the duty of public politics. But there is no doubt that this rule suffered many exceptions, or only applied to personal appearances as an advocate or supporter of litigants in court. He had the reputation of being a subtle advocate, ready to take every advantage in the intricacies of the law, or in the statement of doubtful facts; he was even openly accused during his lifetime, and ever since, of selling his services to opposite sides in the case of the disputes between Phormion and Apollodorus. Something of the kind he must really have done—perhaps (as Blass thinks) in order to induce Apollodorus to propose the bill for the application of the theoric fund to war purposes. The proceeding now fashionable among the panegyrists of Demosthenes is to evade this serious moral charge by asserting the spuriousness of all the speeches for Apollodorus, a desperate resource in the face of the soundest ancient criticism.

But to return to the earlier speeches. It has been well remarked that those personally delivered show a marked contrast

to those composed for others. The latter are bold, incisive and passionate ; the former very modest and restrained, if we except the pathetic and anxious appeals at the end of the speeches *against Aphobus*, where he pleads for the succour of the jury as an orphan on the brink of ruin and disgrace.

§ 502. The public speeches of Demosthenes belong rather to the political than the literary history of the period, and are so fully discussed in every Greek history, that it is unnecessary to recapitulate here the circumstances familiar to every student of the period, and to which we must again refer in speaking of the several harangues. But without an intimate knowledge of the history, it is impossible to appreciate their greatness and their power. They are essentially occasional, each called forth by the crisis of the time, and applying themselves to its solution. And yet for all that they are the exponents of a great and consistent policy—the policy of maintaining the imperial position and dignity of Athens at the cost of personal sacrifices and personal dangers.[1]

His political career begins at the moment when by the Social war Athens had a second time lost her naval greatness, and by the death of Chabrias Timotheus and Iphicrates her best generals. Passing by the speech *against Leptines*, which, though spoken before a jury, is devoted to an exposition of public policy and the maintenance of public obligations, we have the speeches *on the Symmories* (354 B.C.), *on behalf of the Megalopolitans* (353 B.C.), and *for the Liberty of the Rhodians* (351 B.C.), the first of which proposes an important financial reform, so as to equalise the state burdens and render the state forces efficient. The other two are very important and statesmanlike announcements that the policy of Athens is to be influenced not by special likes and dislikes, or by past quarrels and ingratitudes, but by present expediency, and above all by the determination to maintain a proper balance of power

[1] By far the best commentary on the political speeches is Grote's *History*, as that author, being himself an experienced politician, as well as an accurate and philosophic critic, has a power of appreciating political situations which is quite foreign to Schäfer, E. Curtius, and the other philologists who study Greek politics.

among the neighbouring states. He also advocates the cause of democracy against despotism, of Hellenedom against barbarian encroachment. The style is very Thucydidean, being grave, at times even harsh, and restrained. But we see from the first the deep earnestness and the large views of the speaker.

§ 503. Then comes the period of Philip's aggression in the north—an aggression begun by small degrees, and not openly attacked by Demosthenes till his first *Philippic* in 351 B.C. His panegyrists, indeed, pretend to discover allusions to Philip in the speech *on the Symmories;* but there is no reason why the king of Macedon, if then at war with Athens, should not have been expressly named by so direct a speaker as Demosthenes, who seems here to have been behindhand in turning his attention towards the real dangers of his country. He claims, indeed, and obtains even from Grote,[1] credit for having foreseen political events from their beginnings, and having forewarned his hearers. In the present case the danger must have been already obvious enough; it was Demosthenes' real merit not only to have brought it forcibly and clearly before the people, but to have at the same time, as was his wont, pointed out the practical remedies for it, and the proper policy to be adopted by the Athenians.

Then followed the three orations *for the Olynthians*, which make up what has been properly called the first series of Demosthenes' *Philippics*. The real adversary in all these famous speeches is not so much the king of Macedon as the sloth and supineness of the Athenians, and the influence of the peace party, whether honest or bribed by Philip. Against these he is ever insisting on financial reforms, personal service, and diminution of mercenary auxiliaries. He advocates the seeking of alliances, and the abandonment of petty disputes. Thus while practically effective, and even minute in the details of their special recommendations, these harangues have large and eternal features about them, and are applicable to all luxurious and peace-loving societies, when brought in their advanced age into conflict with a young and energetic power. Still more do they apply to the conflicts of a democracy, which conducts its

[1] xi. p. 442.

affairs by public discussion, against a despot who keeps his own counsel. It was Demosthenes' greatest difficulty that he was opposed not only by able and unscrupulous orators like Æschines, but by men of integrity and personal weight of character, Eubulus and Phocion, both of whom steadily advocated the peace policy against his more splendid but dangerous exhortations. For he would have the people assume higher responsibilities than personal well-being, and greater risks than those of a mere defensive armament.

On the fall of Olynthus, he was persuaded of the necessity of peace, and for a moment joined his political adversaries (in his oration *on the Peace*, 346 B.C.). To this coalition is attributed his somewhat mean settlement as regards a public and personal insult by Meidias, who, apparently through the influence of Eubulus, after some delays and subterfuges, was enabled to stay the pending action by paying Demosthenes thirty minæ—a result which has been mentioned to the orator's discredit ever since.

Yet it was during these years—the years of peace (346–40) which were being employed by Philip for the consolidation of his power and the extension of his influence—that Demosthenes seems to have gained an important place among the public advisers of his country. He led, with Hypereides and Hegesippus, a great party against the supporters of Philip. His second *Philippic* (344 B.C.) raises the alarm, and declares a new war with Macedon to be impending; and in the following year Philocrates, the main advocate of peace and confidence in Philip, was banished by the prosecution which he promoted. In the same year came on the long delayed prosecution of Æschines (*περὶ παραπρεσβείας*), the debate on which is still extant. But here Eubulus and Phocion were able, though with difficulty, to rescue the accused. In 340 there followed his third and most powerful *Philippic*, which calls the Athenians from their indolence and false security to arms against the increasing and now proximate danger.

During the next three years (340–38 B.C.) the power of Demosthenes was at its zenith : his eloquence had really awakened his countrymen ; vigorous measures were taken ; Eubœa was

regained to their alliance; Byzantium saved from Philip's attack. Even the theoric fund was resigned by the democracy, and applied, as the orator had long since proposed, to the public emergency. But by means of the new Sacred war Philip succeeded in invading Greece, and fortified Elateia, the northern key of Bœotia. Then it was that Demosthenes first persuaded the Athenians to cast aside traditional hate, and bring prompt succour to their old enemy, Thebes. Moreover, he himself went forthwith on an embassy to Thebes, and induced the Thebans, in spite of the opposition of the Macedonian party, to receive the Athenian army with sincere good-will. Without doubt this was the greatest triumph of his life, and it is ever to be lamented that the hurry and urgency of the crisis have deprived us of the harangues by which he effected these wonderful results.

§ 504. The battle of Chæronea (August, 338 B.C.) crushed his hopes, and his policy. He fought in the battle as a common soldier, and fled with the rest when the day was decided. But the Athenians marked their sense of respect for him, and chronicled their refutation of the charge of cowardice, by appointing him (in the following winter) to pronounce the *Epitaphios* over the fallen. He was also appointed Commissioner of Public Works, to repair the fortifications of the town, by which the patriots maintained the dignity of Athens, though she was compelled to abandon her aspirations to the leadership of Greece. Owing to the orator's good conduct in this office, and his munificent donation of eighty minæ towards the works, he was voted the public compliment of a crown, to be presented in the theatre, at the proposal of Ctesiphon (337 B.C.). But the proposal, being impeached as illegal by Æschines, was not then carried out. The death of Philip (336) once more revived Demosthenes' hopes; he appeared in festive array, having cast aside the mourning just assumed at his only child's death, for in him patriotism loosed all domestic ties. While Alexander, content with a formal confirmation of his position as generalissimo of the Greeks, was for a moment hidden among the barbarians of the north, Demosthenes, with the aid of treasure sent from Persia which he dispensed without control, gave the Thebans arms and supplies

and endeavoured to incite a general revolution against him. But the Athenians were still delaying, and had not actually declared themselves, when the Macedonian swooped down upon Thebes, destroyed it, and demanded the heads of the patriot party at Athens, whom he knew to be the real rebels against his authority. By the mediation of Phocion and Demades the lives of Demosthenes and his friends were saved —an act of remarkable generosity in Alexander, but rather, I fancy, from a policy of contempt than of prudence.

The splendid conquests in the East, the Hellenization of Persia, the foundation of a new and continental Greek empire —all this was lost upon the Greek patriots. They remained at Athens, sorrowing over every fresh Greek victory, offering up secret prayers for their ancient enemy, the Persian ; hoping against hope that Alexander might be lost in the remote East, from which the wonderful reports of his doings brought despair to their narrow though noble hearts.

Yet while the East was the theatre of brilliant deeds, Athens witnessed a contest of arguments which has almost produced as much attention among posterity. This was the prosecution by Æschines of the vote of confidence in Demosthenes, which Ctesiphon had carried, and the reply of Demosthenes—in reality a public trial of the life and acts of the orator before his assembled countrymen, after his policy had failed, and his country had been hopelessly subdued in the struggle. The successful defence of Demosthenes (*on the Crown*, 330 B.C.) is the greatest of the speeches handed down to us from antiquity.

§ 505. After this great and worthy triumph, the voice of the orator is to us all but silent, and the closing years of his life were clouded with misery and disgrace. When the 'unjust steward' of Alexander, Harpalus, arrived off Sunium with an army of mercenaries and an immense treasure, Demosthenes opposed his admission to Athens ; but Harpalus obtained an entry without his troops, and scattered his gold among the politicians, in the hope of raising Athens against Alexander. Demosthenes now separated himself from the patriots, and advocated, with Phocion, submission to Alexander, whose power he understood ; and he accordingly proposed the detention of Harpalus

and sequestration of his treasures till Alexander's officers should come to claim them. But Harpalus escaped, and half the money, though formally lodged in the acropolis under the direction of Demosthenes and others, was found to have disappeared. Demosthenes was forthwith charged with having been bribed to connive at the flight of Harpalus. After an enquiry by the Areopagus, he and others were sent for trial. State prosecutors, of whom Hypereides was the most notable, were nominated. Demosthenes, who was the first defendant, was sentenced to a fine of fifty talents, and cast into prison, as if payment were impossible, without allowing him even the legal respite. Two of the speeches against him have survived in the remains of Deinarchus and Hypereides (the latter mutilated). With the help of these documents, and the narrative of the facts, most modern historians have reversed the judgment of the Attic jury, in which the ancients acquiesced, and consider him to have fallen a victim to the coalition of the Macedonian with the ultra-patriotic leaders at Athens.[1] He escaped from prison, and was leading a miserable life of exile on the coast of Argolis[2] when the news of Alexander's death startled all Greece. The patriot party at Athens rose in rebellion. Demosthenes reconciled himself with them, and joined their embassy to influence the Peloponnesus to war. He was recalled by public decree to Athens, and his glorious return was compared to that of the far different Alcibiades. But after brief successes, the defeat at Crannon again ruined the patriots, and Antipater, no Alexander in generosity, insisted upon the extradition of the orators, who were a perpetual danger to the dominion of Macedon in Greece. Demosthenes was overtaken by his pursuers at the temple of Neptune on

[1] So Grote, A. Schäfer, E. Curtius, F. Blass, and others. I find that the Messrs Simcox, in their introduction to the speeches of Demosthenes and Æschines *on the Crown* (Oxford, 1872), take a more sober and prosaic, but to my mind a truer, estimate of the case. We shall revert to it hereafter in connection with the accusation of Hypereides.

[2] Perhaps writing plaintive letters to soften the anger of the demos; and if the extant letters, which are on this topic, are genuine, they must be the latest compositions we have from his pen.

Calaureia—an ancient shrine commemorating the earliest confederacy in the nascent Hellenic people. Seeing escape impossible, the orator, under pretence of writing his last wishes to his family, retired to the shrine, where he took poison which he had kept in readiness. His strength did not serve him to free the temple from the pollution of his death—a pathetic scene, which Plutarch has immortalised.

§ 506. If the date of his birth is disputed, that of his death was noted with peculiar and affectionate accuracy—Ol. 114, 3, the 16th of the month Pyanepsion (322 B.C.). He was then sixty-two years old. Fifty years later, the Athenians, at the proposal of his nephew Democharès, erected to him a bronze statue (the original of our extant portraits) in the Agora, and granted honours to his descendants. The following foolish epigram was inscribed on the pedestal :—

> εἴπερ ἴσην γνώμῃ ῥώμην, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες
> οὔποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.[1]

The statue in the Vatican represents a poor, thin figure, with lean arms, and no muscular development ; the face is careworn and furrowed ; there is no geniality, no trace of humour or good nature, as in most Greek portraits ; the lower lip is contracted, and retreating—a corroboration of the witnesses who tell us of his naturally defective utterance. He looks a disagreeable, painstaking, morose man; nor can we see in his face any clear marks either of the moral greatness which raised him to a foremost place among Greek patriots, or of the intellectual force which made him an orator unsurpassed in the annals of history.

§ 507. The existing collection of the works of Demosthenes seems to be very nearly complete, for we hear from the *Life*

[1] The same point is brought out in the ironical fragment of Timocles, which Athenæus quotes (cf. Meineke, *Fragg. Com.* iii. 598) :

> B. καὶ πρῶτα μέν σοι παύσεται Δημοσθένης
> ὀργιζόμενος. A. ὁ ποῖος ; B. ὁ ποῖος ; ὁ Βριάρεως
> ὁ τοὺς καταπέλτας τάς τε λόγχας ἐσθίων,
> μισῶν λόγους ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ πώποτε
> ἀντίθετον εἰπὼν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' Ἄρη βλέπων.

(among those of the ten orators) that the number of recognised orations was sixty-five, and we still possess sixty speeches, exclusive of the *Letter of Philip*, the six letters of Demosthenes, and the collection of prefaces and speeches. We have many different arrangements of these speeches in our MSS., nor is that of the oldest and best apparently preferable to the rest. They agree (I think) in one point only, in placing the eleven *Philippics*, or speeches against the policy of Philip, first in order. None of the MSS. observe a chronological, but rather a logical order, and upon the following general lines. The widest division is into δημόσιοι and ἰδιωτικοί, orations on public and private subjects. The former are again divided into five general συμβουλευτικοί, eleven Φιλιππικοί, and eight δικανικοί, or court speeches on public questions, like that *on the Crown*. The ἰδιωτικοί, or orations in the causes of private individuals and on private disputes, are subdivided according to their legal aspects, such as those on the guardianship of his property, then arguments on demurrer, on contracts, on assaults, &c. Beyond these two classes come the ἐπιδεικτικοί (spurious) and the *Letters* and *proems*.

The first collection, or πίναξ, of Callimachus (for the Alexandrian Library) seems not to have been very critical, and to have contained all that went by the name of Demosthenes; but the rhetors of the Augustan age, Dionysius and Cæcilius, were already full of critical doubts, and the former (the criticisms of the latter are not extant) rejects many speeches on the ground of style, and also of historical inaccuracy. This careful and sensible writer acknowledges only twenty-two public, and about twenty-four private, orations as genuine, thus giving us a total of forty-six. But the path on which he trod has suggested to modern critics similar investigations, and, as is natural to destructive criticism, more and more speeches have been declared spurious, till the list of the greatest of the German critics—A. Schäfer—only reaches twenty-nine in all.

§ 508. Before entering on any special analysis of Demosthenes' works, it is necessary to say something generally on this question, one analogous to that of Homeric and Platonic criticism, but fortunately with some additional elements at hand

to afford us a solution. The moderns observe, reasonably enough, that the first rhetors who opened the way in rejecting previously received works were likely to be timid in their procedure, and to allow much to stand which should logically have been set aside. This is in most cases a sound and fair argument. But when I find that Dionysius was not at all conservative in his views, and that, owing to his extravagant estimate of Demosthenes' perfections, he was disposed to reject anything unworthy of him, I do not think that we are justified in advancing beyond his scepticism. I hold this especially in the case of orations which he has quoted as genuine, but which moderns have rejected on the score of inferior style. This is the one point in which the old rhetor's judgment was doubtless far keener and sounder than ours, and it seems to me accordingly that when he, who had his attention closely fixed on style, allows a work to pass unchallenged, and even quotes illustrations from it, the strongest arguments are required to convince us that moderns have proved it spurious on the score of stylistic defects.

From another side, we may approach the same conclusion. When we are told that, owing to the too frequent admission of the hiatus, or the imperfect rounding of the periods, or the monotonous use of connecting particles, a certain speech is unworthy of Demosthenes, and therefore spurious, there are two assumptions involved, neither of which need be true. The first is that the orator was at all times equal to himself, and that all his efforts were equally grand; whereas we may be sure that not only the subject, but any momentary crisis, the state of his health, or of his popularity, was sure to affect strongly the productions of his genius. But even admitting, as we may, that up to a certain point the assumption is warranted, and that a great orator will not allow a poor and feeble composition to be circulated under his name, we have no right to hold that all Demosthenes' speeches received the same amount of revision, or in many cases any revision at all. For we know that only some were published by himself as political pamphlets—these of course were the most carefully and thoroughly polished. Others, and especially the speeches on private suits, being perhaps not even

the rhetor's property, but sold to the litigants, and in any case of small importance to a man who did not live by speech-writing, may have received very little after-revision; and, except in a few instances, when the author was interested in his subject, or had accidental leisure for composition and correction, such speeches might fall far short, both in power and in polish, of the greater public speeches. There is yet again a third class, not intended for publication, or left aside for the time being, and never taken up again, till other hands did so after the orator's death, and then brought them out in a condition very different from that of a perfect and revised work. Such is the case with even so remarkable a speech as that *against Meidias*, which, not being spoken, was cast aside, and never perfected by Demosthenes himself.

But it may be argued that all these counter-suppositions assume a greater improbability than those above censured; for they assume that the first draught of a speech by a great orator such as Demosthenes would not contain all the perfections of his style. Why should not so practised a composer at the very first burst produce a speech unmistakeable in the power of its arguments and the splendour of its diction? The answer is, that in the case of Demosthenes we know that such extemporising was foreign to him, that all his speeches, when completed, were strictly studies, and that their beauty and variety were not the result of a spontaneous gift, like that of Demades, but of careful and conscious elaboration. The varieties, for example, in his acknowledged speeches in the admission of the hiatus point to the fact that he did not in ordinary writing or speaking avoid it as naturally disagreeable, but rather that he revised his compositions and got rid of it in the finished draught. This is, in fact, the method of composition postulated by both Schäfer and Blass in their account of the speech against Timocrates, where there are evidences of two recensions, one of which was not polished, and therefore contains offences against the usual rythm and hiatus between vowels.[1] Perhaps the same elaboration was applied to his periods, to the studied

[1] Cf. Schäfer, iii. 64, 65; Blass, iii. 248.

variety of his connecting particles, nay, even the logical strengthening of his arguments.

As regards form, therefore, I think moderns have been hasty in rejecting much that is genuine, and we can point to the conflicts of opinion in our support. What Schäfer thinks manifestly spurious, Weil and Blass defend with sound arguments, and these are only instances of a large and widely spread controversy.

§ 509. When we approach the matter of the speeches as a criterion, it is confessed by all the sceptics that the majority of the disputed speeches are so thoroughly at home in the details of Athenian history, or Athenian law and social habits in Demosthenic days, that any theory of late forgery is out of the question, and that these works, though spurious, must be the compositions of obscurer contemporaries. A few, such as the *Epitaphios* and *Erotikos*, are ascribed to later rhetors, though even here (in the *Epitaphios*) Blass shows that the secrets of Demosthenic style, soon obscured and lost in the decadence of oratory, are known and observed. But admitting the matter to be of the Demosthenic age, they think that (1) feebleness and vulgarity, (2) dishonesty in the speaker, are sure marks of spuriousness. The former is so completely a matter of taste, and one upon which the critics vary so widely, that I pass it by as of no account. The second is clearly what has urged A. Schäfer to seek for grounds of rejection in the case of those speeches in Apollodorus' suits which argue against a client for whom Demosthenes had already composed one of his best court speeches. The ancients had noticed this grave charge against Demosthenes. Æschines brings it against him, and he nowhere denies it. Subsequent biographers, like Plutarch, repeat it. It is surely safer, with Blass, to find strong political reasons for some laxity in the morals of Demosthenes' advocacy, than to start by assuming his moral perfection and make it the ground for seeking critical objections against well-attested speeches. This tone runs all through A. Schäfer's great work, and in my mind mars its critical value and its good sense in more than one argument. But its thoroughness has made it the standard book, which both historians and critics in this country seem now to follow blindly.

§ 510. With these prefatory remarks I pass on to say something in detail of the principal orations of each class, and upon each it will suffice to cite the opinions of the three best modern critics—A. Schäfer, Blass, and H. Weil (as far as his edition reaches). In general, we shall follow the chronological order, making, however, exceptions where a good logical grouping can be attained. Thus we begin with the juvenile speeches against his guardians, as certainly the earliest, though belonging to the *ἰδιωτικοί*, or private orations, and therefore placed late in the MSS.

The first and second speeches *against Aphobus* are very interesting, as the first composed by the orator, and certainly composed with the advice and help of Isæus, upon whose eighth extant oration (on the succession to Kiron's estate) they are modelled, and from which some commonplaces are even transferred to these speeches[1] especially in the proem and recapitulation. Some old critics for these reasons thought them wholly composed by Isæus, and are often refuted with the bad argument, that we find everywhere advances in structure, in fulness, and in pathos beyond the older orator. I call this a bad argument, because I believe these speeches are not now in their original form, but retouched by Demosthenes in maturer years, when he published them as early specimens of his art. Hence, though in many respects they are tame and dry, there are many other parts in which we find the real master. The tame parts are the long and minute proofs of the amount of his property in the first speech; the finer portions are the pathetic conclusions, especially in the second speech, when, after describing the death-bed scene of his father, he bursts into a passionate appeal to the judges, which must have been quite startling to those accustomed to the older and more staid eloquence.[2] Of the ethos or character-drawing so attractive in Lysias we find no trace. The whole composition is serious and at times even harsh, showing a mind anxious and

[1] Cf. *α'*. §§ 2, 3, 7, 47, with Isæus, Or. 8, §§ 5, 4, 28, and 20, in the second speech; there are also borrowings from other Isæan speeches in these and the Onetor speech (Blass, p. 202).

[2] §§ 20–2.

engrossed with the subject, to the exclusion of all conscious rhetoric. But, as I have said, we may be sure that many youthful defects, perhaps many more Isæisms, have disappeared in our revised version of this early specimen of the great orator's work.

The third speech (for Phanos), in reply to (πρός) Aphobus, is a good example of the controversies to which I have alluded. According to Westermann, the speech is inconclusive and wordy, full of Asian bombast, and therefore spurious. To this A. Schäfer adds a number of apparent inconsistencies with the other speeches against Aphobus, and that against Onetor. He thinks it not even like Demosthenes' work. H. Weil, an equally competent judge, thinks all these arguments inconclusive, and suspends his judgment. Dareste defends the speech, and so does Blass decidedly, showing that no forger would have argued so independently or even inconsistently with the other speeches, and declaring that to him there is nothing un-Demosthenic in either style or argument. In this state of the controversy the early tradition of the work as Demosthenic must be allowed to maintain its authority. The speech is in other respects not very interesting, and does not call for analysis here. We know that the prosecution of Aphobus was successful, though the law's delays and subterfuges did not permit Demosthenes to obtain his rights either at once or in full measure.

§ 511. The two speeches against Onetor, Aphobus' brother-in-law, were delivered in the sequel of the same suit (362–1 B.C.). Aphobus, when defeated, or expecting to be defeated, had conveyed to Onetor his landed property under the guise of repayment of the dowry of Onetor's sister, from whom he pretended to be judicially separated. By this means Demosthenes was prevented from seizing this property in satisfaction of the award granted him against Aphobus. The present speeches are in a trial ἐξούλης, which we should call 'contempt of court,' or something like it, and argue that Onetor is defeating by false pretences the previous sentence of the court. The orator's main difficulty was doubtless the good character of the defendant, who had lived hitherto a blameless life ; hence ethos, or character-drawing, was so far excluded, even had he been able and

desirous to use this device. We are not informed of the result of the case. Demosthenes here again [1] uses a commonplace from Isæus' eighth speech,[2] which is, however, as is remarked, already to be found in Isocrates,[3] but only in substance: it is the stupid commonplace, that while sworn evidence has been often found untrustworthy, evidence by torture has never been proved false, a notion upon which I have remarked in another work.[4]

Thus these speeches are rightly classed with those *against Aphobus*, as showing some dependence on Isæus, and marking the first stage of the orator's style. The rythmical laws which critics have discovered in his later works, and which we shall note presently, are not yet observed with any strictness. On the other hand, the influence of Isocratic prose is manifest in a more strict avoidance of the hiatus than we find afterwards. But the distinctly Demosthenic features of strong pathos, shown by exclamations, and of the absence of ethos, are already prominent. So is also that peculiar subdivision of subjects, by which he does not complete one consideration, and abandon it, but interweaves argument and narrative, and returns to his former ideas in recapitulations—all this, which is the most striking feature in his masterpieces, may here be found in germ. To the same epoch are referred the speeches against Spudias, Callicles, and the speech *About the trierarch's crown*, which latter is hardly a private oration, but one on the condition and duties of the Athenian fleet. This work is so methodically divided into κῶλα, or members, and so carefully composed as to rythm, that it has been referred to the Isocratic school.

§ 512. With the opening of the social war (B.C. 357) the critics mark the second epoch in Demosthenes' development, when he begins to speak not only in court cases of public interest, but comes forward as a politician to advise the assembled people. These two kinds of speeches now interchange so constantly, and are so closely allied in subject, that it is better to take them as they occur chronologically than to separate them into their logical classes.

[1] α'. § 37. [2] § 12. [3] 17, § 54.

[4] *Social Life in Greece*, p. 240.

First then come the *Attack on Androtion* (παραπρέσβεων) and *on Leptines' law*, which is substantially a pleading of the same kind —both, therefore, arguments against mischievous legislation. The former is not delivered by the orator himself, but composed (355 B.C. according to Dionysius) for a certain Diodorus, who spoke in support of Euctemon in attacking for illegality the bill of Androtion. This politician had proposed the customary vote of thanks to the outgoing council, though they had not provided in their year of office the additional ships, without which the law forbade them 'to ask for any complimentary gift.' The proposal of Androtion is therefore attacked by these speakers as illegal and contrary to the public interest. The elaborate second Greek preface, as well as that of Libanius, gives full information concerning the case. As the speech is a δευτερολογία, or subsidiary to the main accusation, it begins, without strict proem, by stating the causes of enmity which the speaker had against Androtion—a strange preface in our eyes, but at Athens an apology for an accusation, which, if gratuitous, might be called *sycophantic*, and hence a frequent preliminary justification in such cases—and goes on to anticipate the arguments by which this clever and experienced debater will probably defend himself. The speaker argues his own case, (1) from the informality of the proposal. (2) from the incompetence of the proposer to bring it before the people. The proposal had not gone through the preliminary stage, and was opposed by the law prohibiting any rewards to a council which had not provided new ships. Androtion is supposed to urge that the preliminary vote, though enjoined by law, was in practice usually omitted, and, again, that though the law prohibited the outgoing officers *asking* any favour, there was no law against their receiving one proposed *ab extra*. Against these he urges first the importance of the letter of the law, and then the importance of its spirit, for those who were not to ask must *à fortiori* (σφόδρα γε) not receive favours. He furthermore insists, with a historical retrospect, on the great importance of the navy to Athens, and shows how its efficiency was always coincident with the power and prosperity of the state. As regards the person of Androtion he argues (without any proper

proof) first that his father was still a debtor to the state, which disqualified the son from proposing measures; again, that he had lived such an immoral life as to be in any case disqualified. To this the speaker adds many details of the violence and injustice of Androtion in exacting certain debts from public defaulters in taxes. These and other subsidiary topics are urged with great force and acuteness, and with intense bitterness, against Androtion. The whole speech shows us for the first time the orator in his full strength, though it is not free from a great deal of conscious sophistry, and much violent personal abuse, which is directly justified by the speaker's private hostility to his opponent. Thus the letter of the law is urged against the loose precedents brought by Androtion, but the spirit of the law against his argument that the letter has not been violated. There are, moreover, evidently insincere evasions of Androtion's reply that his personal character should have been arraigned directly, and not for the purpose of annulling a vote affecting others. Nevertheless, the speech is a masterpiece in its way, and the first of those we have discussed which is likely to interest the general reader, though its intricacy and close reasoning make it no easy study. We are not, however, surprised to hear that it failed in procuring a verdict.[1]

§ 513. We pass to the more celebrated but not abler speech *In reply to* (πρός) *Leptines*, who had proposed that the list of exempted persons should be abolished, and that all should be liable to the same state burdens, except the representatives of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the ancient tyrannicides. This was the first speech of the kind delivered (B.C. 354) by Demosthenes in person. The time for direct prosecution (παραγόμων) having passed, the orator assists a previous speaker (Aphepsion) in attacking the law, not the person of the pro-

[1] There is another much longer and more intricate speech of the same kind written for Diodorus, the *Attack on Timocrates* for illegality; but it would require a volume to analyse all the several speeches, and I therefore pass it by, though it suggests interesting critical questions as to its second recension, owing to a change in the adversary's attitude (cf. Blass, *Demosthenes*, pp. 244, sq.).

poser. I will not attempt an analysis of this intricate speech, which deals in far too many repetitions and recapitulations for a reader, though all practised public speakers know that such insistance is necessary when addressing an audience. But from many points of view the work is peculiarly interesting. In the first place, as the ancients remarked, the enumeration of the acts of several of the benefactors threatened by the law gives the orator an occasion of showing his panegyrical style, of which hardly another specimen has survived.[1] He argues that the number of persons affected is small, and therefore the result insignificant in a monetary point of view, compared with the tremendous effect produced by a repudiation of state obligations. For here lies the main interest of the speech, as a manifesto of the orator's character and of his policy. He defends the sacredness of public promises, on the one hand, against the seductions of a false expediency,[2] which really would defeat itself; on the other,[3] against the pressure of alleged religious scruples, which he shows to be inconsistent with common honesty.

There is reason to believe that Demosthenes' efforts to keep the people from committing an impolitic injustice failed, and that Leptines' proposal became law.[4] Demosthenes' speech, however, remains a monument of the lofty views and the large policy which he consistently pursued, and it gives us a high idea of the Athenian assembly that such an argument should have been delivered before them by one of their public advisers—at least in aspiration. A good edition is that of F. A. Wolf.

§ 514. Before we proceed to the professedly public harangues, I will notice one more speech, which though in form a charge of illegality, yet approaches nearly to a speech on foreign policy, and is in many respects one of the orator's best efforts—I mean the speech composed (for Euthycles) *against the proposal of Aristocrates* (end of 352 B.C.), that the mercenary general Charidemus, then in the pay of the Thracian king Kersobleptes, should be declared sacrosanct in person, and that any man slaying him should be held guilty of a crime against the whole

[1] §§ 30–86. [2] §§ 13, sq. [3] §§ 125–7.

[4] But Dio Chrys. (i. 388) says distinctly that Leptines was defeated, ἑάλω γραφῆς.

confederacy, no city of which should be allowed to harbour him. This astonishing and disgraceful proposal was eminently suited to bring out the powers of an orator of large and dignified views. Accordingly Demosthenes opens by deprecating any personal hostility against Aristocrates, whose name hardly occurs in the speech. After a general introduction he subdivides his argument into three formal heads—rather an unusual practice with him—first, the formal illegality of the proposal, secondly, its inexpediency as a matter of policy, thirdly, the unworthiness of its object to receive this, or indeed of any honour from the state. But while these heads are severally and fully discussed, there is constant recapitulation and suggestion of them all, and the speech ends by reminding the audience particularly of the first head, which might be obscured during the later details.

This formal illegality is shown by an accurate analysis and interpretation of the Draconian and still valid laws concerning homicide, and is, indeed, the *locus classicus* on the six methods of procedure in the various forms of homicide.[1] With great subtlety the orator shows that the proposal to make the slayer of Charidemus directly punishable violates all these solemn enactments, which former complimentary edicts had respected by the clause 'let the slayer be punished *as if he slew an Athenian*.'[2] He also cites the general decree that no law should be made which did not affect all Athenian citizens equally—a provision which could, however, hardly be meant to exclude special enactments or compliments. He then passes, after some further technical arguments, to the reply of the opponent that the bill is at all events for the public interest, and therefore excusable, even if formally questionable.[3] This is by far the most interesting part of the speech, and is based on the principle which we find the most dominating in Demosthenes' foreign policy—I mean that of maintaining a balance of power among the rivals or enemies of Athens. He shows that by giving so strong a support to Charidemus and his employer Kersobleptes, the rival Thracian kings will be discouraged, and the Thracian Chersonese, an important Athenian possession, will be endangered by his ambition. He shows by the exam-

[1] §§ 22–86. [2] § 89. [3] §§ 100, sq.

ple of the Olynthians and of Philip,[1] that the friendship of these semi-barbarians is untrustworthy, and that no compliments to Kersobleptes will prevent his seizing the Chersonese if he feels strong enough to do so. This untrustworthiness makes all extreme declarations of friendship, such as the present, dangerous; and likely, under altered circumstances, to become ridiculous. Indeed, it lowers Athens to the position of a mercenary bodyguard, protecting the life of a despot or an adventurer. Nor will there be wanting many others of equal claims, who will feel offended at such a special selection. This leads him to sketch briefly, as he pretends, the previous history of Charidemus—a valuable sketch, and indeed the *locus classicus* for the life of the condottieri[2] of the fourth century B.C., but in the present connexion far too diffuse.[3] He then meets with a lame excuse[4] the retort why he had not mentioned all this long ago, when other honours were being paid to Charidemus. He concludes with a splendid eulogy, often to be repeated in his political speeches, of the dignity of the policy and the rewards of the older Athens compared with the decadence and folly of his own day, especially as regards the leading politicians (*ῥήτορες*) and their actions.[5] With a recapitulation of his legal argument the speech concludes. We may well wonder how any but the orator himself could possibly have delivered so long and intricate a speech, for we do not know what assistance from notes or otherwise the buyer of a speech was allowed to use in court. All the main lines of Demosthenes' policy are here plainly laid down. All the wonderful arts of his oratory are already at work.

§ 515. We are thus naturally led back to his political speeches, the first of which was spoken two years before the present trial, and is termed *On the Symmories*. It is really a recommendation of an important naval reform, but in direct relation to an exposition of the foreign policy of Athens at a given crisis.

[1] § 107.

[2] The student may further compare Demosthenes' defence of Diopeithes, a similar general, in his speech *On the Chersonese* (§ 24, sq.), delivered some years later.

[3] §§ 144–86. [4] §§ 187–90. [5] § 201.

Hence it properly ranks under the Hellenic harangues of the orator, and Dionysius proposes to entitle it 'on the relations to the king of Persia' (*περὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν*).[1] But, after the manner of Demosthenes, the two subjects are intertwined, and produced as parts of the same policy. There seems to have been a strange uneasiness, almost a panic, at Athens about the armaments of Darius Ochus against Egypt, which were supposed the prelude of a new invasion of Greece.

Demosthenes shows that these fears are in all probability groundless, in any case premature, and that a declaration of hostile policy against Persia might produce serious complications. 'Military preparations against either Greek or barbarian being the same, why, when we have acknowledged foes, should we seek new ones, and not rather prepare against the former, and so be able to repulse the latter should they arise?'[2] All the commentators, from Dionysius and the scholiasts down to Schäfer and Blass, have asserted that the orator is here pointing at Philip, and that he here first (354 B.C.) shows his long-sighted prudence as to the real dangers of Athens. I think the context proves this widely accepted view to be quite false, and invented to panegyrise the wisdom and political insight of Demosthenes. As he speaks in the previous sentence of *Greek as opposed to barbarian* enemies, and then of acknowledged as opposed to problematical enemies, it is quite certain that he did not intend Philip, whom he always carefully separates from proper Greeks, and ranks among barbarians. Moreover, had he really intended or thought of Philip, it would have added point and power to his argument to say 'especially Philip, against whom we cannot contend without an efficient fleet.' It appears, on the contrary, from *Philip's Letter*,[3] which is now generally accepted even among the Germans as genuine, that the Athenians at this time intended to invite Philip to join them and the rest of the Greeks against Persia. Such evidence

[1] Nevertheless, as Spengel observes (*Demegorien des Dem., Abhandl. Munich Acad.* for 1863, p. 62), the lesser and merely introductory part of the speech refers to the Persian king, whereas Demosthenes' main object is the internal reform. He therefore justly rejects Dionysius' proposed title.

[2] §§ 10–11.

[3] § 6.

is absolutely conclusive against Demosthenes intending to indicate Philip among the *acknowledged Greek enemies* of Athens. I therefore call attention to this as one of those remarkable specimens of a false and forced interpretation, which, when it has once gained a footing in philology, goes on infecting book after book for centuries. Mr. Grote alone, with that genuine historical sense and appreciation of proper evidence which distinguishes him above all the narrators of the affairs of this epoch, ignores the imaginary reference, and notes how obscure Philip's plans remained, and how little even the wisest people thought of them at this time.[1]

I will not here discuss the scheme of naval reform proposed by Demosthenes, which shows a thorough study of the resources and wants of Athens, and proves his thorough competence as a financial statesman. It is the guarded and dignified foreign policy, the insistance upon proper preparation and diligent attention to public affairs, which forms the main interest of this weighty speech. The style is sober and grave, as befitted a young speaker then first coming forward as a politician. The critics justly note in these higher qualities, as well as in a certain harshness and obscurity of diction, the strong influence of Thucydides upon the orator.

§ 516. In connexion with this speech, we may take that *on Megalopolis* (353 B.C.), and that *on Rhodes* (351 B.C.), both declarations of foreign policy, and both distinctly written in Demosthenes' *pre-Philippic* attitude. In the former, he supports the petition of the Arcadians, now united in Megalopolis, whom the Spartans (as soon as Thebes was weakened by the Phocians) wished to break up into their old sporadic villages and political unimportance. To support these Arcadians was to reverse the policy pursued at the battle of Mantinea, when Athens had sided with Sparta against the then dangerous power of Thebes. Hence Demosthenes has to refute the charge of inconsistency, which he does by showing that with a change of circumstances Athens must change sides, and that she is really consistent in

[1] xi. 399. Cf. p. 406: 'In this (on Megalopolis), as in the oration *De Symmoriis*, a year before, there is no allusion to Philip, a point to be noticed,' &c.

doing so, the balance of power being the object at stake. As the Spartans were formerly supported with this object only, so now they must expect that, when they attempt unjust aggrandisement, Athens will oppose them with active force. Similar is the speech for the exiled Rhodian democrats, who came to implore the assistance of the Athenians to reinstate them, though they had been active in the social war against Athens, and had been leading agents in the overthrow of her naval and insular dominion. Hence these exiles, far from being able to claim sympathy, were the objects of hatred and aversion to Athens —a feeling which Demosthenes recognises, and which he expresses in his speech in the strongest terms. But he shows that a large policy should not be guided by such personal likes and dislikes ; he thanks the gods that the Rhodians have been taught by bitter lessons the errors of their ways ; he urges that it is the essential duty of Athens everywhere to support democracies against oligarchies, and he therefore recommends that they should be assisted in their present misfortunes. It is objected that this will bring Athens into collision not only with the Carian queen (widow of Mausollus), but with the power of Persia, whose vassal she is. To this Demosthenes replies, that such hostility need not be feared, that when a proper cause is supported, men should not shrink from danger, and moreover that Persia is only strong with Hellenic aid. Thus the very policy which when vague, and for no special purpose, he opposed in his speech *on the Symmories*, he here advocates when a special purpose and distinct foreign policy require it. These three speeches give a full and clear picture of the pan-Hellenic policy of Demosthenes, ever desirous to make Athens felt as a leading and an imperial state, ever ready and claiming the right of interfering in external politics, nay even insisting upon it as a duty, but always in relation to definite questions and for definite purposes. These purposes were two : first to maintain the balance of power among the rivals and opponents of Athens ; secondly, to sustain liberty and democracy against tyranny and oligarchy, whether Hellenic or barbarian.

§ 517. But the rising power of Philip is not yet clear to the orator ; he does not mention him as even of equal importance

with Kotys or Kersobleptes. The single allusion in the latest speech of the three[1] makes me believe it to be really his first notice of Philip, and delivered before the first *Philippic*, though Dionysius maintains the reverse. The passage is, moreover, interesting as having suggested to the critics that in contrasting the king of Persia with confessed enemies in the earliest harangue, he intended the king of Macedon. Here are his words: 'I see some of you often speaking with contempt of Philip as of no consequence, but with fear of the King as a powerful enemy when he takes up a quarrel. But if we do not actively resist the one as too cheap, and yield in everything to the other as formidable, against whom, O Athenians, shall we set ourselves in array?' This is not the tone of the first *Philippic;* it is even contradictory to its proem. I hold it, therefore, to have been deliver d just before serious advices reached Athens that the power of Macedon was no longer to be trifled with, and that here lay the real danger. But instead of agreeing with Dion and his panegyrists that his chief merit was to foresee coming events and to raise the first note of warning, I marvel that this series of harangues should show such ignorance and carelessness about Philip, and think the orator may fairly be charged, along with his obscurer countrymen, with great want of providence and curious dimness of political vision.

The ancients justly separated the Hellenic harangues from the Philippics, under which title they classed all the speeches relating to the struggle between Athens and the rising power of Macedon. Of these the undoubtedly genuine are (in their chronological order) the first *Philippic* (351 B.C.), and the three Olynthiac orations (349-8 B.C.); these may be called the earlier or first group before the Peace of 346 B.C. Then follow the orations *on the Peace* (346 B.C.), the second *Philippic* (344 B.C.), the oration *on the Chersonese* and the third *Philippic* (341 B.C.)—in all eight orations. The remaining three, of doubtful authenticity, I will postpone for the present.

§ 518. Nothing can be more striking than the new and altered tone of the first *Philippic* as compared with the nearly synchronous *Rhodian* harangue. There Philip is mentioned as an

[1] Or. xv., § 24.

object of contemptuous indifference to at least a section of the people, here the orator assumes at the very outset that all are dispirited at his successes, that many debates have already been held about them, and that he does not hesitate to come forward, because the advice of older speakers has been exhausted and found useless. Such a sudden change of attitude seems to me inexplicable by the natural course of events, and in a politician of ordinary foresight, especially when we find Demosthenes with his attention fixed on the foreign relations of Athens, and already knowing the northern Ægean from personal service as a trierarch. Dionysius, indeed, divides the speech into two parts, of which he brings the latter part [1] down to 347–6 B.C.—a division not sanctioned by later critics, who insist upon the unity of the speech, and its delivery at the earlier date. I confess that but for a stray mention of Olynthus, and of the prompt expedition to Thermopylæ as recent,[2] I should be disposed to bring the whole speech down to a later date, and to demand a considerable lapse of time or a serious crisis between this and the former public harangues; and this will yet, I believe, be possible with the aid of a few emendations.[3]

[1] From § 30, onward. [2] τὰ τελευταῖα πρώην, § 17.

[3] There is the strongest possible internal evidence against the chronological order of the public speeches delivered 354–50, as laid down by Dionysius, and adopted by A. Schäfer and other moderns. If we compare the allusions to Philip found (or not found) in these speeches, we get the following natural sequence: (1) The speech *on the Symmories*, where he strives to calm the fear of the Persian, and though it lay in his way to mention Philip, he is silent concerning him, and only contrasts certain Greek enemies to the uncertain Persian. (2) The speech *on the Rhodians*, in which he casually mentions Philip as an enemy whom some at Athens despise, while they dread the Persian. (3) The speech *against Aristocrates*, where Philip's acts towards Olynthus and Athens are cited as affording a clue to the probable policy of Kersobleptes, in being ambitious as well as faithless, and preferring risks and dangers to peace and security. (4) Then, after a momentous (though possibly short) interval, comes the first *Philippic*, of which the proem states that many public discussions had already taken place about Philip, and that the public mind is in discouragement, nay, even in despair at his great successes, and his almost impregnable position. I am hardly able to conceive in an earnest man, following

The orator seeks to meet the profound discouragement of the people, and their belief in the invincible and impregnable position of Philip, by showing that this was not the temper by which Philip waxed great, or by which Athens recovered her independence from the dominion of Sparta, and that every really vigorous action of Athens has been crowned with success. He recommends the preparation of a large force at home, of a small flying squadron near the scene of the war, but above all he inveighs against the sloth and dilatoriness of the people, who are ever talking and voting and resolving and doing nothing. The whole tenor of the speech is that of Demosthenes' later oratory, full and vehement, speaking with authority and yet with respect for the people, attacking the national faults and the corrupt politicians with bitterness, yet ever maintaining the dignity and the greatness of the real Athens.

§ 519. It is not necessary to analyse severally all the kindred harangues, which are curiously similar in tone and style, and turn perpetually round the same subjects. Indeed, so general are the recommendations in the *Olynthiac* orations, that their order cannot be determined from internal evidence, and the greatest authorities from Dionysius to our own day have differed upon the question. Had even Thirlwall and Grote been at one we might accept their consensus as historians to outweigh all the mere critics, but even they cannot agree, and Grote, while adopting the order which seems to me most probable, expressly refuses to give a positive opinion. I call special attention to this general character of these speeches, as perhaps the reason why they had less effect upon the audience than might be expected. It arose no doubt from the personal apprehensions of the speaker, who could not make a definite proposal without danger of prosecution for illegality (*παρανόμων*). Indeed, we know that he put forward Apollodorus to run this risk by voting the Theoric fund to military purposes; and though his proposal was carried in a moment of panic, he was accused when it had passed over, and was fined a talent, about

an honest and consistent policy, such declarations as these last preceding the casual or contemptuous notices in the other speeches.

which time the proposal he had made was declared by a new law to be a capital offence.

What strikes us next to this generality of exhortation, which is, however, always suitable to the particular facts of the case, or illustrated by past history, is the great seriousness of style, which admits of hardly any ornament in the way of metaphor or simile. Nothing can be simpler and more direct than the redhot earnestness of these speeches. There are only two of them which have marked differences from the rest, the shorter and poorer speech *on the Peace*, and the larger and more varied speech *on the affairs of the Chersonese*. The latter is professedly in defence of the mercenary general Diopeithes, who had undertaken to act on his own responsibility against Philip, and whom Demosthenes defends against the attacks of Philip's party at Athens. This speech, moreover, contains a very remarkable peroration, declaring the orator's own policy, and his description of the duties and responsibilities of a good citizen, in contrast to the venal and the corrupt. There is no finer passage in all Demosthenes, as has been recognised by Brougham. I therefore quote it as a specimen of his thinking and his style.[1] The speech *on the Peace* is poor and tame,

[1] Or. viii. §§ 66-72 : τοιγάρτοι τούτων μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν ἔνιοι ταχὺ πλούσιοι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐξ ἀνωνύμων καὶ ἀδόξων ἔνδοξοι καὶ γνώριμοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐκ μὲν ἐνδόξων ἄδοξοι, ἐκ δ' εὐπόρων ἄποροι· πόλεως γὰρ ἔγωγε πλοῦτον ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους πίστιν εὔνοιαν ὧν πάντων ἔσθ' ὑμεῖς ἄποροι. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτων ὀλιγώρως ὑμᾶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐᾶν ταῦτα φέρεσθαι ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ' ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ μὲν τῶν ὠνίων ἀφθονίᾳ λαμπροί, τῇ δ' ὧν προσῆκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον περὶ θ' ὑμῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ὁρῶ βουλευομένους· ὑμᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν φασὶ δεῖν, κἄν τις ὑμᾶς ἀδικῇ, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐ δύνανται παρ' ὑμῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐδενὸς αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῦντος.

Εἶτα φησὶν ὃς ἂν τύχῃ παρελθών 'οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις γράφειν, οὐδὲ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλ' ἄτολμος εἶ καὶ μαλακός.' ἐγὼ δὲ θρασὺς μὲν καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδὴς οὔτ' εἰμὶ μήτε γενοίμην, ἀνδρειότερον μέντοι τολλῷ πάνυ τῶν ἰταμῶς πολιτευομένων παρ' ὑμῖν ἐμαυτὸν ἡγοῦμαι. ὅστις μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἃ συνοίσει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, νὺ δεμιᾷ ταῦτ' ἀνδρείᾳ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὑτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς θρασύς ἐστιν. ὅστις δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναντιοῦται βουλήμασι, καὶ μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς

for Demosthenes was advocating against his will the policy of his opponents, and recommending a peace with Philip, from apprehension of a general attack by the Amphiktyonic Confederacy. The orator afterwards denies that he advocated this peace (in the *Embassy* speech), which Grote notices as a matter of doubtful honesty, but which the German panegyrists explain away by absurd subtleties of interpretation.

§ 520. In the opinion of most critics, the third *Philippic* is considered not only the finest of Demosthenes' public harangues, but probably the greatest speech ever delivered. I confess that, not to speak of the oration *on the Crown*, which they perhaps do not call a public harangue, the speech about the Chersonese seems to me more varied, more pathetic, and not less powerful. But critically, the third *Philippic* is peculiarly interesting in being handed down to us in two recensions—one (the shorter one) represented by our oldest and best MS. (the Parisian S) alone, the other by all the rest, in which clauses are constantly added, so as to change the symmetry, and at times even the argument. Nevertheless, both recensions seem purely Demosthenic, and point to separate editions. Blass, the

χάριν, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαιρεῖται ἐν ᾗ πλειόνων ἡ τύχη κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν παρέχει, οὗτός ἐστ' ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ χρήσιμός γε πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐχ οἱ τῆς παρ' ἡμέραν χάριτος τὰ μέγιστα τῆς πόλεως ἀπολωλεκότες, οὓς ἐγὼ τοσούτου δέω ζηλοῦν ἢ νομίζειν ἀξίους πολίτας τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴ τις ἔροιτό με 'εἰπέ μοι, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἀγαθὸν πεποίηκας;' ἔχων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν καὶ χορηγίας καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς καὶ λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴποιμι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων πολιτευμάτων οὐδὲν πολιτεύομαι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τἄλλ' ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἑνὶ τούτων πώποτ' ἐμαυτὸν ἔταξα οὐδὲ προήχθην οὔθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὔθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμὶ παρ' ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς δ', εἰ πείθοισθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε· οὕτω γὰρ ἴσως ἀνεπίφθονον εἰπεῖν. οὐδέ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δικαίου τοῦτ' εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ' εὑρίσκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι· ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, μὴ τὸ ῥᾷστον ἅπαντας λέγειν. ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ προάγεσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην.

best of modern critics on such a subject, considers the shorter to be the later version prepared by the orator himself—if so, another proof that he attained his perfect form not by previous meditation and slow composition, but by repeated and conscious correction.[1]

There are several other speeches in the series, only one of which, the fourth *Philippic*, has any strong claims to authenticity. But it so abounds in passages borrowed from or used in other Demosthenic orations, that it must be either a cento by a later hand, or an incomplete sketch elsewhere utilised by the orator himself, but afterwards found among his papers, and published. Owing to the excellent composition of an original passage in the oration—the attack on Aristomedes[2]—Blass thinks the latter to be the case; he even thinks Aristomedes a fictitious character, and that the speech was a mere exercise prepared at home by the orator. This seems hardly so probable as that a pupil put together the speech, using perhaps fuller materials to those now extant.

The speech *περὶ συντάξεως*, generally set down as a later cento from the orator's speeches, is now shown to be probably a document of the year 352 B.C. by an inscription from Eleusis regarding a sacred *ὀργάς* on the boundaries of Athens and Megara.[3] Here, therefore, the suspicions of the critics may again be at fault. The speech on *Philip's Letter* is more certainly spurious, being not even a reply to the now acknowledged missive of Philip placed beside it in the MSS. The speeches *on Halonnesus* and *on the treaty with Alexander* will be referred to elsewhere. All these represent to us the average oratory at Athens.

§ 521. I pass to the three longest, and perhaps best known, speeches of Demosthenes on his own affairs—those *against Meidias*, *on the corrupt Embassy*, and *on the Crown*. These, though separated in date, are worthy of being considered together, as they form, with the speeches against Aphobus, our materials for an estimate of Demosthenes from autobiographical sources.

[1] Cf. also Spengel in *Abhandl. of Munich Academy* for 1863, at the end of his first article on Demosthenes' public harangues.

[2] §§ 70–4. [3] Cf. *Bull. de Corresp. hell.* xiii. 447.

Meidias, who was connected with Demosthenes' guardians, and hence an old personal enemy of the orator, had, after many annoyances and insults, gone so far as to assault him publicly in the theatre, when directing in festive dress the performance of the chorus of his tribe. This expensive public duty Demosthenes had volunteered, when others were unwilling, and his tribe likely to be disgraced beside the rest. He had been fortunate enough to secure by lot the choice of his flute-player, and his chorus would have won (he says) but for the constant and malicious interference of Meidias. But when the latter went so far as to give him publicly a box on the ear, Demosthenes brought the matter at once (*προβολή*) before the assembled people, who passed an immediate decree condemning Meidias. The extant speech was written for the subsequent action in court, by which the penalty should be assessed after due argument. But as the case was compromised for thirty minæ, this speech was never delivered, and bears many traces of not having been even revised for publication.

It is, perhaps, one of the greatest triumphs of Demosthenes' art, that he has raised so scurvy a quarrel to eternal fame, for an action 'about a box on the ear' (*περὶ τοῦ κονδύλου*) was no grateful subject, especially when the orator submitted to the insult at the time, and reserved all his rage for a rhetorical display. Indeed, he is almost ridiculous when he congratulates himself[1] 'that he was not carried away at the moment to do something irreparable;' with his feeble body and in state dress, any retaliation would doubtless have placed him in a more absurd and contemptible position. The mighty pathos then, which the scholiasts and Germans so admire, when he is describing his own chastisement by Meidias, rather affects us with merriment than with indignation. Even worse are the passages where he boasts that he has rejected repeated attempts at a compromise, which he regards as dishonourable in the case of so grave an insult to a public officer. For we know that after all this was written—we will hope not before—the matter was compromised for a considerable fine (about 115*l.*). This fact is naturally laid hold of by Æschines and by Plutarch as an ugly passage in the

[1] § 74.

orator's career, nor can he be cleared of meanness except by those who are determined to find in him a perfect hero.

The finer side of the speech is its remarkable insistance on the public side of the offence—how personal violence, as such, cannot be tolerated as being opposed to the very essence of democracy; still more, how violence done to a citizen acting in a public capacity is a far graver offence, and an insult to the state; how in the present case a religious ceremony, moreover, was disturbed, and hence the crime amounted to public impiety (ἀσέβεια), at Athens the most heinous of offences. He proves the public feeling in these matters by citing many remarkable precedents.[1]

From another point of view we may consider the oration as a good specimen of what the ancients called a λοιδορία, or personal attack, the counterpart of the *eulogies* which were part of their epideictical oratory. The life and acts of Meidias, his violences, his luxuries, his cowardices—in fact, his violations of every principle of a democracy—are painted with great variety and liveliness. He is shown to be a sort of feeble ape of Alcibiades, but only to have succeeded in copying his private vices. It is remarkable how the orator[2] speaks of his own solitary position, in connexion with no other public man, whereas Meidias has great political support. I have already noticed his explicit statement of his age as only thirty-two,[3] when he says that Meidias, though now fifty, has not performed equal public service. The reading is certain, but as the speaker wished to urge his youth, he was probably guilty of an understatement of his age, so that it is not too bold of modern critics to reject, as they do very generally, this explicit statement as inconsistent with the birth-year established on other grounds.

I will only call attention to one more passage as particularly splendid in its pathos, the passage[4] in which he calls up the unfortunate Straton, who had decided in an arbitration against Meidias, and, having been disfranchised by his contrivance, could no longer speak or give evidence in court. As the speech was never thoroughly revised, there are many repetitions and unevennesses in the argument, and many feeble or diluted passages. Nevertheless, they are relieved by others of

[1] §§ 175–82. [2] §§ 189–90. [3] § 154. [4] §§ 95–8.

such force that, in spite of the shabby subject, and the somewhat sorry figure presented by the speaker, it is generally considered one of the finest of his speeches. Dionysius says the speech was composed 349–8, as it was then that the assault took place. Possibly, however, it may not have been written till 347, after which time Demosthenes, by going on the embassy, shows that he was reconciled with the politicians whom he there speaks of as opponents.[1] The best special edition is that of Buttmann.

§ 522. The speech *on the corrupt Embassy* (B.C. 344), against Æschines, which is, I believe, the longest of all Demosthenes' speeches, may be placed, for many reasons, midway between the *Meidiana* and that *on the Crown*. It is, like the others, to a large extent autobiographical, but devoted to a great public cause, in which the orator vindicates himself, and attacks the policy of Æschines for corrupt subservience to Philip. Strange to say, though dealing with a far higher subject, it affects no pathos as compared with the earlier speech. Indeed, the only prominent passage of the kind—that about the treatment of the Olynthian captive woman at the feast[2]—was, as we hear from Æschines in his reply, an oratorical failure, for which the actor was hissed by the audience. In ethos, as is confessed, the orator is not remarkable, though he often attempts it in the present work.

The form of the speech has excited great suspicion on account of its irregularity of structure, its constant change of subject, its sudden returns upon itself, in fact, its want of symmetry and its diffusiveness. Moreover, in Æschines' reply there are several points controverted which do not appear in our present text, and which imply that Demosthenes' spoken attack must have differed from it. Ancient critics were accordingly of opinion that it was never really delivered, and that we have (as in the *Meidiana*) a mere preparatory sketch not finally worked up. They even state that in their after disputes no pointed

[1] Blass, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[2] There is some reason to think from Æschines' allusions that the story was told with greater and more revolting detail in the actual delivery of the speech than it is in our extant version.

reference is made to the trial; which is true, for though Demosthenes[1] alludes to Æschines being on this occasion let off on the ground of his insignificance, I do not think this passage proves anything more than that Demosthenes laid his accusation, and failed to carry it through, which he might have done by not prosecuting a case he found hopeless. But Plutarch quotes, without being persuaded, the statement of Idomeneus that Æschines escaped by only thirty votes. On the whole, I am disposed to side with the ancients against the moderns, and to regard the close general correspondence of Æschines' extant reply to the undelivered attack as arising from the Athenian habit of discussing in the agora all the probable *pros* and *cons* in every impending lawsuit, so much so, that it was a common formula to say, 'but I hear that the defendant is going to lay stress on the following argument.' Those who hold that the trial took place think that we have the first sketch, which was altered for delivery in some respects, and Schäfer even defends all the transitions and reversions, which bolder critics seek to mend by transpositions and omissions.

After duly weighing these various views, I will state my own opinion, without venturing to dogmatise. In the first place, as regards the great length of the speech, I think it was forced upon Demosthenes. The trial, if it ever came off, was certainly looked forward to as such an oratorical treat, that special arrangements were made, and additional time assigned to both plaintiff and defendant. If then the multitude of citizens came together full of interest and curiosity, it was absolutely necessary to satisfy them as to time, as well as in other respects. But Demosthenes' method of treating a large subject at full length was not that of an orderly succession of heads. We see from his imperfect *Meidiana*, from his perfect speeches *against Aristocrates* and *on the Crown*, that his aim was to keep the whole subject all the time before his audience, by means of rapid turns, ingenious retrogressions and anticipations, and constant recapitulations. Hence nothing required more care and revision than the sequence of these interlacing arguments, and the proper methods of transition from one to

[1] *De Corona*, § 142.

another without sameness and without jerkiness. Thus, I conceive him to have first chosen his arguments, then to have turned to the question of diction, and lastly to that of composition, properly so called. I feel convinced that he transposed paragraph after paragraph, omitted some and added others, and only with great labour and perseverance attained that perfection where every point seems to come in naturally, and yet receives no more than its due weight in the whole effect. If then the speeches *against Meidias* and *on the Embassy* were laid aside before actual delivery, and by a political man full of business and with no leisure hours, we can conceive them still requiring that exceedingly minute filing and polishing, which may be perceived in the oration *on the Crown*. We have, indeed, not only the materials, but the worked-up materials of such a speech. Probably, the actual paragraphs are all as he would have spoken them. The joining particles, perhaps the order in some cases, would have been different, so that fair critics could not have stumbled, as they have done, at the logical irregularity of the arguments.

As an historical source, this great speech, controlled by the counter-allegations of Æschines, is one of the most precious documents of the period, but it requires the good sense and candour of Grote to balance the conflicting assertions, and make out the residuum of truth between them. Hence as a commentary on the matter of the speech, there is nothing comparable to Grote's discussion.[1] On the mere text, we must study the critical revisions of Cobet (*Misc. Crit.*) and Weil (*Harangues*), which have brought out all that can be obtained from the study of the best Parisian MS. for the interpretation. Shilleto's foolish hostility to Grote mars his otherwise valuable commentary.

§ 523. The circumstances introducing the oration *on the Crown* are somewhat complex, but well recorded and tolerably certain. When, in consequence of the defeat at Chæronea, the Athenians were compelled to look to their fortifications, they appointed Inspectors of Fortifications (τειχοποιοί), one from each tribe, to superintend the public expenditure in this respect.

[1] xi. pp. 525, sq. See especially his valuable note on that page.

Demosthenes, representing his tribe, not only displayed great zeal, but spent a considerable sum of his own money in this service. For this merit Ctesiphon proposed that he should be publicly crowned in the theatre of Dionysus before the assembled people with a golden crown. But the proposal was indicted (*παρανόμων*) by Æschines, on the legal grounds that Demosthenes was as yet accountable for public money, and that there were special enactments forbidding such public demonstrations elsewhere than in the legal assembly in the Pnyx. This objection stopped the proposal in its first stage, though it had received the approval of the Council (*προβούλευμα*), and Demosthenes' friends did not feel strong enough to force on the actual trial at the time. But in 330 B.C., when the revolt of Agis had just been crushed, and the anti-Macedonian sympathisers had no doubt nearly involved Athens in the danger, Æschines felt able to bring his case to a decision. He therefore indicted Ctesiphon formally for an illegal proposal, on the ground that Demosthenes was a traitorous and cowardly politician, and that his public life had been fraught with disaster and not with credit to the state.

This is the account given by Grote of the position of affairs in August, 330 B.C., when the trial came on. It appears to me, however, strange, if it was really done at the instigation of the Macedonian party, that Æschines should have insisted on Demosthenes' secret subservience to the Macedonians, and his dishonesty in pretending to oppose them.

Apart from the formal question, on which Æschines seems to have been right (though Demosthenes is able to quote precedents violating the letter of the law in his favour), he reviewed Demosthenes' life and acts in four periods: that before 346, that from 346 to 341, then the crisis ending with the battle of Chæronea (338), and lastly, the subsequent period. The reply of Demosthenes does not follow him strictly in his track. In the first place, the legal question is treated very briefly, and thrust into the middle of the speech, where its importance disappears, owing to the larger and weightier arguments before and after it. Secondly, as regards the four periods of his life, the last was not only of little political importance, but very incon-

venient to be discussed in the face of Alexander's successes, and the close observation of his agents at Athens. This then the orator completely ignores. Thirdly, it is more remarkable that he is also silent on the period before 346, in which his first *Philippic* and *Olynthiacs* show him to have been an active and able state adviser. I can see no reason why he has not touched upon this period, except that (as I have already suggested) he did not show any peculiar prescience in an early discovery of Philip's plans, and, in any case, though already a political man, his speeches at that time had little effect either for good or evil. We may even suspect that our redactions of these early speeches contain a good deal of *ex post facto* wisdom, which the orator may have added when revising them later in his life for publication.

In addition to the proper matter of his defence, Demosthenes has all along added parallel pictures of Æschines' character and policy, by way of contrast to his own, so that the speech is no mere defence of himself, but also a vehement and even scurrilous attack on his opponent. A very slight sketch of the general line of his argument must here suffice, as its extreme variety and complexity can only be understood by a special and careful study.

§ 524. The proem,[1] which opens with a modest prayer that the gods may grant him a requital from the judges of the same goodwill which he entertains for the city and its citizens, requests that the jury may not be induced to expect in his reply a close adherence to his adversary's attack, for he is under a grave disadvantage; his whole reputation, and not a single action, is at stake, and he will be bound to praise himself. For they will see that the trial does not affect Ctesiphon more than it does himself; he therefore repeats his prayer. He then proposes[2] to take up the general attacks of Æschines before approaching the case at trial. Then follows the narrower preface (*προκατασκευή*), in which he passes from the private attacks to those on his policy and public life, and shows[3] that this is no proper way to bring so grave a charge. Had Æschines been honest, he should have brought an open and

[1] §§ 1–8. [2] *πρόθεσις*, § 9. [3] §§ 12–17.

direct indictment long ago. This complaint of the form of attack chosen by the adversary is a commonplace as old as Antiphon, and recurs (say the old critics) seventy-two times in various forms throughout this speech. Then follows[1] a sketch (supported by documents) of the affairs of 346 B.C., of the peace negociations with Philip, and the ruin of the Phocians, in which he justifies his own policy, followed[2] by a parallel exposing of the conduct of Æschines during the same period, with sundry digressions into the present consequences of this policy, and the pretended friendship of Æschines with the Macedonian kings.

He now turns for the first time to the actual charge,[3] and directs it to be read out, but fastens again upon the statement that Ctesiphon's praise of his policy was false, and proceeds to refute this charge from a sketch of the history of Greece subsequent to the affairs of 346. This, with recapitulations, and with an account of previous crowns awarded to him, occupies a long argument.[4] He then turns back to the legal side of the charge, where his case is weakest, and seeks by charges of confusion, and by quoting precedents in which the letter of the law was violated, to dispose of this serious difficulty.[5] He passes into a violent personal attack on Æschines' origin and personal history, a regular λοιδορία, such as would hardly have been tolerated even in the Irish Parliament;[6] and next to the political acts which he accuses Æschines of having done for the enemies of the city.[7] Then he repeats[8] the initial solemn prayer to the gods, since on previous occasions the people were blind and would not see either Philip's ability or the fatal effects of Æschines' guilt.[9] There follows the famous narrative of the seizure of Elateia by Philip, of the great crisis, and of his own acts, justified against Æschines' attacks.[10] This narrative is concluded by the noble outburst in which he maintains that, even had the result been foreseen, no other policy was honourable or possible for imperial Athens—and here follows the

[1] §§ 18-31. [2] §§ 31-52. [3] §§ 53-9.
[4] §§ 60-109 [5] §§ 110-20. [6] §§ 121-31.
[7] §§ 132-140. [8] § 141. [9] §§ 142-4. [10] §§ 145-87.

famous adjuration.[1] He then continues the narrative up to the battle of Chæronea, which he naturally does not touch, but shows how that, even as it turned out, his bold policy was of service in obtaining good terms for Athens.[2]

The whole remainder, though very long, is epilogue. First he replies to Æschines' attack that he was an unlucky politician, who brought evil upon those he advised ; he contrasts the fortunes of his life with Æschines' low life and adventures—a bitter and abusive outburst. Then [3] he announces that he will recapitulate before concluding ; and in the remainder of the speech he touches upon almost all the topics already treated, throwing in new narrative, and digressions upon the duties of an honest politician and the fatal effects of treachery. He ends with an eulogy of the great men of old, whom he had followed in spirit, so far as he was able, and with a prayer (as he had begun) that the gods may destroy the traitors, and save his city from impending dangers.

§ 525. Even this scanty outline will show the curious and variegated pattern in which Demosthenes has woven his great masterpiece. He has despised all the ordinary subdivisions by which inferior speakers preserve order and regularity in their compositions. He passes to and fro, combining apology and invective, argument and narrative, by natural transitions and in marvellous relief. The feeling which results from reading it straight through is (I think) not so much that of conviction, as that of being dazzled by the multitude and variety of the speaker's matter, and by the general effect which he produces. There is no boasting, no vain-glory, and yet never was there such sustained and artful recital of personal merit. So, likewise, the contrasted picture of Æschines, though coarsely drawn, and not without obscene allusions, is so powerful that he has never recovered it in the eyes of posterity. But in marked relief to this lower side of the speech is the lofty moral tone, the almost Stoic disregard of consequences, the assertion that the highest honour, the most enduring success, is the performance of right actions for their own sake. It was, indeed, the only defence possible for a politician whose career had

[1] §§ 188–98. [2] §§ 199–250. [3] § 270.

been disastrous, and whose plans had turned out a failure. But, nevertheless, it was the right defence, and as such has stamped upon the speech a dignity rarely attained in political oratory.

The extreme complexity and variety of its plan is obviously the original idea of the orator, but is doubtless slightly increased by the insertion of special replies to special points made by Æschines, these replies generally occupying (as Blass remarks) the place of excrescences or appendices to the main argument. This is in itself sufficient to show that Demosthenes composed his defence on the general lines which he knew *à priori*, and which the gossip of the town informed him would be taken by Æschines, and afterwards added such special paragraphs as seemed required. Whether this was done in the actual delivery is more than doubtful. For Demosthenes certainly did not hold himself bound to publish the speech as it was spoken. In fact, Æschines (as the critics have shown) added replies in *his* speech to points made by Demosthenes, which do not now appear in Demosthenes' harangue. But how far Greek speakers were able to answer *extempore* we do not know, and most assuredly in the carefully constructed orations which we possess, not only the avoidance of hiatus, but the alleged regularity of the *cola* or clauses in each period, must have made all such sudden additions easily marked and ungainly excrescences. Hence I believe them to have been either omitted, or specially worked in, before the oration came to be handed over to the copyists.

But will it be believed that this masterpiece of Greek prose has found its Wolf, who insists on cutting it in two, and declaring it the later combination of two inconsistent plans, one sketched at the first threatening of the trial, the other actually delivered six years after? This is the theory of A. Kirchhoff,[1] whose essay will no doubt be read with delight by those who reject his critical dissection of the Odyssey. For if anything could throw general doubt and suspicion on a man's critical judgment, indeed on his critical sanity, it is this attempt to

[1] *Abhandl. Berlin Acad.*, 1875.

demand from a great and perfect work of art the starved logic of pedantic syllogisms.[1]

The special editions of this oration, generally accompanied by the companion speech of Æschines, are very numerous. Weil (*Les plaid. pol. de Demosthène*, vol. i. Paris, 1877) gives us the newest and most careful recension. The edition of the Messrs. Simcox (Oxford, 1872), with Æschines' attack, is a very good and satisfactory book.

We have now concluded our review of the harangues to which Demosthenes owes his great and deserved reputation. The speech *on the Crown* is (with the exception of a couple of *Letters*) the last literary product he has left us, and, as Grote has called it, the Epitaphios of Greek Republican liberty.

§ 526. But we have as yet hardly noticed the large collection of court speeches, written in private suits, which are handed down to us among his orations, and which have given rise to volumes of comment and criticism. To review them in detail would be beyond the scope of this work; nor are they, with one or two exceptions, equal to the public speeches, or calculated to give us a better and clearer view of the orator's art and of his style. Indeed, court speeches upon obscure quarrels can hardly in any age be called literature, nor is it from this point of view that they will ever again be popular. They were in their day important studies of how a legal plaint or defence should be framed ; they afford many commonplaces and general appeals useful in other cases, and may have been a sort of handbook for speech writers. But nowadays they are chiefly valuable as a deep fund of materials for reconstructing the details of the Attic juridical system, which they discuss from all sides. They are, moreover, incidentally, rich sources for studying the private life and manners of Athenians in that age ; for in the narratives of facts, in the evidence adduced, in the personal attacks on character, we have sketches of life and of habits peculiarly fresh and genuine.[2]

[1] Cf. Cicero's judgment, *Orator*, c. 38, § 133: 'Ea profecto oratio—ut major eloquentia non requiratur.' So Wm. Fox in his new com. (Wien, 1881).

[2] The later chapters of my *Social Life in Greece* were drawn from this unexhausted source; among other like studies, I may call attention to the

For it is remarkable, that though many of these speeches have been declared spurious as being unworthy of Demosthenes, hardly any of them have been shown the product of a later age, or the work of sophists imitating in rhetorical exercises the real conflicts at the Attic bar. On the contrary, their minute and accurate detail, both in legal and historical allusions, prove them to be genuine court speeches, composed in the age and for the occasion when they profess to have been delivered. Accordingly they have been rejected merely from deficiencies of style, except, indeed, in the case of critics like A. Schäfer, whose objections are based on the moral ground, that he does not believe Demosthenes capable of sophistically advocating certain unsound claims. This latter ground especially applies to the speeches for Apollodorus, whom Demosthenes had vehemently attacked in one of the ablest and bitterest of his court speeches, *on behalf of Phormion.* The charge, however, of having corruptly changed sides as an advocate openly brought by Æschines, was not formally denied by Demosthenes, and was generally believed in ancient times, so that any rejection of such speeches on moral presumptions must be regarded as uncritical, and opposed to common sense.

It is considered a remarkable coincidence of evidence, and a perfect proof of spuriousness among the Germans, that Benseler, starting from the merely external test of the avoidance of hiatus, and A. Schäfer, who quite independently examines the speeches on æsthetical and moral grounds, should come to proximate conclusions in their rejection of particular works. But in the first place they do not always agree, and in the next it seems to me that the same revision which removed the hiatus would also remove faults in rythm, clumsinesses of transition, and inconclusive arguments. Thus the researches of both scholars would only result in proving that some of Demos-

second volume of Messrs. Paley and Sandys' *private* orations of Demosthenes; and, above all, to the striking and picturesque study of bankers and banking, sketched from the history of the Bank of *Pasion Phormion & Co.*, in these orations, by M. G. Perrot (*Revue des Deux Mondes* for Nov. 15, 1873).

thenes' speeches were more logical, powerful, and carefully composed than others, and to the latter class belong most of the works they have declared spurious. When Dionysius and the ancients felt a speech to be spurious, I cede to their far keener appreciation ;[1] when the moderns object, I do not feel persuaded, except they can show strong internal grounds, such as the avoidance of all historical detail, and the servile imitation of a known model, which we find (for example) in the two speeches *against Aristogeiton*. But here Dionysius, of course, was not at fault.

§ 527. The simplest and best of all the 'private orations' is doubtless that *against Conon*, in an action for an aggravated assault. In this, as in very few of his works, the orator occupies himself with simple narrative, and a sketch of the dissolute life of Conon and his aristocratic set ; the subject is one quite fit for Lysias, but though all the critics praise Demosthenes' narrative as superior in strength and even in ethos, I cannot see in it the genuine and unaffected grace of the older master.[2] Perhaps more celebrated is the speech for *Phormion*, to whom the celebrated banker Pasion had bequeathed his wife (a common Attic practice) and his banking business, with the guardianship of his children. The eldest son, Apollodorus, an extravagant man, quarrelled with Phormion about the inheritance, but presently compromised his differences. When he again, however, attacked Phormion, the accused brought a demurrer (*παραγραφή*), and so spoke first, showing that the former compromise was a legal bar to any action, but for safety's sake going carefully into the rights of the case. The present speech is a *συνηγορία*, or supporting speech by some friend of Phormion. The narrative, the argument, and the replies to Apollodorus are combined in Demosthenes' manner, and, indeed, here if anywhere, he succeeds in the ethos, and draws his client as an honest man of business, opposed to a worthless, vain, and noisy spendthrift.

[1] This appears to be Mr. Jebb's judgment, in his excellent article on *Demosthenes* in the *Encyclop. Britann.*, but he nevertheless defers to A. Schäfer's opinion on the speech *against Macartatus*.

[2] Cf. the excellent analysis of this speech by M. Perrot, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for June 15, 1873, pp. 946 sq.

The first speech *against Stephanus*, which is certainly genuine, is happily a sort of reply on the side of Apollodorus, who sued Stephanus for having given false evidence in the trial concerning the establishment of Pasion's will. Thus though Demosthenes did an immoral act in pleading on different sides in the same quarrel, we have learned by this means a great deal about an interesting case. The struggles of Demosthenes' panegyrists to get rid of this evidence against their hero are summed up by Blass,[1] whose conclusion I have adopted.

§ 528. Among the other speeches rejected, because there is too much hiatus either between the vowels or the proofs, because the dates are supposed later than the epoch during which Demosthenes wrote court speeches, or because the arguments are, in the opinion of the Germans, not sound enough or acute enough for the great orator, there are several which seemed genuine, and good specimens of his eloquence, to Dionysius, and which liberal critics will hesitate to condemn; for we should now have given up that veneration for destructive criticism which is often rashly felt for a new acquaintance.

Thus the excellent speech against Callippus is rejected by Schäfer and Blass because no long interval can be proved to have elapsed since the death of Pasion (370 B.C.) and the case before us, which was therefore tried before Demosthenes wrote any speeches. These chronological inferences are extremely doubtful; in fact, delays in Attic law were rather the rule than the exception, and to base upon them the spuriousness of a work sustained by its own merits, and by consistent tradition, seems to me regular Teutonism in reasoning. But no sooner is it determined that Apollodorus' affairs were not argued by Demosthenes than the critics at once discover all sorts of feeblenesses and follies in a speech which would be shown full of beauty and of force if they thought it genuine. The same remarks will apply, I think, to two other sets of three speeches rejected even by Blass: first, the speeches *against Macartatus, Olympiodorus and Lacritus*, two of which are cited by Dionysius as good specimens of Demosthenes' ethos; next, those against

[1] pp. 412–13.

Apaturius, *Phormion* (quite a different person from the client of the speech *in behalf of Phormion*), and *Dionysodorus*. In the case of any of them there is, however, some possibility that a clever pupil or imitator may have written under the advice and with the revision of the master. Such a production would be now quite undistinguishable from a lesser, or careless, or unrevised, work of the orator himself.

There are not more than nine as to which the arguments of the sceptics seem to me of real weight ; but when we reach a certain boundary line, or balance of probabilities, the decision becomes very difficult, if not impossible. It is perhaps best to refer, in conclusion, to the results reached by Blass,[1] to which I do not subscribe, but which will show the reader the most recent state of the controversy in Germany.

§ 529. There remain two epideictic speeches, the *Epitaphios*, or funeral speech, and the *Erotikos*, or tract in praise and exhortation of the fair Epicrates. The latter is so essentially Isocratic in form and composition, that we wonder how it ever came to be attributed to Demosthenes. The Funeral speech is supposed to be that delivered on the slain at Chæronea, and is really, in outward form, of the school of Demosthenes ; but is a poor performance,[2] full of over-dressed conceits, and has never been able to deceive critics as to its spuriousness. The writer shows more acquaintance with Plato's *Menexenus* than with any of the other extant models.

§ 530. Far more interesting is the collection of *proems*, or introductions to public harangues, fifty-six in number, which have been raised, by separating some of them into parts, to the number of sixty-two. These commonplaces are in several

[1] p. 526. He acknowledges eleven public harangues, and eight court speeches on public affairs ; then seven private orations of an early, and seven from a later period. This gives a total of thirty-three genuine speeches. He furthermore classifies the spurious speeches into those by contemporary authors, by the school of Demosthenes, and by the writer who composed for Apollodorus. Weil, a greater linguistic critic, acknowledges the speech against Olympiodorus, and others which Blass rejects.

[2] I observe that Spengel (*Trans. Munich Acad.* for 1863) is not indisposed to accept it as genuine, though confessedly below the average of Demosthenes' works.

cases identical with the openings of the earlier speeches of Demosthenes (up to 350 B.C.), but show no traces of any of his later and more famous harangues. Had a rhetor or later collector been here at work, such an avoidance would be inconceivable; and therefore the collection is to be referred (in spite of Schäfer and Dobree) to about the year 349 B.C., and to the great orator himself. In form—in the observance of rythm and avoidance of hiatus—all these proems agree with those confessedly used by Demosthenes. About one half of them refer to special occasions; the rest are perfectly general introductions, intended to excite the interest of the audience and to obtain a fair hearing for the speaker. But they are strictly commonplaces, and seek to gain attention not by putting things in a new and startling way, or by striking some sudden and exciting chord of sympathy, but by the careful and well-rounded expression of some sound common-sense consideration. As such they are not very well suited for the use of the modern orator, though showing clearly how strict and conservative was the taste of the so-called ochlocracy of Athens.

§ 531. As regards the *Letters* of Demosthenes, which close the long catalogue of his works, it has hitherto been the usual fashion to reject them as spurious in composition, but to use them as historical materials, on account of the important and apparently accurate information they contain about the orator's exile.[1]

The genuineness has lately been defended (at least as regards most of them) with great ingenuity by Blass. They had

[1] The genuineness of the documents inserted in the speeches has also of late years been generally impugned, and in many cases they have been proved the ignorant compilations of a later age. Nevertheless, the wholesale scepticism regarding them which was growing up has been considerably checked by the discovery of some of them on marble, especially those cited in the speech against Macartatus, which so many critics think spurious. Hence the conclusion of Weil (in the preface to his edition of the speeches) is the just one—that we can lay down no general law, but must test each alleged document on its own merits. Some are certainly false, some apparently genuine; the majority are very doubtful. But this is not a literary question. Cf. H. Sauppe in the 25th *Philolog. Versammlung*, Leipzig, 1868.

been assumed spurious by Westermann, who was followed, without argument, by Schäfer,[1] and, what is far more important, by Grote, who was no sceptic in such matters, but who will not even[2] use them as historical sources, which Schäfer does. Blass[3] accepts the second and third, holds the first and the sixth to be doubtful (though the former may be in substance genuine), and rejects the fourth. No. 5 is of no consequence. He shows that the writer possessed accurate knowledge of obscure details, and that, moreover, both his politics and his composition correspond with those of Demosthenes. He concludes that the *onus probandi* lies on the sceptics, and makes out a very reasonable case. Without venturing to decide the question, in which, however, I sympathise with Blass, I will only point out how signally German critics have their æsthetical judgments controlled by their critical conclusions, and in consequence how utterly unsafe they are as to questions of style. Westermann, having made up his mind that the letters were spurious, discovers that he is guided by their 'thoroughly un-Demosthenic composition, their senile verbosity, their unworthy complaining of misfortune, their obtrusive boastfulness, their want of argument,' &c. Blass, who decides them to be genuine, finds their self-praise moderate and in good taste, their logic thoroughly convincing, their bitter complaints the natural voice of a sensitive and refined nature, their patriotism noble and affecting!

§ 532. After this long review of special works, we may sum up our estimate by some general remarks. All critics are agreed that, as in the writings of Isocrates, so in those of Demosthenes, the greatest elaboration and conscious finish were apparent; we know that the orators of that age regarded themselves as artists, who competed with poets, painters, and sculptors in the production of permanent masterpieces, of models for the imitation of lesser men. Hence the form of a Greek oration is a matter of widely different importance from

[1] Schäfer has since (*Neue Jahrb.* for 1877, pp. 161, sq.) given his arguments, and strongly supported Westermann's view; Blass has replied (*Ibid.* pp. 541, sq.), but I cannot see that the case has become clearer. I still adhere, though without much confidence, to the side of Blass.

[2] xii. 406, note.

[3] pp. 383, sqq.

that of modern speeches. Even if the ideas were commonplace, or at least, not new, a Greek orator could attain the highest praise by the arrangement of his argument, the choice of words, and of the constructions in which he put them. Hence the frequent use of commonplaces, such as the *proems* of Demosthenes, in which some frequently occurring thought was shaped into a proper expression, in which it might be always produced, without offending the audience by its repetition. Moreover, as speeches seem to have been mostly committed to memory, such commonplaces were of no small assistance to the speaker, like the repetitions in the Homeric poems. As all art, and more especially Greek art, so Greek oratory was subject to rules, which were not lightly transgressed; it was based on precedents, which were altered or extended slowly, and protected with great jealousy. The perfection of such a speaker as Demosthenes consisted, therefore, partly in his adherence to the tradition of his predecessors; partly in the wise and cautious innovations whereby he raised his eloquence to a higher level.

§ 533. First, then, as regards his *choice of words*, while adhering generally to the traditions of Lysias and Isocrates, it was remarked that he increased his vocabulary in strength by the admission of many common words and exclamations, which they would have considered beneath their proper dignity, but which give him both greater variety and greater force. Such are his ἀνθρώπιον, ἰαμβειοφάγος, ὁ δεῖνα, ὦταν, νὴ Δία, and many other terms, especially of abuse, which prevent him from being cited as a master of Attic purity, but which must have added to the force and homeliness of his language. We have reason to believe that his actual speeches contained more of these expressions than we now find in our texts; for some were expunged during revision by the author; others rejected by rhetoricians as improper and undignified. These coarser expressions are to be found rather in his court speeches (even in public cases) than in his public harangues, which are remarkable for their dignity and calmness of expression. Indeed, nothing can give us a higher impression of the assembled Attic population than the eloquence which best succeeded with them. But in his

court speeches he is in every respect freer, using vulgarisms and trite proverbs when he thinks them effective. Far rarer are poetical expressions in any of his speeches. His close study of Thucydides shows itself in his choice of certain abstract forms, such as the crowding together of infinitives with articles, which is very obtrusive in some speeches, and the use of neuter adjectives substantively, such as *τὸ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν εὐμενές*. These *tournures de phrase* make some of his early speeches, for example, that *on the Symmories*, as obscure as the speeches of Thucydides. On the other hand, the use of the plural of abstract nouns, like *περιουσίαι*, is on the model of Isocrates. His metaphors are not frequent; they are chosen from familiar objects, and are thus not poetical in our sense, but are very striking, and always tersely put, often in a single word. His similes are accordingly very rare. In the great third *Philippic* there are six to be found; in the equally great speech *on the Chersonese* there are none. Everywhere we wonder at the simplicity and brevity of his diction, no idea ever being repeated which does not give balance to a period; and most of these exceptions are removed by rejecting, with Cobet, the second and otiose expression. Indeed, we must again repeat that Demosthenes in his first draughts, or original compositions, did not approach the perfection and beauty of form which his speeches ultimately attained, and that it was through conscious and painful revision that he introduced their more subtle beauties. This is frequently alluded to by the ancients, not excepting his contemporaries, who said his compositions smelt of the lamp; it is also shown clearly by modern critics, like Blass, who point to speeches of which parts have been elaborated and the rest left in the original form.

§ 534. But this after-polishing applies less to his *words* than to the rules as to *hiatus* and *rythm*, which have been analysed with minute care by Benseler and by Blass. As to hiatus, it appears that Demosthenes began by following pretty strictly the practice of Isocrates, and not permitting final and initial vowels to come together, even when separated by a pause, except in such words as *ἤ* and *καί*. This is the case up to about 357, or

the period which embraces the first speech relating to public affairs (that on the *trierarch's crown*). But even during this period, some of his speeches show less care than others, probably in the revision; and afterwards we find that he refused to be bound by these fetters, and allowed himself greater liberty. At the close of a colon or clause, he no longer avoided the hiatus, any more than the tragic poets did at the end of a verse. How far elision and crasis prevailed in pronunciation, and diminished the apparent cases which we find, cannot now be determined. But after articles, relatives, and such frequent words as ἐπεί, μέντοι, &c., initial vowels are freely admitted. The exact law which he followed seems nowhere stated. Cicero says he avoided the 'concourse of vowels' *magna ex parte*. Later rhetors seem to understand only the Isocratic law.

Passing to rythm, Blass has enounced the law that Demosthenes avoids the collocation of more than two short syllables, just as is done by the poets in tragic trimeters—a law of which he asserts that no trace is to be found in any of the previous prose writers. He thinks that the immediate followers of Demosthenes observed it, but that presently it was lost. In Plato especially Blass finds frequent crowds of short syllables, thus proving, as he thinks, that Demosthenes' law was a deliberate removal of his style from that of polished conversation. The reader who desires to go into the minute details of this theory, its apparent exceptions, and the evidence for it, should consult Blass' statement.[1] He says it is used so concurrently with the avoidance of hiatus, that spurious or unrevised passages show a parallel negligence of both, and he applies them throughout to determine the question of genuineness.

§ 535. There follows a long and intricate discussion on the structure of Demosthenes' periods, which were known to be divided into κῶλα, or members, and which were, according to critics old and new, arranged symmetrically, so as to produce a harmonious effect like that of the odes of Pindar. But while the best old critics, who speak fully and constantly about Demosthenes—I mean especially Dionysius and Cicero—often indeed praise his rythm and his periods for their harmony and their

[1] AB. iii. pp. 100–4, and also iv. 359–68.

structure, yet never give us any special rules, or any definite analysis of his procedure, modern critics have striven to penetrate into the secrets of his composition, and tell us what laws he adopted to produce his great effects. That these laws produced a certain avoidance of hiatus is certain, proving a rule of oratory expressly discovered and used by Isocrates. That they also resulted in the rythmical rule set up by Blass seems true, after the evidence he has adduced; but I cannot see it so clearly as to assert that this rule is not the accidental, or at least unconscious result of some more subtle and purely æsthetic canons, which the orator never taught, and probably could not teach, his pupils. This I think is the fair inference to draw from Blass' own admission, that all observance of such rythm disappears as soon as he comes to speeches distinctly posterior to Demosthenes in date. In other words, the revision of the master pointed out offences against a very delicate subjective taste to which his pupils deferred, but as there was no canon laid down, or perhaps possible, the secret was lost with the artist who alone could apply it.

The case seems to me equally strong as regards the question of larger composition, that of the arrangement of κῶλα, or clauses, wherewith Demosthenes is said to have produced a sense of harmony by a symmetrical disposition. For this the reader should consult Blass's arrangement of the beginning of the *Crown* oration, according to his hypothesis.[1]

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 560–1, *Proem*, §§ 1–8:

§§ 1–2	§§ 3–4	§§ 5-6	§§ 7–8
κῶλα	κῶλα	κῶλα	κῶλα
32 | 23 | 33	44 | 35 | 53	24 | 4 | 4 | 42	2222 | 2222
στίχοι 16	στίχοι 24	στίχοι 24	στίχοι 16

This looks wonderfully symmetrical; but if the reader will turn back to the text printed by Blass on p. 529, he will see how arbitrary the determining of each *colon* is. In fact, the old rhetors, as Blass tells us, could not agree about it. Some are long, some short, and hardly any are clearly determined by either the sense or the construction. To print the passage would occupy too much space. Cf. the article on *Stichometry* and *Colometry* by Blass in the *Rhein. Mus.* for 1869 (p. 524), followed up in his account of Demosthenes, pp. 105, sq. The question at issue is this:

But when we come to enquire by what laws Blass determines the beginning and end of each member, we find no satisfactory test in his long and intricate discussion[1] except the occurrence of a strong hiatus, which was seldom allowed within a κῶλον. As to the rest his arrangements are capricious and often unnatural, nor do I think that another scholar, acting independently, and without a desire to produce a symmetrical result, would bring out the same divisions. I do not even think that a recovery of the analysis by the orator of Rhodes, who divided the speech *against Philip's Letter* into κῶλα according to the number given in (then) old MSS., and professedly derived from Demosthenes himself, would help us much. For in the first place this speech, being spurious, would not give us the real practice of Demosthenes, but a mere imitation by what Blass himself determines to be[2] a poor successor, who did not follow the rythmical rule. The analysis of the proem *on the Crown* by Lachares, which is still extant, dates from the 5th century A.D., and has, I suspect, no authority. Nor do I think with Blass that these indications are at all sufficient to prove that the στίχοι noted at the end of our oldest MS. mean metrical or rythmical κῶλα and not mere lines found in an older copy. It is confessed that even the best of the older rhetors had no certain traditions, or fixed rules about the matter, for Cicero and Dionysius always confine themselves to generalities; Hermogenes and Aristeides even contradict one another.[3]

In the face of these difficulties, I think we may abandon as hopeless the attempt to measure out the symmetries of Demosthenes with plummet line, and must content ouselves to believe that, like his great predecessors and successors in the art, he worked out his speeches by constant reference either to the taste of his audience—in this case a very critical and competent one—or to that delicate taste which he had produced in his own mind by constant and anxious meditation on older

whether the number of στίχοι given at the end of each speech in some old MSS. is the number of mere lines in the speech, as written in even columns, or whether the lines represented originally *cola* of various length, of which the sum is given. Graux (*J. de Phil.* ii.) has now proved that στίχοι were never sense lines.

[1] pp. 105, sq. [2] p. 347. [3] Blass, p. 105, note.

models, on their perfections, and on their deficiencies in regard to the advanced requirements of his age.

§ 536. It is far more interesting and more practical to examine the features wherein we can still securely judge the orator, and explain how he attained his preeminence. Not that there does not still remain considerable difficulty. For when we consider what not only scholars, but statesmen and modern speakers have noticed, that in Demosthenes we have a man who produced the greatest results ever attained in his art, without great natural gifts, or good voice, or a commanding presence, without being a philosopher, without any broad generalisations which could affect future ages, without ornament in the modern sense, without any pathetic scenes, without any real wit—in fact, without attracting either the thinkers or the sensitive natures whom Plato and Aristophanes can fascinate, we are still disposed to be incredulous, and to require some clear and definite solution of so mysterious a problem.

The old rhetors are very far indeed from giving us any adequate account of these things. But what they tell us is interesting and instructive as to the facts of the case. The theory of Dionysius is that Demosthenes consciously combined all the perfections of his predecessors, choosing the terseness and pathos of Thucydides, the grace and ethos of Lysias, the harmony and skilful disposition of Isocrates, and working them up into a mixed style, which embraced all these perfections. Of course no great genius was ever a mere eclectic, but what is really to be here inferred is the extraordinary *variety* of Demosthenes, in whose work could be found passages emulating all these writers in their peculiar strong points. Nor does this variety apply exclusively either to the form or to the matter of his speeches; it interpenetrates both thoroughly. Thus his choice of words was at one time grand and dignified, at another so homely as to be almost coarse. His periods were at one time splendid constructions of such complexity and intricacy as to astonish the hearer, at another they were mere loosely connected clauses, like the easy narratives of Herodotus. Nay even the arguments are never, so to speak, sustained and methodical, but he passes from point to point, anticipates for a

moment, then recapitulates, recounts facts and then expounds arguments ; in fact, plays all round his subject so as to present every aspect of it in curious and varied succession.

It is accordingly a constant remark of the old critics that he not only used the *figures of thought* of older orators more frequently, but added several of his own, which they never dared to use. He used *anaphora*, *anastrophe*, *systrophe*—they enumerate nearly twenty of them—in the way of repeating words at the opening of his clauses, of imagining questions put by objectors, of questioning himself, and so forth. But what seemed new in him was the frequent use of *aposiopesis*, and the use of exclamations, especially at the end of an indignant sentence. Two of these, which must have had a most stinging effect, are very frequently quoted.[1]

This vivacity of making his oration almost a familiar dialogue, and of bursting out into exclamation, was an unheard-of liberty according to the old traditions of Greek eloquence. His action in delivery corresponded to it, and shocked the old school. For while even Æschines, with his fine voice and prepossessing appearance, stood up (as his statue still represents him) keeping his hand hidden in the folds of his cloak, and spoke with dignified calmness, we hear that Demosthenes contorted his figure, laid his hand across his forehead so as to affect the attitude of sudden reflection, often raised his voice to a scream, and even turned round and round on the bema in his excitement. These things carried away the lower public, but were always reprehended by artistic critics. In fact, Demosthenes' action was as new and startling on the bema as Mr. Irving's *Hamlet* has been on our stage, and it was a long time before critics could come to confess that the new and vehement style of the young politician had great and enduring merit.

§ 537. If we examine what modern students have added to the somewhat barren criticism of the classical theorists, we may contrast with the liveliness and variety, which they have

[1] (*And.* 78) : ἀλλ' Ἀνδροτίων ὑμῖν πομπείων ἐπισκευαστής, Ἀνδροτίων ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί. (*Aristocr.* 210): νῦν ἡ πόλις εἰς ὑπηρέτου σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήλυθε καὶ Χαρίδημον εἰ χρὴ φρουρεῖν βουλεύεται, Χαρίδημον οἴμοι.

described as 'figures of thought,' a certain remarkable persistence in urging the main point, which makes him never forget his object amid all the changes and momentary digressions of his eloquence. He was far too subtle a student of human nature to lecture in definite heads, like a Scotch preacher. If he has a scheme with subdivisions, he almost always conceals them by such natural and easy transitions that he leads on his hearer insensibly from point to point. But never does he digress from his real subject, and his affected episode is often his most insidious and telling argument.

All this subtlety and even astuteness of advocacy, which does not shrink at times from distorting facts and wilfully dealing in fallacies, is combined with that peculiar dignity and reticence in emotion which have secured him the sympathy of strange generations of men. For he never strains his pathos ; however seductive or striking a picture may come before him, he never turns aside to paint it in detail, like the orators of the present day. He suggests it with a burning sentence, a brief clause, nay, with a single word, and passes on his way. It is particularly remarked by the moderns how quiet and sedate are his conclusions, as if the Attic audience objected to be released in high excitement, and in a moment of strong emotion. Hence the orator, like the tragic poet, was expected to calm his hearers, and close with an appeal to reason and common sense.[1] He never uses a simile for its beauty, but always for its effect in illustration, and hence borrows it from the affairs of ordinary life. Whatever license he may have allowed himself in his actual delivery, he reduced all pathetic digressions, when he came to revise his speeches, to a very minimum, and so produces on us an impression of serious earnest, to which I can quote no modern parallel. This is perhaps the strongest feature in his 'thoughts that breathe, and words that burn.' And together with this redhot earnestness, there is, on the whole, a moral splendour about him, which raises him above all his contemporaries. It is of course ridiculous to assert that he was a Stoic in his philosophy, that he was so Quixotic a po-

[1] The extant speech of Lycurgus offers a remarkable exception to this rule.

litician as to advocate from the *bema* the doing of right for its own sake, apart from consequences. He plainly enough, in his Hellenic harangues, lays down self-preservation by the weakening of neighbour states as the real basis of Athenian politics. He was quite ready to call in the Persian king, the hereditary enemy of all Hellenedom, to join with the Greeks against the newer and more dangerous, though semi-Hellenic oppressor. But, nevertheless, he had large views of Athenian greatness and responsibilities; he grasped the idea of great sacrifices for great national ends ; he advocated the cause of liberty and of culture against despotism ; he soared above the petty quarrels of individual states to an imperial policy. These wider thoughts made him the exponent of more than Attic policy, of other than Athenian conflicts.

His unattractive presence, his unsocial temper, and his early difficulties, while they prevented a ready recognition of his genius, were perhaps strong contributing elements to its growth and peculiar complexion. For genius he developed, though attained by labour, and decked with artifice. Nor will any number of subsidiary causes explain to us his success.

But while he added more perhaps than any other great man in history to his natural powers by labour and energy, there was one gift he received from fortune, without which he could not have risen to his true position. He lived in a great historical crisis; he grew up to take part in a momentous struggle, which brought out all his eloquence in the vital cause of Hellenic freedom. The force and the subtlety of his unarmed words were pitted against the phalanx and the gold of one of the ablest monarchs in history. To have been overcome after a long and glorious struggle for such a cause, to have stood forth to speak the mighty epitaph on the tomb of departed liberty, was indeed a fortune worthy of no ordinary genius. The trials of his later years forced from him the bitter reflection, that were he again offered, with his acquired experience, the way to the bema or to the tomb, he would not hesitate to choose the latter. But had he been able to look beyond the present life, and see that the one meant lasting dignity and renown, and the other eternal oblivion, he might have justified his first

choice by his own noble words, and cried out that he had not erred—no, not by the heroes that fought at Marathon and Salamis, and all the brave men whom a grateful posterity has honoured with a public tomb, the monument of their valour and their worth ![1]

§ 538. The external history of his text is clearer than that of most Greek authors. It is plain, from the condition in which we find speeches like that *against Meidias*, that many of them were not edited by Demosthenes himself, but by pupils and admirers, possibly by his nephew Democharcs, on whose proposal his name was honoured and his descendants distinguished, but not till forty years after his death. The German critics find, even in some of the speeches they reject, the delicate laws of rythm and hiatus observed according to the model of the master, and they infer from this that he was practically the head of a school. But I think all we know of the man tells against such a theory, and suggests (as has already been argued) that most of these lesser works were probably unrevised compositions of his own. The collection which we possess, though some nine titles are mentioned which are now lost,[2] is in the main that of the Alexandrian Callimachus, a learned man and a scholar, who was not likely to class a notoriously inferior work in the list. Yet he seems to have been easier of faith than his successors.

Cicero constantly alludes to him, and places him as an orator above all other models. Indeed Cicero's rhetorical writings are often the best commentary on his great predecessor, though he evidently knew nothing definite concerning the subtler laws of his composition. But Quintilian, and Plutarch, and Origen,[3] though confessing his greatness as a speaker, seem quite convinced by their historical materials

[1] The reader will see how completely this great ambition had departed from Greece, by reading the critique of the excel ent Polybius (xviii. 14) on the Definition of a traitor in connection with Demosthenes' speeches. *Nil magnificum, nil generosum sapit.*

[2] It is noticed that the geographer Agatharchides and Rutilius Lupus have many quotations from Demosthenes not found in our texts, and apparently not from any varying recension of extant speeches (Blass, p. 59).

[3] All quoted by Blass, p. 47.

that he was not an honest or a worthy man.[1] Nevertheless, Stoics like Panætius justly recommended his speeches as a good moral study on account of their lofty tone. It was through the rhetoricians that he was ultimately rehabilitated. Cæcilius and Dionysius both wrote largely upon him, and the first letter to Ammæus of the latter is an elaborate eulogy of the 'wonderful eloquence of Demosthenes.' From this tract, and from Dionysius' incidental allusions in discussing other Greek orators, we discover that the critics of the day had begun to reject many works as spurious, and that the catalogue only included about forty-four of the extant speeches. As to mere copies of the text, we do not hear much from Dionysius. But it appears that the *Ἀττικιαγά*, or copies written by a certain Atticus, were thought of peculiar value, as Lucian tells us, who speaks of him as a contemporary.[2] Among the Greek rhetors of the Roman schools, comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero, of Demosthenes and Æschines, and other such essays became common; and from the many monographs or *ὑπομνήματα* they composed, were brought together the body of scholia, which have reached us under the name of Ulpian, and in which (together with allusions in *Suidas* and *Photius*) we find at least twenty-five authors of such works quoted. The tract *on the Sublime* is perhaps the only one which gives us the æsthetic criticisms of this age. The author's judgments on Demosthenes are sound and clear. But though Ulpian is said to have been a rhetor of the third century A.D., we find fourth century authors quoted in his scholia, so that his own work may not have extended beyond the public orations,

[1] With this judgment very few moderns are agreed. I find an estimate of the orator in consonance with it in Mr. Simcox's excellent preface to the edition of the speeches *on the Crown*, with all of which I would agree, except that he gives some credence to the attacks on Demosthenes charging him with unchastity. These charges the man's face, and figure, and acts, forbid us to believe. Among the Germans, I find that L. Spengel, in his articles on Demosthenes' harangues, has taken an independent course, and does not fall down and worship the orator's character as well as his eloquence. But Spengel has found many opponents, and only a stray follower in A. Weidner. The question of Demosthenes' incorruptibility will recur in connection with the accusations of Hypereides. [2] *Adv. indoct.* 1.

the rest being the collection of Zosimus, or some such person. They are pretty full on the first twenty-four orations, very poor on the rest, but are, unfortunately, almost all on rhetorical points, and tell us little of the history or politics with which the text is concerned. Our best arguments are ascribed to Libanius, but there are often found more prolix arguments by other rhetors.

§ 539. *Bibliographical.* When we emerge from the Middle Ages we find a rich store of MSS., several Italian ones being as old as the eleventh century (the Marcian F perhaps even from the tenth), and one of them written by the same hand as the famous *Ravennas* of Aristophanes. But they are all completely thrown into the shade by the Parisian Σ, of the tenth century, which is now recognised as the proper basis of the text, and probably taken from an Attican copy, whereas the rest are all the vulgar (δημώδεις), considerably interpolated. But from these latter (especially the Marcian F, sæc. x. or xi.) Aldus printed his *Demosthenes* in 1504. He also printed Ulpian's scholia in 1503. All the later editions up to the present generation followed this recension, merely adding collations of MSS. of the same class. Now at last the Zurich editors, Dindorf, Bekker, and Cobet, have shown the enormous value of the codex Σ, which has been most thoroughly and minutely collated for the edition of H. Weil (two volumes have appeared), but also for the texts prepared by these scholars. The work of commenting on Demosthenes is so varied and extensive, that except Weil's volumes, which already embrace most of the important speeches, and Rehdantz on the speeches regarding Philip, no general edition can be recommended for exegesis. The best texts are Bekker's (second edition, Leipzig, 1854–5), G. Dindorf's (with the scholia, nine volumes Oxon, 1846–51), and Voemel's (second edition, Paris, 1868); special editions of separate speeches are innumerable, and the best have been mentioned separately in the foregoing chapter. The English translations of Demosthenic orations, especially of that *on the Crown*, are very numerous, the latest being that of Sir R. Collier. Leland's, of the last century, has a deservedly high repute. The myriad newer literature on

Demosthenes (up to 1877) will be found catalogued in the thirty-seventh volume of the *Philologus*, pp. 676, sq., and since that time there is a review by Hüttner, in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1887 (pp. 188, sq.), which embraces all the monographs up to 1885. Little can ever be added, save in the way of criticism, to the exhaustive histories of A. Schäfer and F. Blass, from which I have borrowed materials throughout.

CHAPTER V.

THE ORATORS CONTEMPORARY WITH DEMOSTHENES.

§ 540. DEMOSTHENES was only the greatest among a constellation of great speakers, of whom we have sufficient remains to justify the high praise accorded to them by the Greek historians of rhetoric. If in fact they were not all judged by the severe test of comparison with Demosthenes, we should pronounce most of them as quite first-rate in their department of literature ; in some respects, indeed, their less studied composition is more congenial to modern taste than the thoroughly professional eloquence of their great rival.

We naturally begin with ÆSCHINES, marked out by his life as the special antagonist to Demosthenes. Little would be known of him but for this circumstance, and that little again has been obscured and perverted by the unsparing and reckless vituperation of Demosthenes. But it is almost ridiculous how the extant *Lives* of Æschines gravely repeat the calumnies of the *de Corona*, as if they were historical truth, while the equally plausible countercharges of Æschines against Demosthenes are generally set down at their proper value. However, this vulgar habit of personal λοιδορία compelled orators to make counter-statements showing their own antecedents, and to these, when unrefuted by their adversaries, we are bound to assign most weight, as they probably only err by omission, not by deliberate falsification.

The sketch of Apollonius (prefixed to the texts) is more honest than the rest, in appending to Demosthenes' scurrilities the facts stated by Æschines himself in his own defence.[1] His

[1] περὶ παραπρεσβ. §§ 78, 147, 168.

father, Atrometus, who was in court, at the age of ninety-four, when this case was pleaded (344–3 B.C.), was a respectable but poor citizen of the deme of the Kothokidæ,[1] who, before he lost his property owing to the Peloponnesian war, was a private citizen and an athlete, then was exiled in the days of the Thirty, and served as a mercenary soldier in Asia. He belonged, says Æschines, to a clan which had the same family worship and altars as the Eteoboutadæ, from whose family the priestess of Athene Polias was chosen. Atrometus returned from Corinth with the exiles under Thrasybulus, and being poor began to make his livelihood as a schoolmaster. He had married Glaucothea, the daughter of Glaucus of the deme Acharnæ, apparently of respectable family. The orator tells us his mother shared in the exile to Corinth, which seems strange, as her second son, Æschines, was not born till 389 B.C., according to his own statement. His elder brother, Philochares, and his younger, Aphobetus,[2] were both well known and respectable men, and were entrusted with the highest commands and offices.

Our orator is said in early youth to have assisted his father in keeping the school, and also (by Demosthenes) to have helped his mother in some disreputable private religious mysteries, such as were common but in bad odour at Athens. Æschines never denies that she was employed in some such living, but merely accentuates the respectability of her family and connections. Being duly enrolled on attaining the age of puberty, he served his term in the *περίπολοι*, or frontier guards of Athens, and in the later campaigns at Nemea (368), at Mantinea (362); and more especially at Tamynæ (349), he fought with such credit as to be publicly distinguished by the general Phocion. At what time of

[1] Some demes were local, and called by the name of their towns. But others were not so, and were called after some legendary hero. This deme is always mentioned in the patronymic form, but I can find no trace whatever of the personage from whom it derived its name. Hesychius gives *κοθώ* and *κορθώ* as rare forms in the sense of *βλάβη*. Hence Fick (*Griech. Personennamen*) suggests *κοθώκης* in the sense of *healer of ill* (*κοθω-άκης*), as the epithet of the eponymous hero of the deme.

[2] The *Life* ascribed to Plutarch quotes these names as Aphobus and Democharcs, which shows either negligence or a text varying from ours. The former is the more probable.

his life he could have employed himself as a tragic actor we cannot tell. Demosthenes says he played *tritagonist* with bad companies 'in the provinces,' and that he was hissed off the stage as Œnomaus, but apparently only for the accident of falling when he was pursuing Pelops on the stage, and being assisted up by the master of the chorus—a very likely misfortune to happen on the Greek stage, with the awkward and unnatural padding and heightening of the human form. This incident is quoted in the first *Life* on the authority of Democharcs, and even the name of the chorus-master, Sannio, is mentioned. But the actors with whom he played, Theodorus and others, were the most eminent of their day, and they played the 'classic drama,' which was the most respectable and honourable branch of the profession, so that Æschines, though taking inferior parts, played in the very best companies.[1] He may have been prematurely aged by all these occupations, for he speaks of himself (i. 49) as grey at the age of forty-five.[2] Being of good appearance, though short in stature, and possessing a fine voice, he was afterwards appointed public clerk under the administrations of Aristophon and Eubulus, and gradually obtained sufficient experience and training in public affairs to come forward (aged 33) as a political man. He was entrusted with several important public missions, especially an embassy to Megalopolis to oppose Philip's policy. His celebrated appeal to the Delphians, which brought on the Sacred War, was doubtless his greatest political triumph. He married the daughter of Philodemus, and had a daughter and two sons, whom he produced in court during his defence, as children, when he was himself about forty-eight years old. Having completely failed in his attack on Demosthenes in 330 B.C., and being condemned to pay a thousand drachmæ for unsuccessful prosecution, he went into exile to Rhodes, where he supported himself, not I fancy by rhetoric, which he never professed, but by teaching letters, or declamation. He is said to have died at Samos, at the age of seventy-five (therefore 314 B.C.), but on no better authority than that of Apollonius. One of the spurious

[1] Cf. the high praise of this Theodorus in Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 2, 4.

Letters says his mother went with him into exile, aged seventy-three,[1] which is impossible in the face of the statement that she fled with her husband to Corinth in 403 B.C.[2] One of the finest extant portrait statues of the ancients is the full-length figure of Æschines, now in the Museum of Naples, in the attitude he assumed when speaking. The calm and dignified face seems to me, however, wanting in expression, as compared, for example, with the analogous portrait of Sophocles in the Lateran. There is also a noble bust reproduced (from Colonel Leake's collection) in Millingen's *uned. Mon.*, plate ix., which corroborates the genuineness of the statue.

His political acts are reviewed by Demosthenes and by himself in extant speeches. There seems little doubt that Æschines, serving under Eubulus at home and Phocion in the field, naturally adopted their peace policy, and was hence from the beginning opposed to Demosthenes. But though he honestly began to advocate this policy, the weight of evidence tends to show that he was afterwards bribed by Philip to promote his ends, and that his later political acts were tainted by this impure motive. Such is at least the verdict of all the calmest modern historians. Eubulus and Phocion must have thought differently, for they supported him through the trial about his second embassy to Philip, and obtained his acquittal; nor was he ever convicted and disgraced, like Philocrates, though his case was a closely analogous one. Phocion and Eubulus may have been persuaded that, though Æschines took money, he did so while honestly advocating a peace policy, and not as a motive for abandoning his principles. Hence they would protect him against their political opponent, Demosthenes. These important testimonies in his favour make me still doubt his treachery, but there is no likelihood of any additional evidence ever clearing up this difficult point.

§ 541. As to Æschines' rhetorical training, the ancients, who always insisted on the filiation of literary genius, asserted that he had studied under Plato and Isocrates, probably confounding him with the Socratic Æschines. Cæcilius called him

[1] 12, § 12. [2] παραπρεσβ. § 147.

a pupil of Leodamas, for no other reason, I suppose, than that Æschines speaks of him [1] as an orator not inferior to Demosthenes, nay, even in his opinion a pleasanter speaker. Suidas, whose article on the orator is exceptionally bad, says he was a pupil of Alkidamas. All the internal evidence shows clearly that Æschines never studied rhetoric as a profession, but that having great natural gifts, and being brought by his official position of clerk into constant contact with the best speakers, he formed himself as an amateur upon these models, adding to their method the dignified and graceful delivery which he had studied for his parts on the stage. He affected, moreover, not to be a court speaker, versed in the wiles and subtleties of *nisi prius* practice, but a state adviser on large public interests, like the respectable politicians of the day, who thought speech-writing in private causes a questionable profession. Hence he asserts, at the opening of his speech against Timarchus, that though now forty-five years old, he had never yet appeared in court to prosecute anyone; nor do we find it stated that he wrote speeches for others. The three extant harangues, (1) *against Timarchus*, B.C. 344, (2) *on the Embassy*, B.C. 343, (3) *against Ctesiphon*, B.C. 330, were his only published works; a speech about the Delian temple was of old rejected as spurious. Æschines, in fact, trusted more than any of the professional orators to extempore inspiration; he had a ready flow of words, and probably seldom wrote down what he had to say. We have hints that of the extant speeches two were written after the real trials, and accordingly published as pamphlets of vindication. Hence we can easily conceive him reciting to the Rhodians Demosthenes' speeches, but not as undertaking to teach formally the art of rhetoric.

§ 542. The speech (1) *against Timarchus* is perhaps the most interesting to modern readers, as it does not deal with complicated and disputed political affairs, and can be understood without a minute study of the history of the time. Timarchus had joined Demosthenes in charging Æschines with malversation during his embassy to Philip, when Æschines bethought himself of disposing of his lesser adversary by a

[1] iii. 138–9.

preliminary action. He proved Timarchus to be disqualified from political status, or from accusing any citizen, on account of his disgraceful private life. It is evident from the pains taken by the orator in setting forth both the general expediency of such a law, and its basis in the nature of a democracy, that it had come to be usually regarded as a dead letter.

After a proem declaring his own modesty of life, and total inexperience in public prosecutions, to which he is only urged now by the *sycophancy* of Timarchus,[1] he proceeds to show that, of the various kinds of constitutions, democracy is that specially depending on law, and the upholding of its sanctions.[2] Accordingly he proposes to examine the laws of Solon and Draco for the moral restraint of children, of young men, and lastly of the public generally,[3] and then to compare with them the life of Timarchus in each period, which he does[4] in two parts, first showing his prostitution for pay,[5] and then his squandering of his father's property. Having thus concluded his prosecution, he turns by way of epilogue more specially to two points—first, a refutation of the reply which he hears will be made, and, secondly, an exhortation of the citizens to virtue. But these two are not kept asunder clearly, and the latter especially seems introduced mainly to give a good opportunity for recitations from the poets.[6]

This very Timarchus (says our argument) was the author of more than a hundred decrees. We know, too, other more celebrated Athenians, such as Alcibiades, who could hardly have escaped from a similar prosecution. The particular charge is, however, not so much against youthful excesses, a charge which Æschines does not repudiate even as regards himself, but rather against the practising of immorality for hire —a distinction all-important in this case, and on which great stress is laid. Æschines expounds the plan of his speech[7] more like a modern preacher than with the art of Demosthenes, though he afterwards[8] abandons that part of his parallel which affects the boyhood of Timarchus, professedly from generosity, but more probably from want of evidence. Indeed, all through

[1] §§ 1–3. [2] §§ 4–8. [3] §§ 9–36. [4] §§ 37–115.
[5] §§ 37–94. [6] §§ 141–54. [7] § 8. [8] §§ 39 and 160.

his proofs are so purely circumstantial, that he is obliged to reply[1] to the natural demand of his adversaries to produce direct testimony of any particular act of immorality on the part of Timarchus; but such an objection, fatal to a prosecution in our courts, was easily disposed of at Athens by an appeal to the general character of the defendant, on which Athenians, who were great busybodies, laid no small stress. The whole speech is very valuable in showing us the moral life of Athens, but the subject is not easy to discuss in a modern book. On its style I will speak when we have briefly reviewed the other orations.

§ 543. The second oration, *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, as I have already noticed, was possibly never delivered,[2] but was doubtless published by Æschines with more care than attended the publication of Demosthenes' attack, seeing that it was a vindication of his life and policy. The speech is, indeed, much more agreeable to read than its rival, being simpler, full of lively narrative and not less lively vituperation, and not divided, like that against Timarchus, into heads, but rather a narrative of the circumstances of the two embassies to Philip, varied by sundry excursions in personal matters—accounts of his own family and antecedents, and attacks on Demosthenes. It is quite exceptional for its lively ethos, and its most dramatic painting of the sourness and grand airs of Demosthenes on the embassy, as well as of the courtliness and sagacity of Philip.[3]

Indeed, the narrative of Demosthenes' break-down before Philip, when he had raised the highest expectations by his boasting, is too graphic to be omitted.[4] The sketches of

[1] §§ 71, sq. See the severe censure of Blass (iv. 145) who throughout confuses Greek and modern morality.

[2] Against this theory Thirlwall, Schäfer, and others protest strongly, and think the trial must have been held.

[3] Both Blass and Schäfer think it the best of the extant speeches.

[4] §§ 34–5: *Ῥηθέντων δὲ τούτων καὶ ἑτέρων λόγων ἤδη καθῆκεν εἰς Δημοσθένην τὸ τῆς πρεσβείας μέρος, καὶ πάντες προσεῖχον ὡς ὑπερβολάς τινας δυνάμεως ἀκουσόμενοι λόγων· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, ὡς ἦν ὕστερον ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους αὐτοῦ ἐξηγγέλθη ἡ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ὑπερβολή. οὕτω δὲ ἁπάντων διακειμένων πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο προοίμιόν σκοτεινὸν καὶ τεθνηκὸς δειλίᾳ, καὶ μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν*

past history and the account of the Amphictyonic Council are very interesting, and the whole narrative of Æschines' extempore burst at Delphi, when looking down upon the sacred plain, is worthy of the highest place in Greek eloquence. But the vehement and ribald countercharges of corruption and of immorality made in open court by men of the eminence of Demosthenes and Æschines produce a most disagreeable impression, and show us how different was the tone of political debate at Athens from that of our House of Commons.

It was evident that bribery was frequent, and so little heeded that every politician charged his opponent with it as a matter of course. Let me add what appears stranger, but is not the less true, that the occasional accepting of bribes seems not to have been inconsistent with genuine patriotism and even general honesty. We feel it almost impossible to conceive this. A man once detected taking money in such a way would among us be absolutely ruined. But this is far from being the case in less solid nations than the English—as, for example, among the Russians, and perhaps nearer home. There it is so universal a rule to take bribes, that to accept them from supporters is not the least censured, and even more flagrant violations of honesty are condoned by the exigencies of political expediency. Unless we hold fast this notion, we are sure to go wrong in estimating both Æschines and Demosthenes. The peroration of the present speech [1] gives a true and striking sketch of the history of Athens, especially since the Restoration. He appeals to Eubulus and Phocion to support him, and it was certainly the influence of these respectable men which saved him from the attack of Demosthenes.

§ 544. The same general remarks apply to the third speech, the *indictment of Ctesiphon* for illegality, as having proposed a

πραγμάτων ἐξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. ἰδὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς διέκειτο, θαρρεῖν τε παρεκελεύετο καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, διὰ τοῦτο οἴεσθαί τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὡς προείλετο. ὁ δ' ὡς ἅπαξ ἐταράχθη καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων διεσφάλη, οὐδ' ἀναλαβεῖν αὑτὸν ἐδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν λέγειν ἐπιχειρήσας ταὐτὸν ἔπαθεν. ὡς δ' ἦν σιωπή, μεταστῆναι ἡμᾶς ὁ κῆρυξ ἐκέλευεν.

[1] §§ 172–84.

gold crown to be presented to Demosthenes. The circumstances have been detailed in connection with the reply *de Corona*. It is to be observed that the proem repeats in substance the commonplace about the three forms of polity used in the speech *against Timarchus*.[1] The orator then proceeds to his three general heads of accusation: first, Demosthenes was still under audit when the honour was proposed, which was very properly forbidden by a distinct law under such circumstances. This proof, together with the refutation of the counter-pleas, occupies from §§ 6 to 31. Then comes his second point, that in any case crowning in the theatre before the plays began, was specially forbidden by law, and was ordered to take place, if at all, in the Pnyx. This argument, which seems very sound, is met by Demosthenes with the quotation of certain exceptions, which he accuses Æschines to have suppressed in quoting the law. As we see great authorities, such as Spengel and Halm,[2] at variance about the real justice of the case, it is not likely that the problem will ever be settled. It is quite certain that both orators were capable of both suppression and exaggeration, nay, even of stating deliberate falsehoods.

But ancient critics were so much impressed by the clearness and force of this technical part of Æschines' speech, that they say he would have convicted Ctesiphon more easily than Timarchus had he confined himself to it. He enters next[3] upon a different task — a general review of Demosthenes' life in four periods (above, p. 119), in each of which he was either a traitor or proved a misfortune to the state. The account of the earlier periods differs considerably in both orators from their former account, in the speeches about the embassy. As Spengel observes,[4] sixteen years having elapsed since the facts, the orators knew that they could distort or accommodate them with less fear of detection. Hence Grote has found it impossible to make out the real truth amid their contradictions and inconsistencies. But as a piece of rhetoric, the close of this portion of Æschines' speech, not of course so splendid as the

[1] §§ 4, sq.
[2] *Munich Sitzber.* for 1875, p. 1.
[3] § 49.
[4] *Abhandl. Munich Acad.* for 1863, p. 99.

reply, is very impressive.[1] So indeed is the rest of the speech, spent in what were called *προκαταλήψεις*, or anticipations of the adversary's replies. It is of course hard to conceive that such pleading could come from a mere vulgar traitor. I cannot but think him rather a real advocate of the peace policy, and systematic opponent of Demosthenes' imperial views, not perhaps above taking presents from Philip, and doing him a service, when it accorded with the views of Eubulus and Phocion, but not a more serious or systematic delinquent.

§ 545. As regards the general style of the orator, it is first of all to be remarked that he was regarded the father of extemporising among the Greeks. To them careful and even written preparation was so essential to eloquence, that to speak on the spur of the moment, though often necessary in political debate, was not accounted an art till Æschines showed what could be done in this way. For the boast of Gorgias that he could reply fluently and elegantly to any proposed question was of course understood to depend on a carefully prepared and

[1] Here is a fine passage, §§ 132–134: *Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν; οὐ γὰρ βίον γε ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεύς, ὁ τὸν Ἄθω διορύξας, ὁ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν, ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἑτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας; καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁρῶμεν τῆς τε δόξης ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Πέρσην ἡγεμονίας ἠξιωμένους, οἳ καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν ἠλευθέρωσαν. Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, μεθ' ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται, εἰ καὶ δικαίως, περὶ τῶν ὅλων οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευσάμενοι, ἀλλὰ τήν γε θεοβλάβειαν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως, ἀλλὰ δαιμονίως κτησάμενοι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' οἱ ταλαίπωροι, προσαψάμενοι μόνον τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ κατάληψιν, οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ποτὲ ἀξιοῦντες ἡγεμόνες εἶναι, νῦν ὑμηρεύσοντες καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς ἐπίδειξιν ποιησόμενοι μέλλουσιν ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον ἀναπέμπεσθαι, τοῦτο πεισόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ὅ τι ἂν ἐκείνῳ δόξῃ, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κρατοῦντος καὶ προηδικημένου μετριότητι κριθήσονται. ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα πόλις, ἡ κοινὴ καταφυγὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πρὸς ἣν ἀφικνοῦντο πρότερον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αἱ πρεσβεῖαι, κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν εὑρησόμενοι, νῦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἀγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ὅτου Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν.*

well-adapted stock of commonplaces. Æschines' three written speeches, therefore, give us a poor idea of the power of the man, for which we must rather recur to the great scene outside Delphi, where his wonderful address electrified or rather maddened an assembly 'inexperienced in oratory,' as Demosthenes calls them. The ancient critics judge him, however, exactly as we should expect a great extempore speaker to be judged, even allowing for the influence of Demosthenes' ribald abuse upon them. Dionysius calls him delightful at first reading, and, when more closely examined, powerful too, but rather from natural gifts than from art. Cicero, Cæcilius, and Quintilian praise his natural force and clearness; Hermogenes only, of ancient critics, judges him severely. Cicero translated the third speech, and imitated the first[1] in his *pro Rosc. Amer.* and *in Pis.* Schäfer and Blass are sadly warped by their adoration of Demosthenes.

When we look more closely into the technical structure of Æschines' speeches, we find him in choice of words tolerably pure, and showing traces of the culture which he often consciously displays. But he is less careful in his composition than Demosthenes. He is not always strict about hiatus,[2] and the rythmical law of avoiding a crowd of short syllables seems qui e strange to him, as may be seen at the very opening of the first speech. He repeats set phrases. His periods are often long and clumsily constructed,[3] but the sense is usually clear. Though he constantly enlivens his argument by the usual figures, apostrophe, self-question, &c., and with very telling irony and sarcasm, his most brilliant side is certainly his narrative. I may quote, in illustration, another curious passage.[4] The ancients specially praise the splendour of his vocabulary, which often admits poetical metaphors. Æschines' ethos seems brighter and more natural than his pathos, though he affects the

[1] §§ 190–91, a splendid passage.

[2] As, f r example, in i. §§ 2–3, ii. 135 (which I select at random).

[3] e.g. i. §§ 173–5; ii. §§ 211–2; iii. §§ 149–50.

[4] *In Timarch.*, §§ 81, sq.: *τῆς γὰρ βουλῆς τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ πρόσοδον ποιουμένης πρὸς τὸν δῆμον κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ τούτου, ὃ οὗτος εἰρήκει περὶ τῶν οἰκήσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ Πυκνί, ἦν μὲν ὁ τὸν λόγον λέγων ἐκ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν Αὐτόλυκος, καλῶς νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ σεμνῶς καὶ ἀξίως ἐκείνου τοῦ συνεδρίου βεβιωκώς· ἐπειδὴ δέ που προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου*

latter zealously, and occasionally, I think, offends chastity of style. Here Andocides, though far inferior, resembles him. The twelve Letters attributed to him are both spurious and late compositions.

§ 546. As regards the history of the text, it may be observed that while complete editions, and editions of the *Timarchus*, are rare, many scholars have printed the other two together with the corresponding orations of Demosthenes, especially those for and against Ctesiphon. The older and better scholia were published from Paris MSS. by Bekker and Reiske, and then (with those on Isocrates) by W. Dindorf (Oxford, 1842). The age and value of the various MSS. are not yet well ascertained.[1] These orations seem not to be contained either in the best MSS. of the lesser orators, such as the *Crippsianus*, or in the best MSS. of Demosthenes, such as the Parisian Σ. But nevertheless the oldest of the Parisian copies (Coislin. 249) is described by Montfaucon as a quarto of the tenth century, containing many other rhetorical works; and Bekker seems to lay even more stress on the Parisinus J. There are new recensions by A. Weidner (1877) and F. Franke (1863). Scheibe, Hamaker, and above all Cobet, in his *Novæ Lectiones*, have contributed to the purifying of the text There are translations by Francis (1757) and Leland, also French by Auger (1777).

εἶπεν, ὅτι τὸ εἰσήγημα τὸ Τιμάρχου ἀποδοκιμάζει ἡ βουλή, 'καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας ταύτης καὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐν τῇ Πυκνὶ μὴ θαυμάσητε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ Τίμαρχος ἐμπειροτέρως ἔχει τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου,' ἀνεθορυβήσατε ὑμεῖς ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἔφατε τὸν Αὐτόλυκον ἀληθῆ λέγειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔμπειρον τούτων. ἀγνοήσας δ' ὑμῶν τὸν θόρυβον ὁ Αὐτόλυκος, μάλα σκυθρωπάσας καὶ διαλιπὼν εἶπεν· 'ἡμεῖς τοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται οὔτε κατηγοροῦμεν Τιμάρχου οὔτε ἀπολογούμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν πάτριόν ἐστιν, ἔχομεν δὲ τοιαύτην τινὰ συγγνώμην Τιμάρχῳ· οὗτος ἴσως' ἔφη 'φήθη ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ ταύτῃ μικρὸν ὑμῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀνάλωμα γίγνεσθαι·' καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ ἀναλώματι μείζων ἀπήντα παρ' ὑμῶν μετὰ γέλωτος θόρυβος. ὡς δ' ἐπεμνήσθη τῶν οἰκοπέδων καὶ τῶν λάκκων, οὐδ' ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐδύνασθε. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ παρέρχεται Πύρρανδρος ἐπιτιμήσων ὑμῖν, καὶ ἤρετο τὸν δῆμον, εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνοιντο γελῶντες παρούσης τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἐξεβάλετε αὐτὸν ὑπολαβόντες· 'ἴσμεν, ὦ Πύρρανδρε, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ γελᾶν τούτων ἐναντίον· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἰσχυρόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὥστε πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν.'

[1] Cf. now Adam, *de codd. Æsch.*, Berlin, 1882.

§ 549. LYCURGUS, son of Lycophron, was a man of a very different type, and sprang from the family of the Eteoboutadæ, who filled an ancient and venerable priesthood of Poseidon, connected with the famous Erechtheion on the Acropolis. He was born about the beginning of the fourth century, and died in 324 B.C., before the affair of Harpalus. When he felt he was dying, he had himself carried into the Council Chamber, to answer any accusations against his administration. For twelve years—probably 338–26 B.C.—he remained what we might call Chancellor of the Exchequer (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως*) to the Athenian state. During this period he signalised himself by the highest probity, as well as by the highest ability in administering and increasing the revenues. He was, next to Pericles, the greatest adorner of the city of Athens, and to these two, together with Herodes Atticus, and Hadrian, may be ascribed almost all the public monuments of that celebrated city. He completed the theatre of Dionysus, and adorned it with statues of the great tragic masters. Moreover, he studied their memory more effectually by establishing state texts of their plays, to which actors were compelled to adhere. His other sumptuary and religious laws do not here concern us.[1] Though decidedly anti-Macedonian in policy, he cannot have been anxious to reserve all spare funds for war purposes, as he spent so much upon the adorning of the city, and the splendours of religious celebrations. Many additional details concerning him are preserved to us in the valuable and explicit *Life* (among the Ten orators). Its author (or his source) seems well acquainted with Lycurgus' family history, for he traces twelve generations of his descendants, who held the hereditary priesthood, apparently down to his

[1] Grote is singularly curt about Lycurgus, so that the reader must consult either the Plutarchian *Life*, or Thirlwall's sympathetic account, vol. vii. cap. 56. Blass' chapter (iv. 72, sq.) is now the best. If the 3rd letter of Demosthenes be genuine, his children were imprisoned after his death, we know not why; and Demosthenes (above, pp. 129, sq.) wrote from exile to plead their cause. Some twenty years after his death (in 307 B.C.), public honours and a bronze statue were decreed to his memory. An abridged text of this decree is preserved in the *Life*, and fragments of the full text on marble have also been found at Athens. The relation of these texts is discussed by C. Curtius, *Philologus*, xxiv. pp. 83, sq.

own time. This would point to the second century A.D. as the date of the biography, probably to the reign of Hadrian, when the antiquities of Athens, and especially the works of Lycurgus, must have excited special interest.[1] He is said to have been of frugal habits, and of ascetic life, and to have composed with great difficulty and very slowly. His long but well-rounded periods produce this impression on the reader, and betray natural gifts inferior to those of Æschines or Hypereides.

If we abstract from his artistic tastes, Lycurgus must have been a sort of Attic Cato, exceedingly unsparing, and even fierce in the prosecution of crime. Hypereides, however,[2] declares him to be not inferior as a speaker to anyone in the city, and considered besides to be a moderate and fair man —a curious judgment in the face of his violent prosecutions. These are noted by most of his biographers, and of the fourteen speeches enumerated by Suidas (the *Life* says there were fifteen, perhaps including the *Letters*, as a single additional title) a considerable number were public accusations, in most of which—the *Life* says in all—he was successful. Concerning four only we are more closely informed. The first is that against Diphilus, whom he accused of having made a fortune by cutting away the supports of the shafts in the Laurian silver mines, which were specially guarded by law.[3] In Hyperides' speech *for Euxenippus*, which mentions Olympias as the sole ruler of Dodona (and, therefore, not earlier than 330 B.C.), several recent sycophantic actions about the mines are mentioned as having been decided justly by the dicasts, and the panic about working them as having been thus allayed. This panic may have been the consequence of Ly-

[1] This *Life*, and the decree of Stratocles in honour of Lycurgus, appended to it, have been carefully and aptly commented on by Meier, in an appendix to Kiessling's *Lycurgus*. He shows many corruptions in the text, and some inaccuracies on the part of the author.

[2] *Pro Euxen.* col. xxvi.

[3] This Diphilus' property produced when distributed a bonus to each citizen of 50 drachmæ, and, as it amounted to 160 talents, gives us under 20,000 as the number of recognised citizens at the time. But the date of the action is not known.

curgus' prosecution, which would be fixed at about 330 B.C. Next there is the attack, followed by a condemnation to death of Lysikles, who with Chares had been the Athenian general at Chæronea, and had escaped to Athens after the battle. Diodorus has preserved us a sentence of this speech, as a specimen of the πικρία of the orator in accusation.[1] We hear that the Theban general at the battle was also prosecuted; but we are not aware with what reason. His two speeches against Lycophron (for adultery) were answered in Hypereides' partially preserved defence.

§ 548. The fourth and now only extant speech, that *against Leocrates*, is connected with the same crisis, and is an attack made eight years after on this person, who in the panic after Chæronea had escaped into a ship through a little gate in the sea-wall at Munychia, and fled to Rhodes, where he brought so exaggerated an account of the disaster that the merchant ships were afraid to sail for the Peiræus. Leocrates, when he found out that his panic had been premature, was afraid to return in the face of the stern edict denouncing all deserters from the city during the crisis, but settled at Megara, from which he managed to dispose of his Athenian property. Six years later, imagining, no doubt, that the affair was forgotten, he returned, and seems to have been unmolested for some time, for Lycurgus speaks of eight years having elapsed since the defeat when his accusation was made (330 B.C.). It is likely that Æschines is alluding to this trial[2] when he mentions that a man who escaped to Rhodes after Chæronea had just been tried for cowardice, and had only escaped by the votes of the jury being equally divided. The speech is one of great dignity, but also of great bitterness, and treats with extreme severity the mere cowardice of the defendant, for no graver crime is alleged against him.

[1] Ἐστρατήγεις, ὦ Λύσικλες, καὶ χιλίων μὲν πολιτῶν τετελευτηκότων, δισχιλίων δὲ αἰχμαλώτων γεγονότων, τροπαίου δὲ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἑστηκότος, τῆς δ' Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης δουλευούσης, καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων γεγενημένων σοῦ ἡγουμένου καὶ στρατηγοῦντος, τολμᾷς ζῆν καὶ τὸ τυῦ ἡλίου φῶς ὁρᾶν, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλειν, ὑπόμνημα γεγονὼς αἰσχύνης καὶ ὀνείδους τῇ πατρίδι; (Diod. xvi. 18).

[2] *In Ctes.* § 252.

The passionate conclusion is exceptional, and foreign to the traditions of Attic eloquence. Lycurgus follows the usual scheme of first establishing his case, and then refuting the expected replies of the defendant. But he varies it by sundry digressions upon older history, and by many long and interesting quotations from the poets, such as Tyrtæus and Euripides (*Erechtheus*), which are not so effective in their place as valuable to modern students. Apart from these quotations, the finest and most impressive passage is the narrative of the panic at Athens after Chæronea, a moment so splendidly painted by Demosthenes, and which Hypereides, we are told, also attempted, with less success.[1] Though the speech admits occasional hiatus, and too many poetical words and figures, a careful comparison of the composition with that of Isocrates has proved the direct obligations of Lycurgus. His political career was not, however, commenced till after the death of that master, or at least he was not distinguished at the time that Isocrates boasts of his pupils. That he was in his youth a pupil of Plato is also asserted, but for the very foolish reason that this only would account for his greatness (cf. Blass AB, iv. 75 note).

§ 549. We have only Hermogenes' and fragments of

[1] §§ 39–41 : *καίτοι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ὦ ἄνδρες, τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἠλέησεν, οὐ μόνον πολίτης ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένος ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἐπιδεδημηκώς ; τίς δ' ἦν οὕτως ἢ μισόδημος τότε ἢ μισαθήναιος, ὅστις ἐδυνήθη ἂν ἄτακτον αὐτὸν ὑπομεῖναι ἰδεῖν, ἡνίκα ἡ μὲν ἧττα καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς πάθος τῷ δήμῳ προσηγγέλλετο, ὀρθὴ δὲ ἦν ἡ πόλις ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, αἱ δ' ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτηρίας τῷ δήμῳ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσι καθειστήκεσαν, ὁρᾷν δ' ἦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν θυρῶν γυναῖκας ἐλευθέρας περιφόβους κατεπτηχυίας καὶ πυνθανομένας εἰ ζῶσι, τὰς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀνδρός, τὰς δ' ὑπὲρ πατρός, τὰς δ' ὑπὲρ ἀδελφῶν, ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὀρωμένας, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τοὺς τοῖς σώμασιν ἀπειρηκότας καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τοῦ στρατεύεσθαι ἀφειμένους ἰδεῖν ἦν καθ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν τότ' ἐπὶ γήρως ὁδῷ περιφθειρομένους, διπλᾶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐμπεπορπημένους ; πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γινομένων, καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἠτυχηκότων, μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἤλγησε καὶ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς, ἡνίχ' ὁρᾷν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ' ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους· ὃς πρότερον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλεύθερος ἐσεμνύνετο.*

Dionysius' treatment of this orator, nor have any scholia survived. Our MSS. of his extant speech are the same as those of the other lesser orators, or nearly so, and what has been said on the MSS. of Antiphon will apply here. The same holds good of collected editions of this and the other orators, except that F. Blass has not yet re-edited him in the Teubner series, the present text being that of C. Scheibe (1859). The single speech was given (with a Latin version) by Melanchthon (1545), and by many others, including Coraes (1826), Blume (1828), Maetzner (1836), Jenicke, with translation (1856), and Rehdantz. A. Nicolai has published a good school edition (Berlin, 1875), and there are a few special essays, such as G. Kiessling's *Fragmenta Lycurgea* (Halle, 1847), Jenicke's *Symb. crit. in Lycurg. Leocratem* (Leipzig, 1848), Hager's *Quæstiones Lycurgeæ* (Leipzig, 1870), Halm, in *Munich Abhandl.* iii. p. 123, &c. There are many German translations. The Fragments collected by Kiessling do not give us much in addition to the extant speech. They are generally quotations of curious words used at Athens, especially in sacred rites, and in enumerating the expenses of the state. A few interesting sentences are cited in Latin paraphrase as illustrating rhetorical figures in the work of Rutilius Lupus.[1]

§ 550. Perhaps the most brilliant of all Demosthenes' contemporaries was HYPEREIDES, son of Glaukippus, of the deme Kollytus, who was all his life a politician and a consistent leader in the anti-Macedonian party. He is generally assumed in former histories to have been a contemporary of Lycurgus, and thus older than Demosthenes, chiefly because in the *Life* he is said to have come forward and contributed a trireme for himself and one for his son, 'when Philip was preparing to sail against Eubœa.' If this refer to the events of 358 B.C., it will throw back the date of his birth at least as far as that of Demosthenes. But everything else we know of the orator points to his being a much younger contemporary of Demosthenes, especially the passage in his accusation in which he reproaches Demosthenes, at his advanced age, of requiring

[1] Cf. Kiessling, pp. 118, sq.

censure and correction from younger politicians.[1] If the statement of the *Life* be at all trustworthy, I suppose we must apply it to the crisis of the campaign of Tamynæ (349 B.C.), when we may conceive that Hypereides came forward as a young man, and somewhat boastfully offered a trireme for himself and for his infant son (τοῦ παιδός). When Demosthenes in the *Meidiana* enumerates the generous offers of supplying triremes by various citizens, it is strange that this occasion of paying a compliment to a young and brilliant adherent should be lost. Hence I believe that more probably Hypereides' first political act, when a very young man, was the prosecution of Philocrates, and that he may not have been born till about 366 B.C. He would thus be but little over forty when accusing the veteran Demosthenes, as the passage above cited clearly implies. His prosecutions of Aristophon and of Diopeithes need not have been before 345 B.C., though he mentions them before Philocrates' case, apparently because he here only was successful, and he wishes to dwell on it ;[2] Diopeithes especially was not prominent till after that date. The prosecution of Autocles, if occurring just after that person's known στρατηγία, would bring us up to 360–59, but there is no definite evidence that this was the occasion, and I cannot accept it in the face of the general probabilities for the later age of Hypereides.[3] It was through his prosecution that Philocrates was condemned (343 B.C.). During the Byzantine campaign (340 B.C.) he also performed an expensive *Choregia* at home, though himself absent as trierarch. He was moreover employed on an embassy to Rhodes, but at what date is unknown. He appears to have proposed the public crowning of Demosthenes after the Athenian successes in the Hellespont, and to have

[1] Col. xviii. : οὐκ αἰσχύνει νυνὶ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὑπὸ μειρακίων κρινόμενος περὶ δωροδοκίας ; καίτοι ἔδει τουναντίον ὑφ' ὑμῶν παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν ῥητόρων κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ τουναντίον οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν. This passage is not noted by Blass, who supports the current view (AB, iv. p. 3).

[2] *In Euxen.* col. xxxviii–ix.

[3] In a fragment (58, Ed. Blass) he speaks of Socrates being condemned *by our ancestors* (οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν). Would he say this in 359 B.C., when all the elderly people remembered Socrates' trial?

aided him in his celebrated embassy to Thebes before the battle of Chæronea. When the news came in, he was very active in his proposals to enfranchise slaves, restore the disfranchised, and put the city in a state of defence by sending down everything unnecessary to the Peiræus. For these proposals he was prosecuted under the γραφὴ παρανόμων, but triumphantly acquitted. His extradition was demanded by Alexander after the conquest of Thebes, but then successfully resisted. He is said, nevertheless, to have proposed honours for the supposed poisoner of the king. As is well known, he was the public accuser of his old colleague, Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus, from the ultra-patriotic side. Naturally, then, he was again united with him in the war against Antipater, and was chosen to deliver the funeral harangue over Leosthenes and his brave soldiers (322 B.C.). When Antipater won the day at Krannon, Hypereides' extradition was again demanded, with that of Demosthenes. He fled to Ægina, from whence, perhaps from the very temple of Poseidon, he was dragged by Archias, and was put to death, after having his tongue cut out, by Antipater, either at Cleonæ or at Corinth.[1] There was a monument to him at Athens, whither, it was said, his body, at first cast out in dishonour, was secretly conveyed by his friends, but no statue was ever erected. His son Glaukippus was afterwards known as a rhetor and speech-writer.

In character Hypereides is said to have been much under the influence of women, and fond of luxuries, especially of fish,[2] but otherwise both respectable and very talented. He is called, like Lycurgus, a pupil of Isocrates, but the style of his extant speeches enables us decidedly to contradict it. In-

[1] 9th of Pyanepsion, Ol. 114, 3 = 5th Oct., 322 B.C., according to the most recent computation.

[2] Cf. the fragment of Timocles' comedy, called Δήλιος (Athen. viii. p. 341 ; or Meineke, *Frag. Com.* iii. 591), in which, after charging Demosthenes and others with taking money from Harpalus :

A. ὁ τ' ἐν λόγοισι δεινὸς Ὑπερείδης ἔχει ;
B. τοὺς ἰχθυοπώλας οὗτος ἡμῖν πλουτιεῖ,
ὀψοφάγος ὥστε τοὺς λάρους εἶναι Σύρους.

sc. such a fish-eater that cormorants (compared with him) are Syrians (who never ate fish). Cf. also the same poet's *Icarians* (Meineke, iii. p. 592).

deed, Dionysius remarks that his simplicity and grace remind us rather of Lysias. As to Plato having taught him, nothing is more improbable. Later writers seem to think, because all ambitious and rising young men, of whatever politics, attended the suggestive conversations of Socrates in the previous century, that Plato's school occupied a similar position. Such an inference is obviously false, and against all our evidence, both internal and external. It is remarkable that, though a rich man, Hypereides was a speech-writer, as we may see from his *Defence of Lycophron*, which is composed in this man's person. But, instead of assuming, as is generally done, that his speech-writing was his earliest work, I imagine him to have come forward quite suddenly as a brilliant and rich young man, and to have taken a leading part in politics from the year 343 onward, when his arraignment of Philocrates brought him into notice. His extravagant habits and dissolute life having probably impaired his fortune, he turned his great talents to making money by speech-writing. Thus all his private speeches would date after Chæronea. But the other extant works chance to be personal harangues, two of them, doubtless, the most well known he ever delivered, though probably not the happiest—I mean the indictment of Demosthenes and the funeral oration over Leosthenes. This last must, however, be severed distinctly from the rest as an *epideictic* performance, while the rest are court speeches.

§ 551. The accusation of Demosthenes naturally holds the chief place, though it is not the earliest. When first discovered, it was thought that new light would be thrown on the relation of Demosthenes to Harpalus, but, so far as we can judge, in spite of the mutilations and losses at both ends of the speech, no new evidence was adduced, but the report of the Areopagus taken as sufficient guarantee for the facts. Grote has examined the case, with this evidence, partly at least, before him, and considers that Hypereides' speech tends strongly to prove that the real charge against Demosthenes was not personal corruptness but political unpopularity. The opening speech in the prosecution was made by Stratocles, upon whom the speaker of Deinarchus' extant speech seems to

have followed, and Hypereides did not therefore occupy the leading place, as we should have expected from all our notices. Hence he refuses to re-open the question of evidence, which he considers decided by the Report sent down from the Areopagus. I repeat that Hypereides distinctly classes himself with the younger generation, and upbraids Demosthenes, that when past sixty he should require correction from far younger men. He also notes [1] how universally and publicly the political men of the day made indirect profits by their political power. This, he says, is conceded. The only offence resented was the taking of bribes *against the interests of the state.* Taking bribes was *per se* no crime whatever, and the orator speaks of Demosthenes having amassed great wealth in this way. Such was the political morality of the day.[2]

The *defence of Lycophron* for immoral conduct, and for publicly tampering with the loyalty of a bride to her husband, when in command at Lemnos, argues a case which we cannot fully understand. The chief accuser was not Lycurgus, but Ariston, whom Lycurgus supported. Schäfer dates the speech about Ol. 107, 4. In my opinion it cannot be so early. This oration is clear and vigorous, and full of very clever, though evidently stock arguments, against the attacks of the prosecutor.[3] It is chiefly based upon *εἰκότα*, such as the defendant's good character and the absurdity of his addressing in such a way a bride at a marriage procession. The style is easy and clear, and reminds one (as Hypereides constantly does) of Lysias.

§ 552. The *defence of Euxenippus* is more interesting, being spoken by the orator himself in support of this person, who was attacked by Polyeuctus for fraud. The accused had been

[1] Col. xxi. : *πολλὰ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ δίδοτε ἑκόντες τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν ὠφελεῖσθαι—οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑμετέρας πραότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας—ἓν μόνον παραφυλάττοντες, ὅπως δι' ὑμᾶς καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑμῶν ἔσται τὸ λαμβανόμενον.* This is a most important passage.

[2] The text of both this and the next oration is so mutilated that we cannot tell whether a vital part of the argument is not lost, and Cobet has even abandoned the task of editing them as idle.

[3] Cf. col. ix., which meets such an argument as that of Æschines *in Ctes.*, 292–3.

directed by the Assembly to sleep in the temple of Amphiaraus, in order that by his dreams he might discover whether certain distributed territory near Oropus was the god's property or not. In this later case it was to remain the property of two tribes, who claimed compensation if they were deprived of it. The accuser, who here again was supported by Lycurgus, charged Euxenippus with making a false report of his dream. The form of action chosen was an εἰσαγγελία, to which Hypereides objects *in limine*, as applicable only to politicians or prominent public men, whereas Euxenippus was an elderly and unobtrusive private person. The proper test, he urges, of the dream was to enquire at Delphi. The orator gives us a few details of his public accusations up to the date of the speech, when Olympias was sovereign of Dodona (circ. 330 B.C.), and only mentions three. This points to the late rise of Hypereides as an orator. He gives some interesting details [1] of the great profits made in the mines, and of the disgraceful attempts of sycophants to plunder the wealth made by individuals and distribute it among the people, as Lycurgus had once done. In this speech also there is great simplicity and directness of argument, with very little ornament and no pathos, but much lively ethos and cool sarcasm in analysing the motives of the accuser.

§ 553. The *Funeral oration*, actually delivered in 322 B.C., over Leosthenes and the soldiers who fell in the earlier part of the Lamian war, is a very different kind of work, and was highly admired by the ancients. Hypereides here abandons his short, plain, direct style, and undertakes an epideictic display upon the model long established for such purposes. A Greek orator would no more have ventured to innovate on such an occasion than our preachers would in the general form of their sermons—I mean in attaching them to a text, with opening and concluding prayers, and in many other traditional ways of arguing and exhorting which will occur to any reader. This epitaphios, then, is on the model fixed by Gorgias, and followed by Thucydides and Plato, though not without deviations, such as the contempt of mythical histories and long past wars. We have in the remains of Lysias and Demosthenes rhetorical exercises of the same description. Hypereides so affects the old style here that he even balances

[1] Col. xliii sq.

his periods, and alliterates quite in the manner of Gorgias or Agathon (in Plato's *Symposium*). The picture of Leosthenes' reception by the famous dead is strangely un-Periclean, but is very interesting as a specimen of the style.[1] Stobæus has preserved us a fine fragment from the epilogue missing in the papyrus.

Considerable portions of another speech, *against Athenogenes*, have recently been found among the papyri of the Archduke Rayner, and published by Wilcken; also by Revillout in *Revue des études grecques*, ii. p. 1, sq.

§ 554. We have more than two hundred fragments (collected by Kiessling, and also commented on in Blass' text) and sixty-five titles of his speeches remaining, but little of literary value. His free use of colloquial words was censured by the purists. A good deal of the argument of the Δηλιακός is preserved, which evidently treated of the mythical history of the island, and the adventures of Leto before the birth of Apollo, at considerable length. It seems to me that it was probably on this model that Callimachus constructed his hymn to the Delian Apollo (above, Vol. I. p. 137). The speech was delivered about 340 B.C., when the orator was appointed instead of Æschines, but we wonder that the argument does not show more traces of political reasoning. His defence of Phryne, and the anecdotes of his tear-

[1] Col. xiii. 10–xiv. 28 : *ἐν ἅδου δὲ λογίσασθαι ἄξιον τίνες οἱ τὸν ἡγεμόνα δεξιωσόμενοι τὸν τούτων. ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν οἰόμεθα φοιτᾶν Λεωσθένη δεξιουμένους καὶ θαυμάζοντας τῶν ἡμιθέων καλουμένων τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας, ὧν οὗτος ἀδελφὰς πράξεις ἐνστησάμενος τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν, ὥστε οἱ μὲν μετὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν πόλιν εἷλον, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος μόνης πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐταπείνωσεν. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἕνεκα μιᾶς γυναικὸς ὑβρισθείσης ἤμυναν, ὁ δὲ πασῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων τὰς ἐπιφερομένας ὕβρεις ἐκώλυσεν μετὰ τῶν συνθαπτομένων νῦν αὐτῷ ἀνδρῶν, τῶν μετ' ἐκείνους μὲν γεγενημένων, ἄξια δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς διαπεπραγμένων. λέγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθερώσαντες ἔντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν, ἔνδοξον δὲ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὧν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπερέσχεν ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ φρονήσει, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἠμύναντο —ὁ δὲ μηδ' ἐπελθεῖν ἐποίησεν. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπεῖδον ἀγωνιζομένους, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ βεβαιότατα ἐνδειξαμένους, λεγω δὲ Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα, οὐδένας οὕτως αὐτοῖς οἰκείους οὐδὲ πιστοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ὡς Λεωσθένη καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνῳ συναγωνισαμένους, οὐδ' ἑτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τούτοις πλησιάσειαν ἐν Ἅιδου.*

ing open her dress to show her beauty to the judges, are well known. The speech was genuine, but the embellishments apocryphal, and probably falsely inferred from some appeal or suggestion. It was so admired at Rome as to be translated by Messala Corvinus.

The style of Hypereides is that of a newer school than Demosthenes'—of the school of Menander and the new comedy, to whom long periods and elaborate structure seemed tedious, and who affected short and terse statement, clear and epigrammatic points, smart raillery, and an easy and careless tone even in serious debate. Hence the critics, such as Quintilian, think him more suited to slight subjects ; and we feel how artificial to him are the periods of his state sermon on the dead—a mere rhetorical *tour de force.* But of his immediate successors some thought him better than Demosthenes —no doubt he was pleasanter reading—a second Lysias, but with all the accumulated art and experience of the completed Attic eloquence. With all this aristocratic gaiety and lightness of style, the man was no trifler. His life and acts prove him an energetic, earnest, patriotic citizen, and he escaped the dark shadows which hang about the later years of Demosthenes. The judgments of Dionysius, Longinus, Hermogenes, and others can now be read in Blass' fourth volume. The writer *on the Sublime* is particularly full and appreciative in bringing out the contrast between the sour, sombre, mighty Demosthenes and the brilliant, easy, but seldom impressive Hypereides—in fact, the Sheridan of Greek eloquence.

§ 555. *Bibliographical.* The history of his MSS. is peculiarly interesting. A splendid codex, covered with scholia, existed in the library of Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, after the invention of printing, but was unfortunately destroyed or lost in the capture of Buda-Pesth by the Turks. Since then the orator was but a name in the scholia or lexica, such as Harpocration's,[1] till the discovery of the four orations piecemeal in papyri bought by Mr. Harris Warden and Mr. Stobart at Thebes, in Egypt, about the year 1850. The papyrus containing the *epitaphios* is later and inferior to that which con-

[1] It is very curious to read Kiessling's careful monograph (appended to his *Lycurgus*, Halle, 1847), before the recovery of our text.

tains the rest, and all were much mutilated by the Arabs, who cut them in pieces to sell them by separate bargains. The documents have been facsimiled in Babington's editions, and to this scholar we owe more than to anyone else in the restoration of the text. The discovery of course excited great interest, and we now have many good texts by Cobet, Blass (Teubner), &c., as well as Babington's. The papyri seem to date somewhere between the second century B.C. and the second century A.D., and are therefore the oldest Greek MSS. we possess. Unfortunately the writing is careless, and the phonetic spelling of an Egyptian with a provincial and debased pronunciation has introduced many absurd forms. Thus Cobet has found a fine field for his splendid powers of emendation, especially in the Epitaphios.

§ 556. DEINARCHUS, the last of the ten orators, not in point of age, but rather in the date of his activity, was a Corinthian, the son of Sostratus, who settled at Athens, and was intimate with Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus. Dionysius computes him to have been born in 361 B.C., for the vague reason that he must have been seventy when he calls himself 'an old man' in 292 B.C. He does not seem to have produced political speeches earlier than the date of the affair of Harpalus, but in this trial, and for a series of years later, he composed orations, chiefly political, for citizens, being himself merely a resident alien, and therefore excluded from public debates. Dionysius thinks he may have begun speech-writing in the law courts as early as 336 B.C., when he was twenty-six years old. After the death and exile of the greater orators, he occupied the first place for about fifteen years, when he was implicated in the disturbances between Antigonus, Demetrius, and Cassander, and retired to Chalcis (307 B.C.), where he remained till the year 292 B.C., in which his friends obtained his return. He then, in old age, pleaded a personal action for the first time against his Athenian host Proxenus—perhaps merely his *πρόξενος*, or patron among the citizens—for refusing, with treacherous intent, to help him in recovering his property. From this speech even the ancients had learned all they knew of his personal history. Suidas says he was killed at the instigation of Polysperchon.

There is fortunately a special tract extant by Dionysius, which examines the speeches attributed to him by the test of chronology, and rejects many, enumerating sixty as genuine, most of them by their opening words. This is the case with the three extant orations, that against Demosthenes, against Aristogeiton, and against Philokles, all written for accusers in the prosecutions about the affair of Harpalus.[1]

§ 557. The long and elaborate *attack on Demosthenes* gives us pretty fully the case made against the orator. It agrees perfectly with the fragments of Hypereides' indictment in avoiding all statement of details. But this is here fully justified by appealing to the challenge of the accused to refer the matter to the Areopagus, by whose decision as to the facts

[1] This tract of Dionysius is an excellent specimen of his literary criticism, and makes me very slow to question his judgments in such matters. He begins by saying how little accurate information could be had about this orator, whom he had passed over when treating of the pioneers and perfecters of eloquence. Neither Callimachus nor the Pergamene grammarians knew anything clearly about him, or his genuine work. He quotes Demetrius Magnes in illustration of this inaccuracy. He then sketches the orator's life, chiefly from his own words in the speech against Proxenus, compared with the Histories of Philochorus on the contemporary events, and quotes the title of this personal speech, with extracts from Philochorus. From these materials he determines his age approximately, and thus establishes a canon for rejecting all speeches bearing internal evidence of being composed before the orator was twenty-five (viz. 336 B.C.), or during his exile (307–292 B.C.). There follow (caps. 5–6) excellent remarks on his style, which is shown to have been eclectic and imitative, without uniformity. But the imitations, which were evidently very good, must (he says) be tested by close comparison with his models, just as copies were compared with the originals of Pheidias, Apelles, or Polycleitus. They would then be found laboured and artificial in comparison with the older masters. Similar were the attempts to imitate Plato, Thucydides, Hypereides (by the Rhodian school), and Demosthenes. He proceeds to give (c. 9) an invaluable list of all the archons from the orator's birth to his last speech, and then classifies the extant speeches into genuine public, spurious public, genuine private, and spurious private. The spurious are separated into three classes: those too early for the orator, those evidently composed during his exile, and lastly those too watery and frigid in style. Then he vindicates for Demosthenes, and abjudicates from Deinarchus, the speech in reply to Bœotos *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος*. Dionysius' tract is unfortunately mutilated towards the close.

he was willing to abide. The Areopagus had spent months in the investigation, and ultimately sent down not only the names of the culprits, but the exact amounts they had received. According to the ordinary procedure of that court, the details of the evidence were not given. I suppose a re-statement of them was forbidden in the final trial before a dicastery of five hundred, which had really only to assess the punishment. This assessment was made according to the amount of public injury supposed to be done by the accused, and according to his general character. Hence both Hypereides and Deinarchus enter upon this only, especially as Demosthenes had declared that he would acquiesce in the finding of the Areopagus. Deinarchus insists, like Hypereides, on the enormous wealth (150 talents) gained from politics by Demosthenes; and all this was kept out of the reach of direct taxation. For the curious patchwork of passages from older orators in this oration, see Blass' account (iv. 295).

The imperfect oration *against Aristogeiton* is about an abandoned and worthless citizen, who had only obtained twenty minæ of the plunder, but the evidence against him is the same as that against Demosthenes; and if there were any proof that Demosthenes was associated with such a person in politics, it would be a grave corroboration of the charges now disbelieved on the ground of his general respectability.

§ 558. The third speech is *against Philokles*, a man of position and importance, who was in charge of the Peiræus, and, though he had undertaken not to admit Harpalus, had done so, but only in a single ship. This attack is accordingly different in tone from that on Aristogeiton, and does not seek to prove the case from the general bad character of the accused, but rather to throw suspicion on all his former respectability, owing to the present transaction. None of the three speeches are very interesting, though not wanting in power or finish. As Dionysius says in his careful critique, he was neither the discoverer of a new style, like Lysias or Isocrates, nor the perfecter of one already known, like Demosthenes and Hypereides.[1] In fact,

[1] The received reading that he had no feature either common to the rest (κοινόν), or peculiar to himself (ἴδιον), appears to me nonsense, and should be rejected for καινόν—there was nothing in him either new or peculiar (cf.

his style was really made up in the way vulgarly supposed to be Demosthenes'—the eclectic method of bringing together the features of all the previous orators. He specially imitated Demosthenes, so that he was called the *rustic* as well as the *gingerbread* (κρίθινος) Demosthenes. Blass understands it to mean distilled from barley (like beer) as contrasted with wine. The Latins translated it *hordearius*; nevertheless, when they compared him with still later Greek orators, found him full of merits which these lacked. He was, in fact, brought up among the great traditions of the Attic courts and free assembly, and the reflection of this greatness threw its glory over the orator who outlived its decadence. The extant speeches are not faulty, but not striking; they are wanting in fire, in originality, in vivacity, in power, though the writer knows all the figures of thought and diction used by the great masters, and even overdoes the application of them. The MSS. are the same as those of Antiphon, the best editions Maetzner's and Blass'. [2]

§ 559. A few words must be said in conclusion on the contemporary orators of repute, whose works have only reached us through uncertain or fragmentary tradition. Thus the defence attributed to Demades, which formed one of a collection of fourteen orations under his name, is certainly spurious, as this very remarkable speaker, whose striking extemporaneous aphorisms were long remembered and quoted, did not compose written speeches. The same was the case with Phokion, whose sententious addresses to the people were thought so effective by Demosthenes. Both Demades and Phokion were more thoroughly than Æschines representatives of the extempore school, which can only exist when supported by extraordinary natural gifts or great weight of character. But of Hegesippus, a contemporary and supporter of

Dionys. *in Deinarch.* c. 5). I do not think it permissible to translate, 'for he has no *general complexion*, or *uniformity of style*,' though Dionysius says this in the immediate sequel—that he is often like Lysias, again like Hypereides, and again like Demosthenes, and he then refers to special speeches to illustrate this. But to uniformity of style Dionysius applies the term ὁμοειδής or ὅμοιος.

[2] There is a collation of Vienna MSS. by H. Diels, in *Rhein. Mus.* xxix. 107, sq.

Demosthenes, we seem to have an oration—that *on Halonnesus*, which Dionysius notices as *Lysian* in style, and unlike the other works of Demosthenes. It was shown by Vömel, following the hints of Libanius, to be the work of Hegesippus, a partisan of Demosthenes, who had been sent to Macedonia to demand back, with other territory, the island of Halonnesus. On his return (342 B.C.) he gave, in reply to a proposal sent by Philip, an account of his negociations, and of the plans of Philip, which he had carefully studied. The speech follows Philip's Letter point by point in a manner quite foreign to Demosthenes, but with great completeness as a reply. The style of the speech is clear and careful, archaic in its simplicity, but rude and without polish, even disregarding hiatus; yet strong enough to persuade Dionysius of its genuineness.

There are no doubt, among the collection in our MSS. of Lysias and Demosthenes, a good many court speeches by obscurer contemporaries, which give us a valuable insight into the average standard of Attic eloquence as compared with that of the acknowledged masters.

The extant fragment of Polyeuctus (of Sphettus) even points to the loss of brilliant speeches by men who failed to obtain lasting renown.

This cannot, however, be said of the author of a speech recommending war with Alexander, which has survived under Demosthenes' name. Even the Greek scholia on the speech are very outspoken as to its defects. It is far too clumsy to be the work of Hypereides, or even of Hegesippus, and its only value is the evidence it affords of the feeling throughout Greece in 335–3 B.C.,[1] which critics determine to be its date.

Stratocles and Charisius are mere names, represented by a few citations in Latin version. Democharés, Demosthenes' sister's son, a respectable public man, was both a historian and an orator, and we regret the loss of his *history of his own times*, and of his famous speech against the philosophers, whose residence at Athens a certain Sophocles wished to limit and control. He argued that none of them, not even Socrates,

[1] Blass advocates 335; Droysen (*Gesch. Hell.* i. 242) 333.

had made respectable citizens. But hardly a sentence of him remains.[1]

§ 560. DEMETRIUS of Phaleron hardly belongs to the classical period, being both in life and doctrine the representative of the passage of letters from Athens to Alexandria. He advocated the use of short detached sentences against the periods of Isocrates. The favourable judgments on his writings arose chiefly, I fancy, from the personal popularity of the man.[2] He was a leading figure in the history of decaying Athens, brought up in contact with Demosthenes, Hypereides and Aristotle; the pupil of Theophrastus, and friend of Menander. He was practically ruler of Athens for ten years (317–307 B.C.), and he gave an account of his stewardship in a special memoir. But he seems to have written memoirs about everything. After being honoured with 360 statues by the grateful Athenians, they condemned him to death when a stronger Demetrius (Poliorketes) invaded Athens. But he found a pleasant refuge with the first Ptolemy, whom he helped and advised in the founding of the university system (if I may so call it) of Alexandria. The second Ptolemy banished him to Upper Egypt, where he died of the bite of a serpent (283 B.C.). The immense and various catalogue of his works shows that polymath tendency which the Alexandrian grammarians seem to have adopted from the Peripatetic school. Having suffered in his life the change from honour to contempt with commonalties and with kings, he has met the same destiny—that usual with second-rate respectability—at the hands of changing centuries. Admired and praised in his day for fruitfulness, for subtlety, and for elegance, he was presently and permanently forgotten.

[1] For other obscurer names the reader may consult Blass' exhaustive work, iv. 247, sq. The more recent literature on all the successors of Demosthenes is reviewed by Hüttner in the article cited above, p. 143.

[2] The curious and somewhat inconsistent judgments of Cicero, Quintilian, and Diog. Laert. on him, quoted by Blass, iv. 313.

CHAPTER VI.

ARISTOTLE.

§ 561. THE last great name, with which the classical literature of Greece may be said to close, is that of Aristotle, and he—great in so many directions—is least of all a literary man. To us he is such only as a critic, but even to the ancients, who possessed his poems and dialogues, and who praise the elegance of their form, Aristotle's literary performances were as nothing in comparison to his scientific works. And with him, too, we find, perhaps first among the Greeks, perhaps second to Heracleitus only, the feeling that literature and science are distinct, and that the seeker after accurate knowledge need not adorn his researches with the graces of eloquence or of poetry. Nay he even regarded literature, as such, from a purely scientific point of view, and the works which take their place in this history are his investigation of the nature and conditions of epic and tragic poetry, and of the psychological groundwork of eloquence. Even his *Politics*, though he does not enter upon a criticism of historiography, seem (together with his lost πολιτεῖαι) a distinct protest against the Isocratic principle of confusing the narrative of events with rhetorical display, and a reassertion of the style of the bald chronicle with a philosophical rearrangement of facts under logical classes. Thus the numerous and monumental scientific treatises of Aristotle have not the same claim which the dialogues of Plato have to be treated in this book, and we will refer the student who desires to know the deeper side of the man to the library of works on his philosophy, of which Zeller's volume,[1] being the newest

[1] *Philosophie der Griechen*, II Th. 2te Abth., 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1879. Most of this great work is now accessible in English.

as well as the ablest, may be regarded as giving an excellent summary.

The various lives still extant of Aristotle are very disappointing, when we consider the number of details they record. The fullest is that of Diogenes Laertius, who gives us also the text of his will, and the catalogue of his works; then there is the epistle to Ammæus of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which is mainly devoted to proving that the rhetoric of Demosthenes was developed anterior to Aristotle's teaching, and therefore independent of it. There are also several versions of a life attributed to Philoponus, first printed in the *Aristotle* of Aldus. These materials are well worked up for English readers by Sir A. Grant and by Grote, in their respective works on Aristotle.

The life of the philosopher coincides very curiously with that of his great contemporary, Demosthenes: they were born in the same year, and died in the same year. But in all else the circumstances of their career were widely different. Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at Stageira in the Chalkidike—a region then thickly settled with flourishing Hellenic towns. His father, Nikomachus, was personal physician and friend of the Macedonian king Amyntas. His mother, Phæstis, may have been of Eubœan origin, for we hear of the family owning a house at Chalkis, to which the philosopher retired towards the close of his life. It is probable that Nikomachus lived with his royal friend, and that Aristotle was brought up about the Macedonian court; but we know nothing of his education beyond the fact that his parents died early, and that a family friend, Proxenus of Atarneus, took charge of him; a kindness which Aristotle repaid by adopting Nikanor, Proxenus' son, and afterwards also giving him his daughter in marriage. We hear that Aristotle had brothers and sisters, but they are as obscure as the brothers and sisters of Kant or Des Cartes.

In his eighteenth year, being apparently a young man of good fortune, and, as some said, even of luxurious and dissolute habits, he came to Athens and joined the school of Plato (367–6 B.C.). Of this early period at Athens we hear nothing but occasional bits of scandal circulated by Epicurus, Timæus, and

other of his opponents in the school of Isocrates.[1] These stories have found little credence in the face of the enormous extent and seriousness of his scientific labours. It is not even likely that he ever increased his means by practising as a physician. There can be no doubt that his independent mind gradually led him to question his master's theories, and thus to estrange him from the Platonic school; but the anecdotes of his self-assertion and rudeness to the aged Plato are contradicted by the unfeigned respect with which he speaks of him in the first book of the *Nicom. Ethics*,[2] and in the extant fragment of his elegy on Eudemus. He is said also to have edited and imitated several Platonic dialogues. Indeed, for twenty years, up to Plato's death, he seems never to have abandoned the Platonic school, though he openly questioned the doctrine of Ideas. Of course the influence of Plato, during these twenty years, on the best part of his life can hardly be overrated, and yet in two essential features he made little impress on his pupil —first in the matter of style; secondly, in the deductive character of his reasoning. Perhaps the influence of Plato on the former appears less than it really was, because we have lost all the early works written by Aristotle during his Platonic years[3]—the dialogues which were praised for their style, and certain lectures on rhetoric, chiefly directed against Isocrates, whose shallowness seems to have been very distasteful to Aristotle. Indeed, both Cicero and Quintilian quote his adaptation of a line *αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ' ἐᾶν λέγειν*. Nevertheless, in his later and more philosophical rhetoric he quotes no one oftener, as affording good examples, than Isocrates.

§ 562. On the death of Plato, he went (in his thirty-seventh year) with Xenocrates to Hermeias, tyrant of Atarneus and

[1] Cf. Müller's *FHG.* i. pp. 209–11 (*Timæi Fragg.* 70–6).

[2] iv. § 1.

[3] I cannot agree with Susemihl (note 533 to his translation of the *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 140) that these dialogues were not composed till after 335 B.C., when Aristotle returned to Athens. In the face of the enormous catalogue of his works, such a theory seems to me untenable, not to speak of the marked contrast of style between the early and the later compositions.

Assos, who was himself a pupil of Plato. When, after three years, this Hermeias was treacherously put to death by the Persians, Aristotle settled at Mitylene, and took Pythias, a sister or niece of Hermias, to wife. To this Hermias he dedicated a statue at Delphi, and also addressed him in a still extant lyric poem. In 343–2 B.C. he undertook, at Philip's request, the education of Alexander the Great, now a boy thirteen years old. But unfortunately we know nothing of this interesting relation, except that two tracts of the philosopher, *περὶ βασιλείας* and *ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων* (or *ἀποικίων*), were addressed to Alexander; but I do not fancy that Alexander's large ideas were based upon them. Indeed, we know certainly that Aristotle's Hellenedom, which is so manifest in the *Politics*, was distinctly opposed to the Hellenism of the great king. During this period Aristotle and his pupil resided at Mieza, south-west of Pella. He is said to have obtained from Philip (or Alexander) the restoration of his native town, destroyed along with Olynthus in 347 B.C.; but his good offices were thwarted by the jealousies and counterplots of the exiles themselves.[1] Numerous authorities assert that he went with Alexander to Asia, and there collected the materials of his 255 polities. But this is certainly false.

In 335 B.C. he again settled at Athens, and formally opened a school of his own, called Peripatetic, from his habit of walking up and down while teaching in the gymnasium of the Lyceum. In the succeeding twelve years, he produced the majority of those works, and trained the followers, that have brought him undying fame. We hear of private lectures in the morning, of public receptions in the afternoon, also of common meals, and a sort of discipline in his school.

The follies of Callisthenes, whom Aristotle had recommended to Alexander, and who was suspected of being disloyal to him, owing to his outspoken censure, may have estranged the great king from his old tutor, but no overt act can be cited to prove it; nay rather the materials for his natural history may in part have been supplied by the interest of Alexander in his researches.[2] Nevertheless, a few years after the king's death,

[1] Cf. frag. 610, from Dio Chrysostom.

[2] Thus the moot question about the cause of the Nile's rising in sum-

people began to talk scandal about Aristotle having been privy to his assassination by poison. This idle and libellous rumour is sufficiently contradicted by the public feeling which broke out at Athens, at the opening of the Lamian war, against Aristotle as a steady partisan of the Macedonian party. He was attacked under the allegation of impiety by Demophilus (probably the son of the historian Ephorus) for having honoured Hermeias as a hero ; people had also charged him with offering devotions to one of his wives, Herpyllis (after the manner of Auguste Comte); and he retired before the storm to his country house in Chalcis, where he presently died (322 B.C., summer) of a chronic disease, which was no doubt aggravated by his intense application to study. His will, preserved like those of his successors in the school of Ariston, is still extant, at least in substance, in Diogenes' *Life*, and shows us his loving and thoughtful care for the welfare of his daughter, his immediate friends, and even the slaves attached to his house.

We know little of his personality. He was evidently thought ugly in his day—thin-legged and with small features. Many smart things are repeated from his conversation by Diogenes, and he was evidently no very agreeable person, or deficient in the power of making enemies.[1] There are several portraits extant of him, especially the splendid sitting statue in the Palazzo Spada at Rome ; they represent a refined and careworn, but somewhat hard face, in which thought and perhaps bodily suffering have drawn deep furrows. His policy was Macedonian and anti-Demosthenic, and for this reason he was assailed by many sham patriots. Of course he saw, with Phocion, the impracticability of any other policy in the decay-

mer was said to have been settled by the observations of the great summer rains near its source, which Alexander obtained for Aristotle (fragg. 325–6).

[1] Cf. Themistius, Orat. 23, p. 235 (quoted as frag. 57 of Timæus by C. Müller) : *Κηφισοδώρους δὲ καὶ Εὐβουλίδας καὶ Τιμαίους, Δικαιάρχους καὶ στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει τῷ Σταγειρίτῃ πότ' ἂν καταλέξαιμι εὐπετῶς, ὧν καὶ λόγοι ἐξικνοῦνται εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον, διατηροῦντες τὴν ἀπέχθειαν καὶ φιλονεικίαν.* Many of these were posthumous enemies. We know that the school of Isocrates and other sophists afforded him plenty of contemporary opponents besides.

ing state of Greece, and he was not bound by the spirit of patriotism, like Demosthenes, to fight to the last for a dying cause, being only a metic, or resident alien at Athens.

§ 563. The catalogue of Aristotle's works, which were said to amount to more than 400, and which embraced every kind of science and every sort of literary criticism, need not occupy us here. The list given by Diogenes in his *Life* was probably prepared by Andronicus, or perhaps Hermippus, from the works found under his name in the Alexandrian library, and does not contain some of those now extant. There is also a list drawn up by Arabic writers of the thirteenth century The critical questions about these long and complicated lists are discussed by many German writers, who are referred to in Zeller's account. A careful catalogue is to be found in the opening of the fifth volume of the Berlin *Aristotle*, prepared by Val. Rose, and to this splendid volume I also refer in considering the fragments of lost works.

These fragments have, in the case of Aristotle, so peculiar an interest for us, that I propose here to consider them before I enter upon an account of the extant works which belong to the plan of the present book. For it is to the fragments of Aristotle that we must look for all our knowledge of his youthful work, and still more of the work which placed him among the ancients in the rank of a *literary* man. When we read the scientific treatises he has left us, we wonder at the complete neglect of form, the utter abnegation of style in the pupil of Plato, and ask ourselves how it was that so great a critic of poetry and eloquence should not have given some evidence of his theories in his own writing. But the fact is that we only inherit from him those treatises which he wrote as head of a school, and possibly as mere jottings to be filled up by oral explanations. The enormous number and variety of his writings—most of them composed within a few years—seem to preclude anything like careful composition, and in more than one of them modern critics have suspected that we possess the mere hasty notebook of a pupil, taken down from the master's conversation during his morning walks in the Lyceum.[1]

[1] Zeller shows (pp. 135–8) with much acuteness that this view goes too

§ 564. Another account of the bad condition of our texts is given in the famous story for which Strabo is our authority. He says [1] that after the death of Aristotle and Theophrastus, their books were inherited by Neleus of Skepsis, nephew of the latter. Owing to the danger of their being seized by royal book collectors, they were hidden by his heirs in a cellar, where they lay for nearly two centuries, till discovered at the beginning of the first century B.C. by Apellikon of Teos, and by him brought to Athens. Then they were carried by Sylla as booty to Rome, and first edited by Tyrannio and Andronicus (circ. 60–50 B.C.). Hence, Strabo tells us, the early pupils of the Peripatetic school knew little of the real doctrine of Aristotle, and mostly talked barren subtleties (*θέσεις λῆκυθίζειν*). This theory is adopted by Heitz, Grote, Grant, and others, but has been of late combated with success by Stahr and Zeller. There is plainly great exaggeration in it, for we find Aristotle's works distinctly quoted [2] in the interval, and a catalogue of them as preserved in the Alexandrian library; and as he published most of them during his life, it is not credible that among his pupils and critics, especially the Stoics, no other copy but that in the cellar at Skepsis should exist. There is, however, truth in the story as to these particular copies, and it is more than probable that there may have been some unfinished MS., like the *Politics*, which really lay concealed till this date, and which is therefore unknown to ancient critics before the time of Cicero. But the damp of the cellar could only produce lacunæ in the text, it could not mildew the texture of the style.

The ancients had a very different picture of Aristotle from his works. Their best critics speak of him as a master of style. Cicero tells us that he comes pouring forth a golden flood of eloquence to prove the Divine Providence which has ordered

far, and that in these treatises, written in a rough and slovenly, but peculiar and very scientific style, we have the very words of the master, in most cases written down by himself, though often two collateral forms of an argument have crept in either from a new treatment, or an inaccurate copy at the moment. It is at least very likely that his pupils helped him largely both in transcription and in collections of facts.

[1] xiii. 1, 54.

[2] Cf. the evidence collected in Zeller, pp. 145, sq.

the world, and translates a splendid passage to prove it.[1] Dionysius (Halic.) and Quintilian speak in similar words of praise. Simplicius and Photius declare that his letters (collected by Artemon in eight books) were unsurpassed as models of that kind of composition, and though Demetrius quotes a sentence from these letters as far too pompous in style, he cites another[2] to show how thoroughly the author confined himself to proper subjects, in which he says: 'This I do not write to you, for it is not epistolary' (ἐπιστολικόν). Unfortunately the ancients have seldom supported their praise of the philosopher's eloquence by adequate citations, and we must therefore search the scanty fragments carefully to find any clear proofs of their assertions. In the case of Cicero and later critics, we suspect, moreover, that Aristotle's great and established reputation as a thinker may have led them to exaggerate the perfection of his style.

It is, however, to be remarked that Aristotle's Roman critics cite none of our extant scientific treatises except the *Topic* and *Rhetoric*. Either, therefore, they did not know the scientific Aristotle, or, what is more likely, they were repelled by his *acroatic* (esoteric) books, and confined themselves to those ἐξωτερικά, which were written for the public, and were within their comprehension. Thus the Aristotle praised by the Roman philosophers and rhetors is not our Aristotle, he is the author of dialogues and exhortations to philosophy and virtue. But among the Greeks the loss of his dialogues and elaborated essays rather comes from the contempt in which these early semi-Platonic writings were held by his school. In his later and scientific works, they tell us, he put down his real opinions, in the dialogues only what was false or held by others. Hence it is to Stobæus, to Plutarch, and to Cicero that we owe the preservation of a few passages from these dialogues, in which we find not only a Platonic vein of thought, but even a far-off ray of Platonic sunlight in diction.[3] In fact, the influence of

[1] *De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 37. [2] *Frags.* 615, 620.

[3] We hear that he did not attempt dramatic prologues, like Plato, and that he sustained the principal part himself, unlike his master, but in the manner adopted by Cicero, whose dialogues are probably not unlike those of Aristotle in form.

Plato had been as great on Aristotle as the influence of Socrates on Plato; but we can trace the gradual weaning of Plato from the *Apologia* to the *Laws;* with Aristotle the early stages have left but faint vestiges.

§ 565. There were certainly three dialogues modelled closely upon Plato.[1] From the first Sextus Empiricus and Cicero quote arguments for the existence of the gods and their government of a popular and rhetorical kind,[2] also for the eternity of the universe, from its beauty and order.[3] From the third, a close imitation of the *Phædon*, we have so many interesting and suggestive notes about the nature of the soul, its unlikeness to a harmony, its future happiness, together with strange narratives of a spiritualistic character, that we can feel how thoroughly it was a literary work.[4] From the προτρεπτικός, or *Exhortation to Philosophy*, we have also an interesting anticipation of Des Cartes' refutation of the doubter, for Aristotle tells us that men must either accept or reject philosophy. But if the latter, it must be done by argument, and hence by philosophy. Whether, therefore, men choose it or not, they must philosophise. From the treatises *on Nobility* and *on Wealth* we have also some good extracts by Stobæus.[5]

Among his critical works of this period I may mention an account of the older poets and rhetoricians—a favourite amusement in those days when original literary genius had become exhausted. Cicero tells us that his summary and exposition of the older rhetors (in his συναγωγη τεχνῶν) was so clear and good that people gave up reading these authorities themselves. And, no doubt, if the rhetoric now ascribed to Anaximenes were genuine, it must date from this period, and long before the far

[1] That περὶ φιλοσοφίας, that περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, and the Εὔδημος.

[2] Frags. 12–15. [3] Frags. 17–18.

[4] Frags. 32–43.

[5] Frags. 82–5, sq. Bernays (*Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69) thinks that the opening chapters of the fourth book (new order) of the *Politics* are in substance an extract from an ethical dialogue, on account of the greater ease and flow of the style as compared with the rest of the book. The hypothesis, though rejected by Vahlen and others, is probable enough, but the resulting specimen of Aristotle's easier style is not a favourable one, there being little peculiar in it, except some overdrawn expressions.

different psychological study which we find in the real rhetoric of Aristotle. His views about the poets we cannot estimate except from the excerpts in the scholia on Homer, which constantly refer to his *problems and solutions.* I confess that both the difficulties and the answers seem to me so prosaic and often silly, that they do not raise the author in my mind above the critic of the *Poetic*, a work of little æsthetic taste. He raised such questions as these : How could Helen, in her view from the walls, express uncertainty about her brothers, the Dioscuri, seeing that the war had lasted ten years, and many prisoners had been made and ransomed? Of course the obvious solution to us is that this scene was taken from a poem describing the first landing or marshalling of the Greeks at the opening of the war.[1] Aristotle says : 'Perhaps Paris prevented her from meeting the captives.'[2] Many similar pieces of criticism will be found in the adjoining fragments, mingled with occasional common sense. The most interesting is doubtless the curious anticipation of the Comparative Mythologers, in which he tells us that the 360 oxen of the sun were the days of the year. Thus Aristotle's ἀπορήματα on Homer seem not very much better than his edition,[3] if indeed it be true that he prepared an edition for Alexander, which that monarch carried in a precious casket.

§ 566. This criticism of the poets suggests to us the philosopher's own poetry, of which three very noteworthy fragments have survived. They are a skolion to Hermias, an epigram for a statue of the same, and part of an elegy on Eudemus. I will cite them below.[4] The epigram on the statue is like those of

[1] Cf. Vol. I. p. 73. [2] Frag. 142. [3] Cf. Vol. I. p. 31.

[4] (1) On Plato (fr. 673):

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλίης ἱδρύσατο βωμὸν
ἀνδρός, ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνήρ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

(2) On Hermeias (fr. 624) :

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβὰς μακάρων θέμιι ἀγνὴν
ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλευς,

the best period, very simple and condensed. We do not possess enough of the elegy to understand its plan, but we can judge from the fragments of the dialogue on Eudemus, and the story there told of the curious vision of his subsequent fortunes and death, that the poem was not wanting in imagination. One famous phrase on Plato has made the fragment celebrated. The hymn, which Athenæus says is not a pæan, as was alleged in the accusation of impiety brought against him, but rather a skolion, is a very elegant little poem, and deserves far higher praise than is accorded to it by most of the Germans. It is, I suppose, silently assumed that the author of the dry Ethics, and Politics, and Categories cannot have been a true poet; but I venture to say, had the poem been handed down under the name of Pindar, some of those who now look upon it coldly would have been loud in their admiration. Apart from the felicity of its expression, there is a moral fervour about it which breathed through the dialogues, and which must have made Aristotle, in his earlier years, more a preacher of righteousness than a votary of abstract science. Of his remaining elegies and his ἐπη we know nothing.

οὐ φανερῶς λόγχῃ φονίοις ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

(3) The Hymn to Virtue:

Ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζηλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπόν τ' ἀθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἕνεχ' οὐκ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πόλλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὰν ἀγρεύοντες δύναμιν.
σᾶς δ' ἕνεκεν φιλίου μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνέος ἔντροφος
Ἀελίου χήρωσεν αὐγάς.
τοιγὰρ ἀοίδιμος ἔργοις, ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι
Μοῦσαι
Μναμοσύνας θύγατρες, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὔξουσαι
φιλίας τε γέρας βεβαίου.

§ 567. From the time that Aristotle went to Macedon, and during the leisure of his retirement with Alexander, we may suppose him to have gradually abandoned popular writing, and to have turned to that purely scientific form [1] which he adopted as a scholarch at Athens. From this latter date come all those dry and abstruse works which belong to the history, not of Greek literature, but of Greek philosophy. Aristotle's view embraced all departments of human knowledge. Like Solomon, he discoursed on plants, from the cedar that is in Lebanon to the hyssop which groweth on the wall; upon animals; on the heavenly bodies and their eternal author; on the mind of man and its faculties—in fact, on all things human and divine.

In this wide survey he also embraced the philosophy of history and the philosophy of art, and here comes in contact with literature in discussing the nature of rhetoric and poetry. Thus we may confine ourselves to a fuller consideration of the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetic*, though we may say something generally about the *Ethics* and *Politics;* not that these are literary works, but because most readers know Aristotle through them, and would therefore note their absence in this book. Indeed, they seem to have been the transition stage between the early dialogues and the later pure philosophy, and to have come in this order: first, the *Ethics*, and next, in close connection, the *Politics;* then the *Poetic*, and last of the exoteric treatises, the *Rhetoric*, which may have been composed about 330 B.C. The latter works are in style and method intermediate between his two classes of writings, so that many have asserted them to belong to the latter. Indeed, the boundary line can hardly have been very clearly marked. All these treatises have been

[1] This distinction is not imported by critics, but recognised by Aristotle himself, who constantly refers to the fuller treatment on well-known statements ἐν τοῖς ἐκδιδομένοις, or ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. This seems plainly to refer to the popular treatises which were written and circulated among the public, while his deeper works, though by no means secret or withheld, were only known to his pupils. The German critics have written a library of controversy on this matter, without advancing our knowledge or understanding of it. The reader will find a summary in Zeller, *op. cit.* pp. 112, sq., with the voluminous notes.

so amply discussed and illustrated, that a student of Aristotle is not likely to delay over a general sketch, but will turn to the full and minute commentaries to aid him in the understanding of them. For none of them are attractive from their style, and all of them are difficult, both from ellipse and compression of thought, as well as from dislocations or gaps in our texts.

§ 568. It is remarkable that Aristotle, in this mature *Rhetoric*, regards the science not as a branch of the fine arts, or analogous to poetry, but as a sister science to Dialectic, and closely allied to Politics. As Dialectic, or logical disputation, seeks to establish the truth by argument, so Rhetoric seeks to persuade, or to establish the probable by such arguments as will convince an audience. Hence the whole science is a popular or exoteric science, but nevertheless depends, or ought to depend, mainly on proofs, not on indirect means of influencing men's minds. In fact, he lays down the irrefragable position, that rhetoric is a natural gift of civilised men, all of whom in some way defend their own opinions, or attack those of others, by argument. It is the systematic treatment of this natural faculty of persuasion which forms the subject of the art of rhetoric. Thus Aristotle opposes on the one hand Plato, who is perpetually arguing that, because rhetoric cannot prove itself good to teach any one thing, it is good for nothing ; on the other, he opposes the Sophists, who pretended that it was the mysterious key to all sorts of knowledge. There is something very severe and noble in the restriction of the true province of rhetoric to that of *reasoning* with an audience. But there can be no doubt that this has been the true secret of all really great speaking. Demosthenes, and the Greeks generally, seldom depart from argument. But even with Cicero, Chrysostom, Bossuet, Burke, and with all our greatest legal and political orators, it is primarily because they were brilliant and persuasive reasoners that they were great orators. Hence the strict justice of Aristotle's simple definition : 'the power of discovering in each case the possible means of persuading.'[1]

[1] ἔστω δ' ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. Cf. the comments of other rhetors upon it quoted in Cope's *Introd.* p. 149.

The main body of the first book is devoted to the analysis of rhetorical materials in relation to the three kinds (εἴδη) of oratory, which Aristotle was perhaps the first formally to distinguish—the deliberative, the judicial, and the epideictic.[1] He says nothing of the exhortations of generals to their soldiers, which figure so largely in earlier historians. No doubt the fashion went out with the rise of mercenary and professional armies, but in any case such speeches must fall into the first class. This division he regards as by far the most important, though he says it was neglected by the rhetoricians for the sake of the court speeches, as in them sophistical arts were of more value. The fact is that political speaking was always thoroughly honoured among the Greeks, but for this very reason was considered a higher art than could be taught by mere sophistical professors. Aristotle's further distinction, that of these three branches the first is about the future, and its main topic the expedient ; the second about the past, and its main topic the just ; and the third (praise and blame) chiefly about the present, and its main topic the honourable (καλόν)—this seems to me a piece of idle or false subtlety.

The first nine chapters are on the requisites for proofs in deliberative speeches—political education, and a general knowledge of ethical principles. Then he turns to judicial or dicastic speeches ; and on these, again, he enumerates the general subjects—justice and injustice, written law and unwritten precedent, and the like, from which the orator should draw his logical proofs. He adds in an appendix the proofs from fact, such as testimony, oaths, documents, torture, by which the speaker may fortify the proofs constructed by argument. So far, then, Rhetoric is little more than applied Logic, in which certain special forms of proof, such as the enthymeme and the example, are substituted for the full syllogism and induction which the philosopher or dialectician uses. But each εἶδος, or special branch, affords special propositions (προτάσεις) from which the orator must argue. Except, therefore, in indicating to him the proper materials, which are de-

[1] The passage which asserts the same division in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* seems to be spurious, as other passages cite only two.

termined by moral and physical philosophy, there is nothing whatever which would give a speaker any practical help in constructing a speech.

§ 569. The second book approaches the psychological conditions which the speaker should either affect in himself, or stimulate in his hearers. so as to produce persuasion. Here there is much that is suggestive and interesting, though the whole subject is treated in a very confused way. The reader must not imagine that Aristotle has deserted his first principle, of laying the whole stress of oratory on proofs. For all the psychological aids which he here discusses—ethos in the speaker, pathos excited in the audience—are all direct helps to persuasion, and, as such, direct means of carrying the orator's point. To excite the hearer, without any further object, by a mere splendour of display, would have been thought by Aristotle meretricious even in an epedeictical speech. Thus *Ethos* is at first represented as the character which the speaker should assume, and manifest by his speaking : it is composed of three elements, viz. φρόνησις, sound common sense ; ἀρετή, moral weight of character ; and εὔνοια, a strong interest in his audience. Aristotle might have gone so far as to say that these, if established by the previous life of the speaker, and not merely assumed for the occasion, will outbalance the strongest logical arguments against him. But presently (as Cope and others have pointed out) we find *ethos* in a new meaning, that of studying the general character of the audience, and addressing them differently if they be old men, or middle-aged, or young. The general features of these ages are then described.[1] As almost all audiences are mixed, such advices seem of little use.

They are, however, preceded by a treatment of *pathos* in rhetoric, which is wider in application than our meaning of it, and signifies the exciting of suitable affections—anger, pity, sorrow—in the minds of the hearers ; and there are minute descriptions of the causes of these affections in mankind. Ethos, in the first sense, when it is actually produced by the speech, is merely arousing the πάθος of confidence and goodwill towards the speaker in the audience, and thus falls under

[1] caps. 13–15.

the class from which Aristotle has distinguished it. But I need not specify these logical defects. The book closes[1] with general directions, or τόποι, for using examples, for using apophthegms (γνῶμαι, which are merely single propositions implying an argument), and enthymemes, or arguments in that short form suited for rhetoric. He even gives a chapter on simulated enthymemes, or sophisms of this kind, which troubles such critics as Cope, who think they must defend the morality of all that Aristotle has said. In these chapters[2] many examples are given from retorts of Iphicrates, from tragedies, especially those of Theodectes, as well as from his speeches, but, strangely enough (though Demades against Demosthenes is quoted), none are quoted from Demosthenes, his greatest contemporary.

§ 570. The third book, which at last comes to what we should call the proper treatment of oratory or rhetoric, is divided into two parts: the first twelve chapters being on expression (λέξις), the remainder on the arrangement (τάξις) to be observed in speaking. The latter division seems to me singularly bald and incomplete, and can hardly have come in its present form from Aristotle's own hand. The remarks on the *proem*, or prologue, are the fullest, but the examples are as frequently taken from poetry as from oratory. On the *narrative* he omits all mention of the προκατασκευή, or first sketch of the story, a point frequent in our extant speeches, and of great effect in tuning the minds of the audience. He criticises Isocrates' direction that the narrative should be compressed (ταχέως), and cites several examples of good and bad narratives from tragedies now lost. Perhaps his best remark is that the narrative should be ethical, and not intellectual. It should not strike the audience as clever, but honest, as is eminently the case with Lysias. On the 'figures of thought' he says nothing, except about the sudden questioning (ἐρώτησις) and

[1] As Spengel observes, this subject was announced to come before the psychological part, and is certainly out of its natural order. Hence some dislocation of the text is to be inferred, even though there are at present references from the discussion on the τόποι to the chapters on πάθος and ἦθος, which show that the work early assumed its present form.

[2] caps. 22–4.

witty repartees, which are indeed hardly figures of thought. As to the *epilogue*[1] he puts the reminding of the hearer on the same level as the exciting him—a peculiarly Greek view, already noticed when considering Demosthenes' speeches, which generally end with a very calm summary, and a quiet demand for justice.

The chapters on expression are more suggestive, though nothing is more disappointing than that on correctness of diction (ὅτι χρὴ Ἑλληνίζειν), in which the reader expects valuable hints on style, and is merely told to mind his particles,[2] his concords, and the clearness of his sentences. Similarly on the difficult and subtle question of rythm, he only says a few words about iambic and trochaic rythms, and then recommends (after Thrasymachus) the first pæon for opening, and the last for closing, a sentence. On the deeper laws of the harmony of periods he is silent, or hopelessly general.

But on the qualities of style apart from grammatical accuracy, there are several good chapters against over-ornament and pomp, against stale phrases (ψυχρὰς λέξεως), such as those often used by Gorgias and Alkidamas, on metaphors and similes, and other kindred topics. His remarks on the differences of poetical and prose style, and also on the difference of style suited to oral delivery and to written matter, are very sensible and sound, but not, I think, very suggestive.[3] To the real beauties of noble poetry he seems comparatively a stranger. After discussing separate words and clauses in eight chapters, he goes on to their connection, either natural or artificial—the well-known λέξις εἰρομένη of Herodotus as opposed to the λέξις κατεστραμμένη of Thucydides, and still more of Isocrates. He adds a chapter on saying 'good things,' and

[1] c. 19.

[2] It is to be wished that Aristotle had followed his own advice. For his use of ὥστε, οὖν, δε, and of prepositions, has caused special difficulty to commentators, and called forth special enquiries, such as Bonitz' (*Wien. Sitzber.* 1863) and Eucken's books.

[3] Voltaire profited by them, as may be seen from his frequent criticisms of the poetical prose of his rivals, and his praise of the principle laid down by Aristotle. On this Havet (*Étude*, pp. 95, sq.) has some excellent remarks.

on vividness of style. But in neither of these is he happy or original.

§ 571. The impression produced by the *Rhetoric* is not very favourable to Aristotle's genius.[1] We feel, indeed, that the whole book is on a large and sound basis, but is mainly an expansion of the hints thrown out with such brilliancy by Plato in his *Phædrus;* and that, in following them up, Aristotle has stated a good many isolated truths of value, and shown great acuteness, but has added little to the τέχναι of his predecessors except the psychological basis, which must have been practically felt by all previous orators. The real secrets of his great contemporary Demosthenes, which he, if anyone, could have discovered, or at least discussed, are either deliberately ignored, or neglected all through his book; and this capital blot in a Greek rhetoric of that age is not to be overlooked or excused. We may add that the style of this work, which expressly treats of style, contains frequent examples of vices which it reprehends. It is constantly too compressed; it is obscure; it is confused; and though some of these blots are undoubtedly to be ascribed to the condition of the text, many are due to the author.

The Latin rhetoricians, Cicero and Quintilian, as well as Dionysius, derive many valuable hints from it, and often follow it closely, but they seem to me to improve upon it very much in the clearness and elegance of their expression. Cicero[2]

[1] If the reader desires to see the opposite case ably argued, I can recommend to him E. Havet's excellent *Étude sur la Rhétorique d'Aristote* (Paris, 1846), from which I have borrowed many points all through my sketch, though I think the author has often transfused his own ideas into Aristotle. I must, however, note the curious blunder (p. 71) of attributing to R. Estienne the passage on torture, which that intelligent translator found in the best MS. (A^c), but which he printed in italics, as of doubtful authenticity. This is not the only error in Havet's suggestive and charming essay.

[2] His judgment on the book is worth quoting (*de Or.* ii. 38): Sed, ut eo revocetur, unde huc declinavit oratio, ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem fuisse, qui diceret, artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Græco διαλεκτικήν appellaret? In hac arte, si modo est hæc ars, nullum est præceptum, quo modo verum inveniatur, sed tantum est, quo modo

especially, as Cope's notes will amply show, has put almost all Aristotle's points with great force, and in admirable and terse language. The Epistle of Dionysius to Ammæus, in which he refutes elaborately by dates the notion that Demosthenes borrowed his rhetorical principles from Aristotle, is valuable in quoting six passages verbatim (as he says) from the *Rhetoric*. Though there are some differences from our text, they are not such as to warrant the belief that the work was originally fuller and more explicit. It is more probable that later rhetors added commentaries or expansions, of which a few fragments appear in Spengel's *Collection*. But, unfortunately, all these

iudicetur. Nam [et] omne, quod eloquimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse, et si simpliciter dictum sit, suscipiunt Dialectici, ut iudicent, verumne sit an falsum ; et si coniuncte sit elatum et adiuncta sint alia, iudicent, rectene adiuncta sint et verane summa sit unius cuiusque rationis et ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus et multa quærendo reperiunt non modo ea, quæ iam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam, quibus ante exorsa et potius detexta prope retexantur. Hic nos igitur Stoicus iste nihil adiuvat, quoniam, quemadmodum inveniam quid dicam, non docet ; atque idem etiam impedit, quod et multa reperit, quæ negat ullo modo posse dissolvi, et genus sermonis affert non liquidum, non fusum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum. Quod si qui probabit, ita probabit, ut oratori tamen aptum non esse fateatur. Hæc enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quæ non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinantur. Quare istam artem totam dimittamus, quæ in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in iudicandis nimium loquax. Critolaum istum, quem simul cum Diogene venisse commemoras, puto plus huic studio nostro prodesse potuisse. Erat enim ab isto Aristotele, a cuius inventis tibi ego videor non longe aberrare. Atque inter hunc Aristotelem, cuius et illum legi librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum, et illos, in quibus ipse sua quædam de eadem arte dixit, et hos germanos huius artis magistros hoc mihi visum est interesse, quod ille eadem acie mentis, qua rerum omnium vim naturamque viderat, hæc quoque aspexit, quæ ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant : illi autem, qui hoc solum colendum ducebant, habitarunt in hac una ratione tractanda, non eadem prudentia, qua ille, sed usu, in hoc uno genere, studioque maiore. Carneadi vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis ; qui nullam umquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit, quem non probarit ; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit. Sed hoc maius est quiddam, quam ab iis, qui hæc tradunt et docent, postulandum sit.

works are lost, and the remaining scholia are declared quite worthless by those who have studied them.

§ 572. *Bibliographical.* Our best MS. is one of the eleventh century, now in Paris (A^c), which was known to Petrus Victorius, and collated in his valuable edition, but more carefully by Gaisford (1820), and still better by Bekker for his edition. The next best authority is the old Latin translation, undoubtedly by William de Moerbeke, in 1281, which followed word for word a text similar to the A^c text, but with marginal interpolations or commentaries which the translator generally adopts. All the later and more interpolated MSS. seem derived from the same archetype as these older and better copies, and all of them bear traces of the amalgamation of two recensions, in which two renderings of the same idea are given one after the other. Separate editions of the Rhetoric are scarce. First printed by Aldus, not in his *Aristotle*, but in the *Rhetores Græci* (1508), it since holds a place in all the editions of the collected works. However, Gaisford's special edition (Oxford, 1833) is the tenth since the editio princeps. The essays of Brandis (*Philologus*, vol. iv.), Vahlen, and of Spengel, who has given special attention to it, in his collection of rhetorical tracts, in his series of papers on Aristotle in the Munich Academy's *Abhandlungen*, and lastly in a separate edition (Leipzig, 1867), also the hints of Thurot in his Essays on Aristotle, may be read with advantage. Bekker's text is reprinted in a separate form, and we have an elaborate Introduction (1867) and a Commentary in three volumes by E. M. Cope of Cambridge (edited by J. E. Sandys, 1874).

§ 573. The *Rhetoric* points back in more than one place to the *Poetic*, which seems to have been composed before it, probably next before it, and to which, as a kindred subject, we may naturally turn. To us oratory is a sister art to poetry, and we may admire the rhetoric of Shakespere and Byron, as we admire the poetry of Jeremy Taylor or Ruskin. We should have accordingly expected to find them treated by Aristotle as sister arts, teaching the most perfect expression in words, under divers conditions of human thought and of human passion. But we find, to our surprise, that he brings them into contact

only in the detail of expression, or λέξις, whereas their sources are to him perfectly distinct. Rhetoric, as we have seen, he regards as merely the art of persuasion, and hence an offshoot of the science of reasoning, applied to a popular audience. It is the science of probable arguments, methodically expressed. Poetry he bases on the instinct of imitation, especially of the imitation of human action, and classes it with the arts of dancing and of music, which have the same object, and which were commonly used in combination with it; also with the art of painting, which uses colours, as poetry uses rythm and metre, or as music uses melody.

This view is evidently the result of the predominance of the drama in Attic life. All other forms of poetry are regarded in relation to it. In Homer it is far more the dramatic side than the merely descriptive or picturesque, which occupies Aristotle. The old descriptive *Margites* is regarded as a kind of comedy, and, what is still more singular, lyric poetry is hardly mentioned at all, except on its dramatic side, and in those later developments when the music and the dancing were plainly mimetic, and represented a sort of lyrical drama. This may possibly be the result of a great gap in the text, but I rather agree with those who hold that while a discussion on comedy has been lost, there was no place for a separate treatment of lyric poetry in our sense, and this for the special reason I have assigned. The complete ignoring of the whole Æolic school, of Sappho, Alcæus, Anacreon—nay, of Pindar and most of the great masters of Greek melic, is a blot in the *Poetic*, like the ignoring of Demosthenes in the *Rhetoric*. But, as has been well observed, dramatic poetry and legal rhetoric, being surrounded by fixed conditions, lend themselves to scientific analysis far more than the other branches of oratory and poetry. Hence the tendency to write special τέχναι for these departments of each of the arts.

§ 574. Aristotle's analyses in the first three chapters of the various kinds of imitation in dramatic and epic, and in tragic and comic poetry, are not very suggestive or fruitful, though undoubtedly correct; but in the fourth he gives an ingenious psychological analysis of the instinct of imitation in man, and its

results. It is owing to this that accurate imitations even of repulsive objects give pleasure by our recognition of their faithfulness. Thus the *Margites*, which he ascribes to Homer, and the Attic comedy are branches of poetry, though they profess to paint men 'worse than they usually are.' But the fuller exposition of the nature of comedy is lost; we still have in the fourth and fifth chapters valuable isolated facts about the history of both tragedy and comedy, which have been utilised in their proper place above.[1] It is, however, plain from several allusions (especially 9, § 3) that the brilliant exuberance of Aristophanes did not fit into Aristotle's system, and that he even excluded it from his very definition of comic drama, which was essentially general, and employed in sketches of character applicable to classes of men. He also objected to the producing of laughter by obscenity, and notes that the new comedy replaced this by indirect hints (ὑπόνοια). In fact, the parabases of Aristophanes are to Aristotle the work of an ἰαμβοποιός, not of a dramatic poet. Thus we have lost by the corruption of our text a theory of Greek comedy excluding Aristophanes![2] In the opening of chap. vi. Aristotle explicitly promises to discuss epic poetry and comedy after he has explained the nature and perfections of tragedy. This latter he does very thoroughly from his point of view. We have but scanty notes on epic poetry near the end, in direct comparison with tragedy, and a curious chapter of criticism, or of commonplaces for replying to criticisms on tragedy.[3] There is also an analysis of diction[4] which is to a great extent on the first elements of grammar, and is totally out of place in this work,[5] as well as some remarks on ornamental diction, which are analogous to, but not so good as, the parallel chapter of the *Rhetoric*.

Apart from all the confusion of the text, apart from the pedantic subdivisions of the school, apart from the flagrantly

[1] Vol. I. chaps. xiv., xix.

[2] Cf. on these points Meineke, *Fragg. Com.* i. 272.

[3] c. 25. [4] cc. 19–22.

[5] Egger qualifies this censure by pointing to the infancy of grammar at this time, and the consequent novelty and importance of what is now trivial and elementary (*Hist. de la Critique*, pp. 227, 456)

inconsistent judgments which are contained in the *Poetic*,[1] and which make it thoroughly unsafe as an authority, without the constant test of plain common sense, there are two permanent merits in the work which will ever interest educated men. The first is the scientific attempt to explain the nature and vindicate the uses of tragedy; the other consists in the preservation throughout the work of many stray fragments of Aristotle's acute insight and his various and profound learning. For however corrupted and interpolated our text may be, there can be no doubt that the main outlines are those of the master's mind. This scattered wisdom, whether on the history of Greek poetry, or on the nature of man, has been gathered and applauded by admiring critics from the days of Corneille's enemies[2] to those of Lessing, who declared the mutilated and tentative essay in criticism to be as infallible as the *elements of Euclid;* and thus it is now commonplace in histories of Greek literature, or of art criticism.

§ 575. The theory of tragedy, on the other hand, has within the last twenty years been discussed in Germany, as if it had never been known before, and with this result, that what was once tolerably clear has become so confused as to be almost unintelligible. In proof of this I will appeal to the discussion

[1] Some of these are explained away by the ingenious reservations and qualifications of critics, as the reader may see by consulting Susemihl's notes to his edition. Other points may be the result of our misconception. Thus Welcker first saw the meaning of the sentence quoted from Sophocles in comparing himself with Euripides. What he really said was not that he himself had painted characters as they ought to be, but as they ought to be painted *by a tragic poet*, whereas Euripides had painted them from real or ordinary life. Again, when Aristotle is made to say that the chorus should be an actor and constituent part of the play, καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ [παρ'] Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ [παρὰ] Σοφοκλεῖ, and to add that the rest of the tragic poets made their choral odes quite irrelevant, he does not mean, as he is often translated, that the chorus was not an actor in Euripides, but that it was not an actor of the right kind, being often an accomplice. I should suggest μηδ' ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ—*and yet* not like Euripides, as probably what Aristotle wrote. But there are other judgments which cannot be defended with any common sense, or independence, in criticism.

[2] Cf. the Preface to his *Don Sanche*, or M. Paul Albert's *la littérature française au xvii^me^ Siècle*, pp. 84, sq.

of the *tragical purification* in the introduction to Susemihl's second edition (1874). It is not too much to say that a more obscure and confused piece of writing could hardly be found even in German literature. This, the most recent result of speculation on the question, is only to be compared to the wonderful hodge-podge made of the same matter in the old Latin version retranslated from the Arabic, and cited by Egger as a curiosity.[1]

Here is the famous definition, in its complete form : *ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.*[2] The first clause is meant to contrast it with comedy, the third with epic poetry, and these require no further explanation. 'Adorned speech' he himself explains as having rythm and music in it. By the next words—the readings are all through uncertain—he tells us he means that different kinds of adorned speech are to be used in different parts, as iambic metre, and lyric measures with music. But it is about the last clause that the storm of controversy is still raging. I will only note a few of the most interesting points.

In the first place it seems likely that this theory of Aristotle's is intended as a vindication of tragedy against the attacks of Plato, who (in his *Phædrus*, 268 C, *Philebus*, 48 A, and *Republic*, x. 604) touches on the subject, and censures tragedy as a mimic representation of passion, and therefore as morally injurious to well regulated minds. For the luxury of pity is in his view relaxing and effeminating. The same objection, for the same reasons, he applies to epic poetry in its dramatic aspect. To this criticism Aristotle replies, not by directly asserting a moral use in tragedy, as has been argued by Lessing and others, not by considering the trials of the *actors* and their purification as intended for a moral training of the spectators, but by asserting (as Goethe insisted) an

[1] *Hist. de la critique*, p. 427, in his commentary on the passage in his edition appended to that work.

[2] c. 6, § 2.

æsthetical purpose. He considers that human pleasures and human griefs, apart from their moral side, though not in conflict with it, require to be raised and purified ; and just as we train the taste of the eye by ideal pictures, and by the study of exceptionally beautiful scenery, so the compassion and the fear of the ordinary citizen may be purified by showing him higher and nobler objects for its exercise. That this æsthetical training will have good moral results is certain, but these are not included in Aristotle's theory. Hence he speaks of the purification τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, that is to say, not the same affections precisely, nor yet different, but of the lower forms of terror and pity, and perhaps other such affections, by the higher.[1]

But the wearisome question, what may have been the exact amount of meaning in the term *purifying* present to Aristotle's mind, whether he intended it as a medical term, implying that tragedy was a purging medicine, and thus homœopathic in principle, or whether he used it in a religious sense, as suggesting the analogy of those treatments of madness and over-excitement by calm and rythmical music then practised in Greece, or whether he meant it in both, or in neither—all this I will leave to the Germans, and to those who have time and patience to wade through their eighty works on the subject. It is the merit of E. Müller and of Bernays first to have brought to bear on the theory a parallel passage from the *Politics*,[2] in which the æsthetical use of κάθαρσις is clear, and in which we find it compared to the musical cures attempted by playing very exciting flute music as a palliative for morbid excitement of the mind. It is also certain from the researches of Bonitz that πάθος and πάθημα are not distinct in sense.[3]

[1] The comic poet Timocles, in a remarkable fragment of his *Dionysiazusæ* (Meineke, iii. p. 592), seems rather to adopt the moral uses of tragedy as the chief good produced. The passage contains an excellent statement of the ordinary theory, to which Aristotle's more subtle view is not opposed, but from which it should be carefully distinguished.

[2] viii. p. 1341.

[3] *Index Aristotel.* sub vocc. The genitive plural of the former is rare in Aristotle, nor is apparently the singular of the latter used at all by him, so that the variation is merely one of usage.

The whole question must be regarded in relation to Aristotle's theory of intellectual and refined leisure (διαγωγή) as the chief end of man. This is the happiness of the gods, whose contemplations are no labour, but the enjoyment of perfect knowledge and perfect leisure. This is the happiness, too, of the cultivated man, whose leisure hours should not be employed in the contemplation of vulgar cares, or wasted in vulgar sympathies, but engaged in that of ideal human actions—not always ideally good, but ideal in their greatness, their dignity, and their far-reaching importance, as illustrations of the laws which govern the world.

§ 576. After thus defining tragedy, Aristotle proceeds to analyse the various features or elements which make it up, and determines six, the plot, the character drawing, the διάνοια;[1] then the diction, the musical composition, and, lastly, the *mise en scène*, or theatrical production. Of these various elements he justly considers the plot as by far the most important, observing that recent tragedians had succeeded, by attending to this element, without any character drawing. He gives a full and exceedingly valuable analysis of plots, both simple and complex, of their various devices, such as *catastrophe* and *recognition*, and of their proper limits as compared with epic plots. He even gives[2] practical advices to a tragic poet as to the construction of a plot. Of these I need hardly say that the first and most important is to imagine his characters clearly and vividly, so that they may live before him; thus alone, says the acute critic, can inconsistencies and blunders be avoided. The character-drawing is discussed in chapter xv., and is not so suggestive. The fuller treatment of the διάνοια seems to be lost, for his reference[3] to the rhetoric is far too general to be satisfactory. The section on expression is in its earlier part an elementary chapter in grammar. The 21st,

[1] By which he seems to mean the thoughts or intellectual aspects of the piece. Thus the later school, and even at times Euripides, were not careful to draw ἤθη, but were very particular about brilliancy of dialogue and rhetorical point, which I take to be the διάνοια of the piece, according to the concise statement in chap. xix. §§ 1–4.

[2] cc. 17–8.

[3] 19, 1.

on elevated diction, is indeed properly within the scope of the work, but whether from corruptions of the text, or spuriousness, or possibly, though one is almost afraid to whisper it, from the coldness and pedantry of the great author, does not touch the real beauties, or unlock the real secrets, of poetical language. This is throughout the crying fault of both *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*, and is not atoned for by any number of acute and reasonable observations. One almost suspects that the author was beginning to disbelieve in genius, and attribute artistic success to mere soundness and accuracy of method. How far truer and more appreciative is the tract of Longinus *on the Sublime!*

The remainder of the work, with the exception of the curious, and perhaps spurious, 25th chapter, on the refutation of dramatic criticisms by authors, is devoted to epic poetry, and chiefly to its dramatic side. This part of the work is vitiated by an excessive reverence for the Homer of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and a tendency to consider him as a perfect model in every respect, so much so that the problem, in case of any apparent defect (as with our Bible), was merely to vindicate and explain the reasons why the inspired master had chosen to put it thus. This over-reverence for Homer, together with a complete neglect of the tragedy of Æschylus, and of the great lyric poets, are indeed grave defects.[1] We saw, moreover, reason to suspect, from the general tenor of the book, and from the few fragments on comedy still extant, that Aristophanes, and the splendid outburst of political comedy in the Periclean age, were set aside by him in favour of the character comedy of Crates and the newer school. If indeed his definition of comedy corresponded with that of tragedy, and if poetry, especially dramatic, was in his view more philosophical than history in drawing general pictures of human nature, such must have been his proceeding.

His ideal poet seems to have been Sophocles, and his ideal play the *Œdipus Rex;* and yet he strangely omits all discussion of the agency of Fate in the Greek tragedies, of which this play

[1] Other defects and omissions, in addition to these, have been noticed in Egger's sensible review of the book (*Hist. de la Critique*, pp. 200, sq.).

affords so obtrusive an example. In fact, *the* point of interest to us in Greek tragedy, especially as we have it in Æschylus—the conflict of human liberty and conscience with the curse of a hereditary fate—is a feature in tragedy apparently unknown to Aristotle. He often cites Euripides with praise, but also with blame, that is to say if we can trust the text. Of this author's plays the *Tauric Iphigenia* is that most frequently commended; but when he reproaches the *Aulid Iphigenia* for inconsistency, we are bound, with all good judges since Schiller, either to accuse him of critical incompetence, or to reject the sentence as foisted in by a later hand. Thus he tells us in one place that Empedocles is only a poet as to metre, and yet in another cites him specially for poetical diction. But every chapter of this tract offers so many points for expansion or for criticism, that I must not venture to enter upon this field.

§ 577. The student who desires to apply the theory of Aristotle to modern poetic art will find it necessary to make allowance for several important changes in the drama, which I will here indicate in a few words. Greek tragedy, being essentially religious, became in the hands of its greatest masters so serious a thing, that the relief of humorous or low scenes was hardly permitted. Aristotle indeed gives us to understand in his sketch of its history that this was not so originally, that it arose from a satyric representation, of which the grotesque side was preserved in the satyric afterpiece, when banished from serious tragedy. This severance was exaggerated by the French school of the seventeenth century, who are far more particular than the less artificial Greek masters in avoiding the lower side of human nature. And such, too, was the opinion of Milton, but happily for us Shakespere gave the law for a wider conception, and since his day, even in theory, the comic or humorous element is admitted and even admired as a merit of contrast in our tragedies. With this exception, the elementary rules and directions of Aristotle are such as should guide every dramatist of every time.

Nay more, in our own reading age, when the drama has given way to the novel, or prose tragedy and comedy of ordinary life, without scenery or illusion, it were well if authors

would study the laws which the Greek critic has laid down on the construction of a dramatic story. Now, as then, the plot is vastly the most important element, and no amount of character painting or clever writing will atone for its deficiency. The consistency of the actors, now as then, can only be preserved by a vivid imagination which transports the writer into the situation of his characters. There are as yet few more devices than those described by him as *ἀναγνώρισις* and *περιπέτεια*—an unexpected recognition and a catastrophe, together with pathetic misfortunes. All these and other of his laws may perhaps be better verified in George Eliot's great novels than in modern tragedies. But of course, as I before said, our novel replaces not only tragedy, but the newer comedy of the Greeks; and thus, in addition to the humour allowed in modern tragedy, we have sketches of ordinary life, home scenes, and other such matter, suited rather to Menander than to Sophocles. There are many cases too, as Aristotle tells us, when the mere accuracy of drawing, even of unworthy objects, pleases us by its very faithfulness.

The history of the varying influence of the *Poetic* on literature is itself a wide and interesting subject, which would easily fill a volume larger than the present. I will refer the reader to Susemihl's Introduction to his edition, which gives the necessary references, excepting the important French adoption of the work in the seventeenth century, with its momentous consequences; for this the reader must consult the histories of the French classic drama, or M. Patin's *Tragiques grecs*. I will here append a mere sketch.

§ 578. *Bibliographical.* There are few early allusions to this work, for some supposed ones are doubtless to the separate treatise *on poets*, which seems to have been in three books. But there are also clear indications that the extant work is referred to, and in the plural number, though we have no divisions marked. Some critics are disposed to think that here too there were three books, our corrupt and disordered text containing the substance of the first two, while the stray fragments of the author *περὶ κωμῳδίας* and elsewhere point to the third book as occupied with comedy. But if our catalogues of Aris-

totle's works really come from the *Lives* of Hermippus, pupil of Callimachus, the work was then complete and in *two* books, and there seems good reason to believe that the authors of the best scholia on the tragedies (probably Aristophanes Byz.) knew and applied the canons of the *Poetic*.

In later days we hear little of the work, and after the sixth century it seems forgotten. The Arabs indeed preserved some tradition of it, and made some attempts to understand it, the only knowledge of the book before it was printed being derived from Latin translations of Arabic or Hebrew versions. It seems that there was a translation from the Greek into Syriac, and from this with much care by Abou-Maschar Matthias, a Nestorian Christian, into Arabic, about 935 A.D. This MS. is still preserved in Paris, and shows that the text was then as imperfect as we now have it. Two centuries later Averroes wrote an abridgment of the work, which we possess in the Latin version of Hermann the German at the beginning of the thirteenth century, printed at Venice in 1481. This Hermann tells us he had a complete Arab version before him, but preferred the abridgment of Averroes—a somewhat grotesque work, seeing that this celebrated man had not the least idea what a tragedy meant, and accordingly confounded it with the Arabic panegyrics in honour of princes. He also replaces Aristotle's illustrations from Greek literature by examples from Arabic poetry. There was a translation of Averroes' work into rabbinical Hebrew, and from this into Latin in the fourteenth century.

The Latin version of L. Valla (Venice, 1498) was made directly from a Greek MS., but the text itself was not included in the great Aldine *Aristotle*. It first appeared among the *Rhetores Græci* with the *Rhetoric*, in 1568; then come Pacci (1535), P. Victorius (Junta, 1560), and a host of others. The MS. followed in these prints was one of the many fifteenth century copies, and this was the case with all later editions till the present century, when editors since Bekker (Burgess is a qualified exception) have reverted to the only older MS., an eleventh century copy in Paris, known as A^c. Passing by other early Latin versions, there are Italian translations by Castelvetro and

Piccolomini in 1570–2, the latter of which is highly praised. In the next century Corneille's enemies brought it out in a French version (by the Abbé Hedelin) and framed upon it their *theory of the three unities*, which they foisted on Aristotle, and which they drove to such a pitch as ultimately to discredit the Greeks by the light of their false Aristotle.[1] This 'conflict of the ancients and moderns' is an important chapter in French dramatic literature, and reached down to the days of Voltaire.

It is, however, now agreed even by the Germans that Twining's English translation (1789), and Tyrwhitt's text and commentary, a magnificent specimen of the Clarendon Press (Oxon. 1794), are the real foundation of a scientific knowledge of the work. Excellent German editions now abound : Bekker's text (reprinted 1873) ; Ritter's and Vahlen's (1867) ; the translations of Stahr, Ueberweg (1870), Susemihl ; the dissertations of Bernays, Vahlen, Bonitz, Susemihl, and a host of others. There are also excellent recent French versions : Egger's (*Hist. de la Critique*, &c., 1849), and several others since that date. I am not aware that there is any work of importance on the subject in English, in our own day, except some notes of Mr. Bywater in the *Journal of Philology*, No. v. ; for this reason I have given these details with disproportionate fullness. The reader will find a summary of works, not nearly complete, but very large, in Susemihl's *Preface*, pp. xix–xxiii, and references to fuller catalogues in various German reviews.

§ 579. We turn to a far greater work, somewhat earlier in date, but not so clearly belonging to a history of literature. The *Politics* are confessed on all hands to be the ripest and fullest outcome of Greek political experience. They were based on the researches in Aristotle's *Constitutions*, or Catalogue of some 158 polities, of which many precious fragments tell us enough to desire that it were preserved even at the expense of our *Politics* (but cf. Appendix). For as such the present work is essentially conceived in Aristotle's peculiar method, being based on actual experience, and the criticism of

[1] Of course Aristotle insists everywhere on unity of action ; he once casually mentions unity of time (v. § 4) in contrast to the freedom of epic poetry ; on unity of place he is absolutely silent.

previous theorists. To the historian, to the student of Greek politics and Greek society, this book, though imperfect and corrupt, is nevertheless inestimable. It can hardly be called a literary performance. All the defects of careless composition, or perhaps dictation, of double explanations, of hopeless conciseness, which we find elsewhere in his works, are here also the exercising ground of endless criticism. I will indicate the chief points of interest to the general reader.

The first book, after an introduction showing how the *state* is the natural and necessary outcome of man's social nature, and a more complex union than that within the household, goes on to discuss slavery, and the acquisition of wealth, as parts of the household, and therefore as entering into the state. The other bonds of union are those of husband and wife, of father and son (daughters are ignored) and of brothers, of which the second only is treated in the subsequent book on education. These various bonds find their respective analogies in despotic, aristocratical, monarchical, and timocratic governments, as appears from comparing other passages [1] with what is here said. Aristotle conceives the relation of sex differently from Plato, for he thinks that women differ intellectually not in degree but in kind from men, and he does not contemplate their ever attaining more than the place of free but inferior and subject personages in the household. The *locus classicus* is not here but at the opening of the ninth book of the *Natural History*, a graphic passage, containing a curious mixture of true and false generalisation. I quote it as a favourable specimen of his style.[2]

[1] Especially *Nic. Ethics*, viii. 10, 11.

[2] Book ix. ch. i. p. 608. After describing the distinction of male and female as the cause of differences of temper in all animals, he goes on to illustrate it by the case of hounds, and adds that in the case of the bear and panther only is the female more courageous than the male. *τούτων δ' ἴχνη μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν ἐστιν ἐν πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ φανερώτερα ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι μᾶλλον ἦθος καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην, ὥστε καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις εἶναι φανερωτέρας ἐν αὐτοῖς. διόπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς ἐλεημονέστερον καὶ ἀρίδακρυ μᾶλλον, ἔτι δὲ φθονερώτερον τε καὶ μεμψιμοιρότερον, καὶ φιλολοίδορον μᾶλλον καὶ πληκτικώτερον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ*

His reflections on slavery are much more interesting, as showing that there were already *Abolitionists* in the world, who declared that slavery was *against nature*—a doctrine which Aristotle earnestly combats, though making several important concessions very damaging to his cause. He rightly denies the absurd doctrine (so fashionable in the last century) of the equality of men, and asserts the radical inferiority of certain races. But it is surprising that he does not recognise among some barbarians, as he calls them, the same right to rule as that of the Greeks. The Aryan barons who fought against the Greeks from the days of Cyrus to those of the last Darius were a nobility of splendid traditions, and educated, as Herodotus tells us, 'to ride on horseback, to use their bows, and to speak the truth.' The Carthaginians had framed so excellent a constitution that Aristotle presently selects it among the best of those known, for careful description and comment. Yet he admits only individual exceptions, and is blinded by the national vanity of the Hellenes. His case would have been much stronger had he known such races as the Negroes; but if we admit his premises, that the refined leisure of a small minority of the inhabitants of a Greek city is the highest possible state, he is perfectly justified in his argument.

The remainder of the book is about trade, about the nature of wealth, and how the acquisition of money has come to replace that of the goods which are represented by it. Here again Aristotle shows the old Greek gentleman's prejudice against retail trade, and brands the taking of interest on money as an unnatural crime. This blunder lasted far into the Middle Ages, while the right of plundering wrecks was recognised, just as Aristotle maintains that war or piracy for the acquisition of slaves among people who ought to be slaves (though they do not recognise it) is perfectly just.

§ 580. The second book is a review of famous polities, both

ψευδέστερον, εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ μνημονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνότερον καὶ ὀκνηρότερον, καὶ ὅλως ἀκινητότερον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος, καὶ τροφῆς ἐλάττονός ἐστιν. βοηθητικώτερον δέ, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, καὶ ἀνδρειότερον τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαλακίοις, ὅταν τῷ τριόδοντι πληγῇ ἡ σηπία, ὁ μὲν ἄρρην βοηθεῖ τῇ θηλείᾳ, ἡ δὲ ὑήλεια φεύγει τοῦ ἄρρενος πληγέντος.

actually existing and devised by theorists, and does not, I think, increase our respect for the great critic. The theoretical sketches are put on a level with actually existing and successful polities, which is absurd, and, moreover, the faults and failures of these latter, which occurred in the lapse of centuries, are charged to want of foresight in their authors, as if any legislator could foresee such far distant consequences. The ideal states of Plato (or of Socrates, as Aristotle calls them throughout), of Hippodamos, and of Phaleas are criticised, the first at great length, but with much sophistry, and little attempt to understand or appreciate the immortal *Republic*. It is, indeed, maintained by Susemihl,[1] that while the refutation of the extreme socialism in family relations in the *Republic* is very complete and successful, the critique of the *Laws*, which sets forth a state not unlike in kind to Aristotle's own ideal, is petty and sophistical. He complains that critics have not attended sufficiently to this contrast. But I cannot concede that an account of Plato's *Republic*, which asserts his marriage laws to be a *community* (κοινωνία) of women, destroying self-command and chastity, is anything short of a gross libel, and unworthy to be called a refutation.

Then follow very valuable sketches of the Lacedæmonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions. The last chapter seems a spurious addition, reviewing Solon and other legislators by way of supplement. There may have been a real review of Solon given by Aristotle, but surely not the brief and bald statement now in the text. Possibly the gap was early felt in this place, and the lost account of Solon replaced by the present chapter.

The third book enters upon the dogmatic or positive part of the scheme, and seeks to analyse what a state or polity means, before discussing its perfect conditions. A state is determined by its citizens, those who vote and judge in it. Aristotle proceeds to determine more closely the idea of a citizen, and whether his ἀρετή is the same as that of the man. Are the good man and the good citizen identical? This he shows to

[1] *Introd.* p. 27.

be not always the case, but so much so in the best or ideal constitution that his good citizen must be a Greek gentleman of leisure, and secure from all menial trade or employment. He then determines [1] the various species of constitution according to the sovereign power in each—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—with their various subdivisions and debased forms. With the ninth chapter he enters upon the discussion of individual forms, and, in the remainder of this book, of the forms of monarchy and its justification in nature. It is probably with his eye upon the astounding personality of Alexander [2] that he declares there are exceptional cases, where the merit of one man in the state is so indisputably pre-eminent that all are willing, and bound, to obey him. But ordinarily there is more wisdom in a selected plurality, or constitutional aristocracy, which is accordingly the best or ideal form.

§ 581. This he discusses at great length, and with special detail, in the following two books, which stand at the close in our MSS., but which have long since been recognised as out of place there, and are now printed as fourth and fifth in all good

[1] cc. 4–5.

[2] The reference has been vehemently denied by Susemihl (*Introd.* pp. 42–3) and others, on the ground that Aristotle never considers such an empire as the Macedonian, but exclusively the small Hellenic polity, with its narrow limits and purely Hellenic citizens. This criticism forgets that Aristotle might be so struck by Alexander as a commanding nature, as to infer the justice of making such an one a king even in a Hellenic and ideal state, though he actually lived in a foreign system. I cannot doubt that this amount of reference is intended, but I do not go so far as Oncken in finding philo-Macedonian allusions throughout the work. But if this point be doubtful, what shall we say to the strange statement he makes (p. 1296, 38) in connection with the moderate democracy managed by the middle classes, that 'of those who had formerly attained power, one man only was persuaded to restore this form of government (*εἷς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπείσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν*), while all the rest had made oligarchies or democracies for their own interest?' Who was this remarkable person? The text seems unassailable. Pericles, Epaminondas, Solon, and Pittacus have been suggested. I will add Mardonius, suspecting that *Μήδων* has dropped out (after *γενομένων*), and that Aristotle may possibly refer to the statement of Herodotus (vi. 43) that he established popular rule in the Asiatic cities, a thing incredible in his own day. But Pittacus is the most probable.

editions. The first three chapters are no doubt an Aristotelian, but hardly relevant, inquiry into the most desirable existence for a state, which is determined on the questionable analogy of the individual. Whether the philosopher, who stood aloof from public affairs, or the politician, who controlled them, be the more perfect man, leading the more perfect life, was a dispute common since Plato's day. Aristotle elsewhere declares expressly for the θεωρητικὸς βίος, the life of intellectual activity, which approaches nearest to that of the gods. He here contents himself with showing that, as happiness—which consists of three parts, the goods of mind, body, and estate—depends chiefly on the first, most men who praise the politician's life from ambition and grasping motives miss the mark altogether. The true and righteous politician's life is not one of unjust aggrandisement, and, on the other hand, not devoid of speculation. So also the philosophic life is not without the noblest kind of action. The two kinds are therefore not mutually exclusive, and a state need not exist for foreign conquest, or for imperial purposes, but may devote itself with equal dignity and perfection to the well-being of its own citizens.

It would carry us too far to pursue even this very brief analysis. The external and internal conditions of Aristotle's state are unfortunately not completely preserved. Nevertheless, the fragmentary fifth book, on the education of the citizens, is so interesting, that I hope to consider it elsewhere fully in connection with the subject of Greek education. The philosopher then turns to the actual forms of polity, and discusses their relation to his ideal state, the conditions of their welfare, and lastly the causes of their decay, with the various means of avoiding it. This analysis of the pathology of polities, which occupies the last book (v. in the old order), is that of most practical value, and has accordingly been most studied by statesmen and political writers. Had Machiavelli completed his *Republic*, designed on the plan of his *Principe*, we should have had a close modern analogy to these books.

§ 582. Most editors, not content with changing the place of the last books in the MSS., as I have mentioned, also transpose the immediately foregoing ones, so that the MS. order is

thus reformed—i. ii. iii. vii. viii. iv. vi. v. The placing of vii. and viii. immediately after iii. was first suggested by Nicolas d'Oresme (1370), then by several of the earliest commentators, such as P. Victorius, Segni, and Scaino da Salo, in the sixteenth century; by Conring in the seventeenth; but was not again urged till the problem was taken up in the last generation by St. Hilaire and Spengel.[1] It is Hildenbrand's suggestion that the closer description of the ideal state was postponed by Aristotle till after he had composed his historical survey, was accordingly left unfinished, and found at the end of the MS. when his books were rediscovered at Skepsis. Hence the place and condition of these books in our MSS. would be explained. The transposition of v. and vi. was not proposed till this century by St. Hilaire, who is supported by Spengel. But this last change is not so imperatively demanded as the former. It is, however, now so generally adopted that the old numbering of the books should be abandoned, as producing useless perplexity.

§ 583. A sober review of the whole work impresses us with sincere admiration on the one hand, and on the other with disappointment. To take the latter first. I will not insist upon the various confusions introduced by Aristotle's over-fondness for logical divisions, especially the vague position assigned to the moderate democracy (*πολιτεία*) and aristocracy in relation to one another, and to his ideal state. Neither will I repeat myself on the defects of his style, or on the many difficulties introduced by corruptions or dislocations of the text. What we rather wonder at is the narrow Hellenedom of Aristotle, who has learned nothing from contemporary history, nothing from his own studies in foreign politics, nothing from his varied foreign residences, nothing from the Macedonian court, and hence nothing of course from the vague but splendid talk of Isocrates and his school about the spreading of Hellenic culture beyond the limits of the race. With Aristotle Greeks alone are worthy to be free and dominant, and all foreigners are more or less adapted for slavery. The researches made for his 260 *πολιτεῖαι*

[1] Cf. the interesting account of Oncken, *Staatslehre des A.* i. pp. 85, sq.

must have brought him within sight of the rising power of Rome, and yet we can have little doubt that the Romans were, or would have been, included by him under the head of slavish barbarians. The Carthaginians occupy him very fully with their constitution, and yet he will not allow that even here there was another dominant race adapted for empire.

With this assumption of slavery as natural and necessary to most of the world, comes a contempt for labour, a glorification of leisure, and a dislike for money making, which was the main defect of all Greek political thinkers. And yet there were in Aristotle's day not only logical thinkers who asserted the unnatural and immoral character of slavery in its essence, but democratic theorists, like Hippodamus and the sophist Lycophron, who had approached the modern conception of a state as a mere power of protecting its citizens by law from mutual oppression and injury, while it left them to follow their individual pursuits, without persecuting them with a lifelong education, or an inquisitive intermeddling in their private affairs. But here Plato's influence was too strong. His pupil differs indeed in many details. He will not approach the splendid conception that all the earthly life even of the highest rulers in the ideal state is but a preparation for a purer and higher existence beyond; he regards the state here as the end in itself. But still he is forced to admit that the life of abstract contemplation, apart from all practical affairs, is the best and nearest to the gods. He objects to Plato's extreme supervision of marriage, as set forth in the *Republic;* yet his own notions differ little from those in the *Laws*, and he admits by far the most offensive point in Plato—the sanction of producing abortion—in his own state. And thus in many other cases. He really opposes Plato on a very few details, and those rather matters of degree than of principle.

On the other hand, the influence of the Athenian democracy on this aristocratic theorist is far clearer than on Plato, owing, I suppose, to a more unbiassed historical study. He fully appreciates, in all actual constitutions, the paramount value of a strong middle class; and he upholds with great force the superiority of a fixed code of established law over the chang-

ing decrees and decisions of courts and assemblies. The strongest, and doubtless the most immortal part of his book, is his review not only of the varying forms of existing polities, but of the causes of their conservation and decay—an account corroborated throughout with historical examples unfortunately too minute to be now verified. But there can be no doubt that here he has built upon so sound a philosophic basis, and upon the evidence of so large and varied a political experience, that his lessons on the rise and fall of governments will never grow old, and will be perpetually receiving fresh corroboration, so long as human nature remains the same.

§ 584. The *Politics* of Aristotle seem to have excited no attention in antiquity. The silence of our authorities gives new countenance to the story of the philosopher's works being hidden in a cellar in Skepsis, and only found and published by Apellikon of Teos in the days of Sylla. Of course this story can be disproved as regards the purely philosophical books, but it is not improbable that this unfinished, and therefore unpublished, fragment of a colossal work may have been hidden by an appropriate fate from the generation who had lost the power of profiting by it. It is distinctly cited by Cicero,[1] but all the other ancients who occupy themselves with Plato's *Republic* are silent concerning Aristotle's criticism, and his alternative state. Thus this work did not pass through the Nestorian Christians to the Arabs.

Bibliographical. Our earliest authority for the text is the barbarous but exceedingly literal translation of William de Moerbeke (a Dominican monk of Brabant), made about 1270 A.D. from an older MS. than any we possess. On this Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus wrote commentaries, but with the political darkness of their age. We have no Greek MSS. older than the fourteenth century, and most of them are only of the fifteenth. They are all corrupt, nor can any one of them be regarded as of pre-eminent value. Perhaps the Milan codex (in the Ambrosian Library) is the best. It was done into French with far more critical insight by Nicolas d'Oresme, about 1373 (printed in Paris 1489). After another Latin version by

[1] *De Fin.* v. 4, 11, and elsewhere.

Lionardo Aretino (1398), it appeared in print in the great Aldine *Aristotle* of 1495–8. In the following century, the days of republics and tyrannies, and revolutions, and factions in Italy, a large number of editions and translations—Oncken says twenty-five—appeared. We see in Machiavelli's *Principe* a close study, and often an imitation of the last two books; and no doubt the Italians of that age were the nearest approach the world has yet seen in politics as well as in art to the old Greeks. In the present century the principal older edition is Schneider's; the more recent and best was Bekker's (in the great Berlin edition), till the appearance of Susemihl's elaborate text and apparatus, which has sorted and discussed fully all the MSS. and other helps. Susemihl has since published a text with German translation and very valuable notes (Leipzig, 1879), quite the most serviceable edition at present, though the translation is very inferior to that of three books by Bernays, and the constant transpositions of short passages (though carefully noted) are disturbing for references. In England we have Eaton's and Congreve's editions, both very inferior to those just named; and there are partial commentaries by Heitland, Broughton, and Postgate. We have now part of the edition long promised by Mr. W. L. Newman of Oxford, of which two volumes have appeared (Oxford, 1887), containing valuable essays, but only the text of the first two books. Unfortunately, Grote's posthumous *Aristotle* does not touch the *Politics*. Susemihl's notes (in his German edition) refer the reader to a great mass of special studies in the German periodicals, of which I may recommend those of Vahlen and Bernays. The best general discussion of the *Politics* is Oncken's *Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1870), a very eloquent and attractive book, and well worth translating, though here and there too enthusiastic, and sometimes hasty; Thurot's and Havet's *Études* are also suggestive. But the modern literature on the subject is almost endless, and may be appreciated from Susemihl's German preface,[1] or from his account in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1874, 1877, and 1887. We have now Mr. Jowett's and Mr. Welldon's translations, but the essays promised by each of them have not been published

[1] pp. xv.ii. xxii.

§ 585. We come, lastly, to the *Nicomachean Ethic*, which was earlier in composition than the *Politics*, but is here treated in reverse order, because it is more strictly a philosophical treatise, with which we are not here concerned. I will pass by all critical questions, and all ethical discussion, and will merely call attention to the literary aspects of some portions of the work, which are, indeed, excrescences to the argument, and beyond its proper scope. I refer to the sketching of particular characters in the fourth book (which are illustrations of his doctrine of ethical excellence being a mean), and to his discussion of friendship in the eighth and ninth books. The most peculiar of his characters is that of the μεγαλόψυχος, which, with all its grandeur and dignity, is not an agreeable picture of Aristotle's ideal in practical life. The Germans are full of theories as to who is intended to be thus drawn. Zeller says he may have been thinking of Alexander. Oncken believes the philosopher was describing himself! As the portrait is exceedingly unlike what we know either of Alexander or of Aristotle, we may pass by these conjectures with a mere notice. We do not know enough of Pericles personally to assert that he was intended, nor perhaps did Aristotle think of him ; but he seems less unlikely than the other two.

The latter dissertation is not without the usual defects of style in our Aristotelian writings—repetitions, parentheses, and omissions of points in the argument, but nevertheless it may lay some claim to style, and has been greatly eulogised by most of the philosophic critics. To us the most interesting question about these books is to determine whether Greek *friendship* was, indeed, no more than is here described, or whether the fault is Aristotle's, who, through his love of definition and explanation, has overlooked the real nature of the thing. He distinguishes three kinds : that from the love of goodness, that for the sake of mutual pleasure, and that for the sake of profit. On all these he makes many acute and many true remarks. But when he tells us that the good man loves himself and his own worth, and *therefore* the same qualities in another ; when he denies the possibility of true friendship, except in the case of such mature and self-conscious

persons who are equal or nearly equal in position, he seems to me to have altogether missed the mark, and to have been misled by a spirit of narrow formalism. This is not the place for ethical discussion, but I suppose there are no observers of human nature who will not admit that friendship, though suggested and stimulated by mutual goodness, and frequent intercourse, does not essentially depend upon either. For within the same house and the same society there are often people of excellence, who respect one another, and yet who are not friends. Again, there are very inferior natures, nay actually bad natures, which are capable of forming loyal attachments that stand firm and unsullied even in the midst of crime, of injustice and of contempt for the rights of society. The fact is that what we call friendship in the strictest sense, apart from any conscious mutual advantage, depends upon a subtle and inexplicable sympathy, which draws people together in spite of all manner of obstacles, and often forms bonds among the unequal, while it refuses to join those whom every other promoting cause would almost force into the relation. While Aristotle is perfectly silent on this intangible cause, which is far the most important, he gives us all manner of useful hints on those lesser and spurious forms of friendship, among which I am almost tempted to rank mutual esteem for the sake of goodness. But there runs all through his remarks an unpleasant prominence of selfish considerations, the reflex of the nation and the age in which he lived.

The discussion of editions and commentaries on the *Ethics* must be sought in the histories of philosophy.

§ 586. Before leaving Aristotle, it may be well to consider generally the oft-repeated charges of dryness and of disorder in that philosopher's writing. As to the apparent disorder, it may arise from confusion of thought, as well as from imperfect transmission of our texts; in the former case it is a grave defect. But we should remind ourselves carefully, in justice to Aristotle, that no discoverer is likely to put his first draught into anything like logical shape, and that if we desire to watch the profoundly interesting phenomenon of the thinking out of new truths, or of a new system, we must be content to take it

with those digressions, those repetitions, those perpetual excursions beyond the strict matter in hand, which characterise the speculations of every fruitful thinker.[1] Moreover, with such a thinker as Aristotle, we may even rejoice that he did not condescend to waste his few years of mature work in polishing his style, instead of quarrying out great mines of untouched knowledge. These considerations are an ample apology for all those negligences which arise from carelessness of form, or the over-crowding of thoughts in the teeming mind of the great thinker. The case is somewhat different when we approach those barren subtleties, those minute subdivisions and distinctions, which waste our time and exhaust our patience, while they do not advance our knowledge. We must confess that here Aristotle was the child of his race and age, and did not escape that defect of over-subtlety, which is the leading fault in the Hellenic mind. Not only their philosophers, but their poets and orators give way to this weakness; no sooner do they come in sight of any logical distinction, than they forthwith abandon themselves to the luxury of divisions and subdivisions, of definitions and qualifications. Which of us has not been wearied with them throughout the divine dialogues of Plato? Which of us has not been in turn offended and amused with them in Aristotle? 'Ce sont des articles de dictionnaire que le philosophe s'amuse à rédiger chemin faisant.' One almost imagines that the Greeks of his day still found the newly discovered mechanism of reasoning so delightful, that they could not help exhibiting it, as a child keeps working a new mechanical toy. We see the same turn in Thucydides; we see it in Euripides, who affects his audience as much by conflicts of argument as by pictures of passion or of woe. But in the great classical writers this dominant passion for logical subtlety alternates with those higher literary qualities, which command the sympathy of all civilised men, and thus we condone the *Parmenides* and the *Sophistes* for

[1] I cannot recal any great discoverer who has put his thinking into a scrupulously neat and perfect form except Champollion, whose inductive reasoning in the *Précis du système hiéroglyphique* has this extraordinary merit.

the pathos of the *Phædon*, for the imagination and humour of the *Symposium*, though here too there are not wanting tedious analyses. In Aristotle, as we have him, there is not this relief; we have nothing but depth of thought, and suggestiveness of expression, to atone for the arid scholasticism of his discourse.

§ 587. Thus the classical literature of Greece may be said to close with Aristotle. He himself, as a literary man, stands between the living and the dead; and if in early life he attended to style, in mature age we find him neglecting it for the sake of the matter of knowledge. With him and his generation—the brilliant generation which produced the greatest eloquence in Demosthenes and Hypereides, the most perfect social comedy in Menander and Philemon—the power of original production seems suddenly to collapse, and the age of criticism to commence. Grammar, rhetoric, eclectic philosophy are the branches of literature which flourish, and which, together with second-rate poetry and oratory, fill up the silver or Alexandrine epoch in Greek literature. We have as yet to say something of the historians contemporary with Aristotle, who, though they were inferior to the great masters whom they imitated, transmitted the taste for historical enquiry to those later men, who have left us what is best and most enduring in the decadence of the nation. Poetry, as we have seen in the former volume, had its flashes of revival in Apollonius and Theocritus, but we may thank the kind Fate which has saved us the study of more productions like the *Hymns* of Callimachus and the *Alexandra* of Lycophron.

In the Renaissance among the Romans, and afterwards in mediæval Italy, the contrast of classical and post-classical was not strongly felt. Men imitated and admired Philetas and Callimachus along with Alcæus and Sappho, and loved Polybius and Plutarch as much as Herodotus and Xenophon. No doubt we have gone into an opposite extreme, and neglect too completely the real worth of the later literature, such as it remains to us in Theocritus and Plutarch. But still, in this hurried and weary age, when it is impossible to study the whole of Greek literature in its vast extent, the proper principle of

selection is certainly to confine ourselves to the age and to the men who, in the judgment of all sound critics, have been pre-eminent as well in form as in matter. Plutarch is a pure and elevating writer, full of precious information, and breathing a lofty moral tone. But we lose little by reading Plutarch in English or in French, for as a stylist he is no Herodotus or Thucydides; he is read for his matter, and his matter only. This too is strictly the case with Aristotle as we know him, and he therefore, as a stylist, is beyond the limit of classical Greek literature. As a critic, however, especially as a critic of classical literature, he has occupied us, I trust, in no undue detail.[1]

[1] The recent literature on Aristotle has been reviewed (up to 1886) by Susemihl in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1887, pp. 1. sq.

CHAPTER VII.

THE LOST HISTORIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, B.C.

§ 588. We must not conclude this account of classical Greek prose without saying something of those numerous historians, especially of the school of Isocrates, who were much praised and quoted, and formed the principal materials from which Plutarch, Diodorus, and other writers of the Roman period drew their facts. The enquiry into what were the sources of Plutarch's biographies, or of the later histories, forms a favourite exercising ground for the Germans, and tracts *de fontibus* Plutarchi, or Diodori, or of the rest, inundate the learned periodicals. Unfortunately, though we have many criticisms upon these authors, especially by Polybius, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who reviews the most important of them, I do not know that we have a single specimen of their style sufficient to afford us an independent judgment. They are cited for facts; they are criticised by one another, at times savagely; they are praised and blamed, but never quoted verbatim at any length. Hence the splendid collection of Carl Müller[1] in the early volumes gives us hundreds of their fragments, and yet conveys no definite idea of their style. Nevertheless, we may be quite certain that none of these writers were in anyone's judgment (except their own) equal to the three great masters, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, who have fortunately survived. All sound ancient critics note this inferiority, not only in judgment and critical knowledge of political and military affairs, but, what would have pained the authors far more, in style. For they were trained rhetoricians, who cultivated manner with conscious care, and sought to outdo the great models placed before them.

[1] *Fragg. Hist. Grac.* 5 vols., Didot, 1853-70.

One imitated Herodotus, another Thucydides, another Xenophon, but, like almost all copies, they were wanting in the vividness, the grace, and the power of the originals. There was apparently a self-conscious and controversial tone about them; they were exercised not only in the jealousies of rival schools, but in the party politics of the day; they wrote history as rhetoricians, and as partisans, if not of men, at least of political theories. Hence later days neglected them, and amid the wreck of the dark ages no one exerted himself to save them. One alone, from a later age, survives. Polybius was doubtless the soberest and most valuable of these Epigoni. His work is of the highest value to the historian, as a long series of approving critics has amply shown;[1] but as a stylist he never has been, and never will be, read. He is a valuable moment in the historical development of the Greeks; he forms no part of their classical literature.

From this preamble it will appear that these writers may here be disposed of very briefly, but a list of their names and works should not be wanting even in this handbook. It is, however, not easy to separate those of a later period from those who flourished before the death of Alexander; for we have a continuous stream of names reaching down to the Roman times, as the student of Müller's *Fragmenta* will see at a glance. I am only here concerned with the earliest of them, and of these some reach higher than the opening of the fourth century B.C.

§ 589. I have already mentioned Ion and Stesimbrotus[2] as authors of historical memoirs from which Plutarch borrowed. Another early historian, who treated of no events subsequent to 420 B.C., was ANTIOCHUS OF SYRACUSE, son of Xenophanes. He wrote on the early history of Italy, in which he, first among Greek writers, mentioned Rome. He also composed the history of Sicily from the earliest times to the first year of Darius

[1] For the English reader the best sources to estimate the value of Polybius are Thirlwall's *Hist. of Greece* (last volume) and Freeman's very remarkable *Hist of Federal Government*, vol. i. Unfortunately, neither Grote nor E. Curtius have carried down their Histories to the period of which Polybius treats. His work has recently been translated by Mr. E. S. Shuckburgh (2 vols., Macmillan, 1889). His life and character are fully treated in my *Greek Life and Thought*.

[2] Above, Part i. p. 42.

Nothus, Ol. 89, 1. Being the oldest authority on Sicily and Italy, it is certain that he was much used by Aristotle, Dionysius and Diodorus, as well as by the many succeeding writers on the same subject. But what is to us most interesting is that the account of Sicily at the opening of Thucydides' sixth book is probably borrowed from him, perhaps even verbally, to judge from some peculiar forms not elsewhere found in Thucydides. Thus the whole of this early chronology would depend upon a single writer from an uncritical age. It is not improbable that, as all the early dates are reckoned from the founding of Syracuse, and that this is determined by Archias, the founder, being the eleventh in direct line from Heracles, our Sicilian chronology, which is implicitly received because it is sanctioned by Thucydides, is a mere theoretical scheme. Antiochus, in an extant fragment,[1] speaks of the Achæans who were founding Croton being helped by Archias when on his way to found Syracuse—a much more likely account than that which makes Syracuse an older settlement. In fact, the natural course of things points to the settlement of Corcyra first, then the south[2] coast of Italy, then Sicily. But I cannot here enter upon this obscure question.

§ 590. The history of Sicily was again taken up by a remarkable man, who lived somewhat later than Antiochus, and was himself a prominent actor in the events of the day, PHILISTUS of Syracuse, son of Archimenidas. Our main information concerning him comes from Plutarch's life of Dion, and from Diodorus, when relating the fortunes of Dionysius and his son as tyrants of Syracuse. For in Suidas' article the historian is evidently confounded with a rhetor Philiscus of Miletus, who was the pupil of Isocrates and master of Timæus, as well as with Philinus of Agrigentum, who wrote on the first Punic war. Philistus was born about Ol. 86–7, and therefore witnessed the great siege of Syracuse by the Athenians. He supported Dionysius with his private means and encouraged him with his advice, and was doubtless one of the staunchest adherents and best friends of the tyrant. Nevertheless they quarrelled, and

[1] Frag. 11, from Strabo.

[2] As the east coast up to Brundusium is very barren and poor in soil.

Philistus was exiled (386–5 B.C.) to the Adriatic, where he composed most of his histories. After many bitter complaints of his exile, and owing to much flattering persuasion, he was recalled by the younger Dionysius, when he set himself in opposition, apparently with success, to Dion and Plato, who were attempting the philosophical conversion of the tyrant. When Dion invaded Sicily, Philistus was appointed by Dionysius to command his fleet, but being defeated by the Syracusans near Leontini after a brave defence, he either killed himself or was put to death by his enemies, when an old man, in Ol. 106, 1 (356 B.C.).

He wrote the history of Sicily from the earliest date down to the capture of Agrigentum (407 B.C.), in seven books; then, in connection with it, the immediately succeeding reign of Dionysius the elder, in four books, down to his death (Ol. 103, 2). He also wrote two books on the reign of the younger Dionysius, down to Ol. 104, 2, and this work was completed by Athanas of Syracuse.[1] Two points are frequently insisted upon by his critics: first, his strong adulation of the tyrants, which made him very unpopular; secondly, his imitation of Thucydides. Cicero[2] calls him 'Siculus ille capitalis, vafer, acutus, brevis, pæne pusillus Thucydides.' Quintilian thinks him weaker but clearer. Dionysius, in a fuller criticism, gives him praise and blame combined, and exhibits him, on the whole, as a very second-rate copy of the great master. From Cicero's *Brutus* (cap. 17) we may infer that he despised rhetorical finish in his writing, and was hence degraded in the estimation of an over-cultivated age as being deficient in these minor qualities of a historian. But this would, no doubt, have made his works not less valuable to us. The later historian Timæus, called Ἐπιτίμαιος from his censorious temper, attacked Philistus, as well as other early historians of Sicily, in his great work, but was himself attacked in turn by Strabo and Polybius. It seems that subsequent historians, who used general histories as their main authority, turned to Philistus as a specialist when they

[1] The title Σικελικά is sometimes given to the whole series, though the author so named only the first part, the second being περὶ Διονυσίου.

[2] *Ep. ad Q. fratr.* ii. 13.

came to treat of Sicilian affairs. This is believed to be the case with Diodorus in particular. Hence comes most of our knowledge of Philistus' works.

§ 591. Far more regrettable is the loss of the histories of Ephorus and Theopompus, the two greatest pupils of Isocrates, whom he trained carefully in what he considered historical style, and whose tempers were so diverse that he said the former required a whip and the other a curb. Hence EPHORUS (of Kyme, son of Demophilus, born Ol. 98–100) with his calmer temperament turned to earlier history, and composed a celebrated work, reaching from the Return of the Heracleidæ,[1] which he seems first to have made his starting-point, to the siege of Perinthus by Philip (340 B.C.). It was afterwards brought down by Dyillus to the death of Philip. This history was in thirty books (the last completed by his son Demophilus), each with a separate introduction and forming a separate whole. It is praised by Polybius as the first and only attempt at an *universal history*. The other works, *on Inventions* and *on Geography*, seem rather to be excerpts from the digressions in this history.[2] The general contents of most of the books have been inferred from the fragments by Müller.[3]

He was considered an honest and painstaking writer, as indeed we may infer from his own statement,[4] but we do not know what sources he used, or how he used them, for we find through Diodorus and Strabo, who constantly follow him as an authority, that he differed frequently from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in relating the periods treated by them. In the case of the last, indeed, it is fortunate that he was so independent, for it is to him (through Diodorus) that we owe the possibility of correcting Xenophon's scandalously unfair account of Epaminondas and the Theban supremacy. His fourth and fifth books, called Εὐρώπη and Ἀσία καὶ Λιβύη, on

[1] This was fixed at 1104 B.C. by Eratosthenes.

[2] This is, however, more than doubtful, though suggested by Müller, in the case of an essay περὶ λέξεως, on expression, mentioned by Theon and by Cicero, in which he recommended dactylic and pæonic, in preference to spondaic and trochaic rythms, in prose composition.

[3] Müller, i. pp. lx–i. [4] Frag. 2.

the geography of the then known world, were largely used by Strabo and by the scholiasts. Ephorus' account of the causes of the Peloponnesian war is restated at length by Diodorus,[1] and is not calculated to increase our respect for him. On the other hand, his geographical researches afforded valuable material to Strabo, as appears all through the *Geography*. He quoted old poets and inscriptions, but not very critically. Polybius says he is quite ignorant of the operations of war, except those on sea, and that his details of land battles, when they are at all complicated, as at Mantinea, are absurd; but this vice is not peculiar to him. In his account of the Athenian hegemony, we can infer from Diodorus' second-hand history that he was partial to the Athenians, and differed from Thucydides' account of many transactions in giving a more favourable interpretation of Athenian conduct. Nevertheless, he seems to have been as sparing as Thucydides in mentioning the inner, or the constitutional, history of Athens. As to style he is alternately praised and blamed (the former by Polybius, the latter by Dionysius), and he no doubt had the faults and perfections of Isocratic teaching. He was elegant and flowing, but not spontaneous, and decidedly wanting in power.[2]

§ 592. It is remarkable that while Suidas calls Ephorus *ἱστοικός*, he calls his brother historian, THEOPOMPUS, a *ῥήτωρ*, and very justly. For not only did this man compose epideictical displays, as for example at the funeral of Mausollus, but all his

[1] xii. 38-41, frag 119.

[2] The value of Ephorus as a source of history, and the extent to which he was used by later writers, such as Plutarch, Diodorus, Trogus, and Nepos, form the subject of constant monographs in German philological journals—monographs which show more erudition and acuteness in their conjectures than solid results. I cite a few, in which the remainder will be found discussed: Volquardsen, *Untersuch. über die Quellen des Diodor*, xi-xvi (Kiel, 1868); Collmann, *de Diodori Sic. fontibus* (Marburg, 1869); Albracht, *de Them. Plut. fontibus* (Göttingen, 1873); Sauppe, *die Quellen Plut. für das Leben Perikles* (*Abhandl. Gött. Akad.* vol. xiii. 1867); Wolffgarten, *de Ephori hist., &c. a Trogo expressis* (Bonn, 1868); Holzapfel, *Untersuch. über Griech. Gesch.*, &c. (Leipzig, 1879). The Sicilian part of Ephorus' history is specially discussed by Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens*, ii. 340, sqq; cf. also A. Bauer's very depreciative *Themistokles* (Merseburg, 1881).

writing was intensely rhetorical, and breathed the vehement and angry spirit of the author. He was the son of Damasistratus, and brother of the rhetor Caucalus, born about the 100th Olympiad at Chios.[1] He was exiled when an infant with his father from Chios *for Laconism*, perhaps, as Müller suggests, by the Theban party when Epaminondas attempted the hegemony of the sea. He became the pupil of Isocrates, and returned to his home in his forty-fifth year, owing to the interference of Alexander in favour of exiles during the early part of his expedition. Being a man of private means he never composed court speeches, but wandered through all the Greek cities making epideictic displays of his rhetoric, of which the most successful seems to have been his *panegyric on Mausollus*, prince of Caria, at the famous literary contest instituted in his honour by his widow Artemisia (Ol. 107, 1).

After his return, his free tongue and quarrelsome manner appear to have made him fresh enemies, for after the death of Alexander he was again exiled, and sought a refuge in Egypt, where, however, Ptolemy I. was as unwilling as the Greek cities to receive him, so that he escaped from this country also, through the warning of his friends. This is the last fact recorded of his life. As to his work, we find cited by Suidas an *Epitome of Herodotus* in two books, then a continuation of Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian war (like Xenophon's *Hellenica*), and subsequent events in twelve books reaching done to the battle of Knidus. But his greatest work was a history of Philip, embracing in digressions all the contemporary history down to the king's death, in fifty-eight books. This very voluminous work was abridged into seventeen books, retaining nothing but the Macedonian history, by the orders, perhaps even by the hand, of Philip III., the opponent of the Romans. In this form at least the work was extant in the days of Photius. The reader will find an epitome of what

[1] This is the date preferred by Müller (i. lxv–vii). Others prefer the date given by Suidas, the 93rd Olympiad, and think he was trained by Isocrates in his first school at Chios. But this does not agree with the statement that he was only forty-five years old after Alexander came to the throne.

is known of the several books in Müller's *Fragg.*, i. pp. lxx–lxxii. His many panegyrical and deliberative speeches, as well as his letters, doubtless in the style of his master Isocrates, are rarely cited. Athenæus refers four times to his letters to Alexander for attacks on the Chians, and on Harpalus concerning his immoral life.[1] There are also mentioned a *Diatribe against Plato*, and a tract on *Piety*.

§ 593. We have many and explicit judgments on his merits as a historian and as a stylist, which are sufficiently supported by his fragments to give us a clearer idea of him than of any of his rivals. We have an abstract of his vain and self asserting personal preface to the *Philippica*.[2] He here boasted of his independence from writing for pay, of the number of his works, and their celebrity through the world, as well as of his travels, quite after the manner of one of the older sophists. He proceeded to assert the superiority of the literary men of his own day over their predecessors, owing to the advances and improvements made in the study of letters. This offensive self-praise was no doubt common in the school of Isocrates, and marks a turning point in the history of Greek literature. It is plain from the exceedingly voluminous character of Theopompus' compositions, from the extraordinary variety of the subjects quoted in our fragments, and from other indications, that he aimed at excelling Herodotus rather than Thucydides. But not only were his digressions excessive and tedious, but the stories of marvels and miracles, and of barbarian manners and customs, which sound appropriate in Herodotus, were out of place and even offensive in this more conscious and sceptical age, and were justly ridiculed by his critics. We may also be certain that he treated his subject in an intensely rhetorical spirit, seeking everywhere for effect rather than strict truth. He was, moreover, a strong political partisan, and allowed himself constantly to attack violently Greek democracies and their failings. Indeed, in every case he sought out hidden motives, and stated them with force, but often with libellous rancour. His taste for repeating private scandal, and for drawing pictures of luxury and of immorality among both

[1] Frags. 276–8. [2] Frag. 26.

Greeks and barbarians,[1] shows a very different order of mind from that of Herodotus. He is in fact a self-conscious, rhetorical, Isocratic ape of the great historian. Nor do his invectives against the increasing luxury of the age sound like the outcome of sincere indignation, but rather of a sour and fault-finding temper.

But withal, he must have been a man of considerable force, and far the greatest of Isocrates' pupils. The very persecutions he endured show that his furious invectives, and his angry advices on public affairs, had far more effect than the despised pamphlets of his master. He is quoted particularly often by Athenæus on various manners and customs, which he had minutely described, and these are unfortunately not the most edifying or instructive portions of his works. In spite of his strong self-assertion, and his unwearied diligence, no subsequent critic admitted him to the pinnacle he claimed above his great predecessors in historiography.[2]

§ 594. I do not think that any of the numerous succeeding historians,[3] or the group of antiquarian writers who

[1] Cf. in Müller frags. 33, 54, 65, 95, 129, 149, 178, 222, 243, 249, 260.

[2] The utilisation of Theopompus by later historians—Nepos, Plutarch, Diodorus, &c.—forms a parallel enquiry to those above cited as regards Ephorus. The episode περὶ δημαγωγῶν seems to have been often thus transcribed. In addition to the tracts above given, which touch on Theopompus as well as Ephorus, we have Bünger, *Theopompea* (Würzburg, 1874); Natorp, *quos auctores—secuti sint Diodorus, &c.* (Würzburg, 1876); Rühl, *die Quellen Plut. in Leben des Kimon* (Marburg, 1867); and Schmidt's *Perikleisches Zeitalter*. These critics set up and overthrow all manner of hypotheses on the indirect use of sources by late authors. But as they are chiefly based on the unproved assumption that later transcribers adhered with uniformity to the authority they had once selected, none of them is likely to add much to our knowledge of lost authors.

[3] Thus *Timæus* of Tauromenium, who was born in classical days (about 350 B.C.), did not begin his literary work till late in life, after his exile by Agathocles, and his settlement at Athens. The whole style of his Sicilian history, his perpetual censure of his forerunners, his want of that chastity and reticence which marked good Greek prose, unite in degrading him in our estimation to a writer of the silver age. Our chief knowledge of him is from Polybius, who 'hoists him on his own petard' by frequent censuring of his angry criticisms.

composed *Atthides* on the legendary and historical lore of Athens, can be included in classical Greek literature. In no case have we sufficient knowledge of them to judge of their style, and there is no reason to think that any one of them reached such excellence as to entitle him to any attention beyond that claimed by the matter of his book.

It is hard to say what the sands of Egypt still hide for us. As a new speech of Hypereides has been recently recovered, so even upon inscriptions we may find specimens of style which will find their place in the History of Greek Literature. M. Holleaux recovered for us in 1887 the whole text of Nero's speech, when he 'liberated the Greeks,' so that we can now judge of that Emperor's prose style.[1] The excavations at Epidaurus have revealed to us an epigram in Doric dialect upon the statue erected to Philip of Pergamum, son of Aristides, a historian hitherto unknown even by name, and still of uncertain date. What is more curious, there is added what seems to have been the Introduction to his work, in Ionic dialect, showing that this literary fashion lasted into Hellenistic days. For I take this to be the general description of this Philip's age. The reader will be glad to see this curious scrap of Greek prose.

Ἐγὼ παντοίων παθέων καὶ ξυνεχέος ἀλληλοφονίης ἀνά τε τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην καὶ τὰ Λιβύων ἔθνεα καὶ Νησιωτέων πόλιας καθ' ἡμέας γεγενημένων ὁσίῃ χειρὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν καινῶν πρήξεων ἱστορίην ἐξήνεγκα ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας· ὅκως καὶ δι' ἡμέων μανθάνοντας ὁκόσα δημοκοπίη καὶ κερδέων ἀμ[ετρίη] καὶ στάσιες ἐμφύλιοι καὶ πίστεων καταλύσεις γεννῶσι κακά, παρατηρήσει πάθεων ἀλλοτρίων ἀπενθήτους ποιέωνται τὰς τοῦ βίου διορθωσίας.[2]

Neither this nor any other of these fragments, however, has yet falsified the assertion, that the age of originating in literature was passing away. People who studied form had unapproachable models in the older masters. People who desired new knowledge sought it in a great and wide-spreading literature which was scientific in its aim, and sought merely to impart

[1] *Bull. de Corresp. hell.* xii. 510, sq. [2] *Ibid.* ii. 273.

knowledge in the plainest way. These critical and scientific tendencies found a suitable atmosphere for their growth beyond the limits of Greece, and in the new kingdom which first mediated between purely Hellenic and non-Hellenic culture. To enter upon the history of this period, and in this foreign soil, must be reserved for a different work.

APPENDIX.

THE remains of Aristotle have been enriched, since the last edition of this book, by the important discovery of a papyrus in a tomb at Akhmîn in Egypt, which contained most of the *Constitution of Athens* quoted by the ancients from the collection of such systems by Aristotle, which amounted, according to the lowest calculation, to 158. The *editio princeps* by Mr. Kenyon, of the British Museum (January 30, 1891), showed conclusively that almost all the citations from the work by late classical authors—especially by Plutarch—were to be found in the new MS. There was, therefore, not the smallest doubt that the newly-discovered text was the alleged *Constitution of Athens* which the ancients ascribed to Aristotle. English critics were very ready in depreciating Mr. Kenyon's work, till they found, upon the publication of the autotype facsimile (March 1891), that they were unable to read more than a stray word in the MS. which he had deciphered. They then joined with the Germans in lauding his work. As might be expected, it contained some doubtful readings and renderings; but most of these were set right by his own revision and by subsequent scholars, so that now, so far as the MS. goes, we have a very clear account of what the ancients accepted as Aristotle's work. Internal evidence seems to show that it was written between 329 and 322 B.C. With over-subtlety it has even been limited to 328–5 B.C. At all events, the work comes from the closing years of Aristotle's life, and gives an account of what we know occupied him very seriously —the historical development of the Constitution of Athens.

Unfortunately, this most satisfactory result is marred by two difficulties. In the first place, the style differs considerably from that of the known works of Aristotle; in the second, both the historical facts and the judgments upon them are sometimes at variance with what other good authorities have hitherto told us.

As regards the first point, a crowd of critics have analysed the text and shown, especially in the particles, a considerable divergence from Aristotelic use. The reply to this is that we have now for the first time obtained one of the exoteric or popular works of Aristotle, which were alleged to be very different from his purely philosophic writing. Cicero is quoted for evidence of the golden richness of his Dialogues, and there have been critics bold enough to ascribe these qualities to the tract before us. A calmer estimate will decide that, though this account of the Constitution of Athens is straightforward and simple, it can lay no claim to eloquence. It is tame and poor in diction, though it exhibits rhetorical care in the avoidance of hiatus, and even (according to Blass) in the balanced rhythm of its clauses. If Aristotle's lost Dialogues were no better in style than this treatise, we may safely say that Cicero was boasting about Greek books which his readers could not understand, and which he himself desired them to believe that he did. These obvious defects, and the total want of *suggestiveness* in the writing, which is so marked a feature of other works of Aristotle, has tempted many critics to set it down as the work of an inferior pupil, revised or not revised by the master. More trenchant spirits (Rühl, Richards, Cauer) have rejected it as wholly unworthy of the great man.

Similarly, when we come to the facts—more particularly as regards chronology—many discrepancies with the well-established sequence of events startle us. The chronology of the life of Peisistratus, still more of Themistocles, is not to be reconciled with the well-ascertained sequence of events in Herodotus and Thucydides, though the author shows his intimacy with both, and here and there deliberately corrects Thucydides. But what shall we say of the critical judgment shown in the following extract? (c. 26) : 'In these days it happened that the better classes had no leader, Kimon, son of Miltiades, being their best man, who was too young, and had taken to politics too late ; and, besides, most of them were lost in the wars. For, the army in those days being recruited from the roll of citizens and led by generals unskilled in war, but promoted on account of their ancestral glories, it regularly happened that 2,000 or 3,000 of those that served in each campaign were lost, so that the better class both of the wealthy and of the demos was consumed.'

The outcome of the library of discussion on these points is therefore briefly this : If we depended upon internal evidence alone, few scholars would dare to ascribe the new text to Aristotle. The external evidence contained in numerous citations from ancient

authors, especially from Plutarch, is so strong as to outweigh these internal or *à priori* improbabilities. Nor is there any good reason to doubt that Aristotle did publish such work on the Constitution of Athens among his 158 πολιτείαι.

The plan of the work is very simple. It is divided into two parts : (1) A sketch of the constitutional history of Athens from mythical times down to 403 B.C., when the democracy may be regarded as complete. This has been called a Primer of Constitutional History. Unfortunately, the first chapters were not written upon our papyrus—perhaps because the earlier MS. was here illegible—but a blank space is left before the first column, as if the copyist had intended to supply it afterwards. Our text opens with the Revolution of Kylon, and runs without break to the term the author had prescribed to himself. He then turns (2) to a detailed analysis of the existing Constitution—a sort of citizen's handbook. This was the part most frequently quoted by grammarians for the meaning of technical terms. The authority of this portion of the text is first rate ; but the conclusion is mutilated, and a portion practically lost.

The literature on this treatise is enormous. To omit praise of the very acute and brilliant essays on some fragments on a papyrus of Berlin, which were identified as belonging to this work, and discussed by Blass, Bergk, Landwehr, and Diels, would be an injustice, though all these investigations are now superseded.

The editions (in addition to the *princeps* and facsimile already specified) are by Kenyon (third edition 1892), Kaibel and Wilamowitz-Mœllendorff (Berlin 1892), Herwerden and Van Leeuwen (Leiden 1892), Blass (Teubner 1891), and, lastly, the very exhaustive and complete work of J. E. Sandys (Macmillan 1893), which is likely to remain for many years the standard book on the subject. All the stray essays, suggestions, emendations, &c., are chronicled in his most diligent commentary. There are English translations by Kenyon, Poste ; French, by T. Reinach, Haussoullier ; German, by Kaibel, Poland, Erdmann. The Italian, Russian, and Polish versions do not concern us here. The last large work on the whole subject is Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, published since Mr. Sandys' edition in 1894.

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